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ABSTRACT 
 
FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
 
“THE USE OF HISTORY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA”  
 
JAMES C. PEARCE 
 
This thesis is an examination of the past’s current situation in Russia and analysis of how the 
Russian state uses history to create a broad coalition of consensus and forge a new national 
identity. History is central to issues of governance and national identity, and is therefore used 
for the purpose of state building and reviving Russia’s national consciousness in the twenty first 
century. In assessing how history mediates the complex relationship between state and 
population, this thesis analyses the selection process of constructing a preferred historical 
narrative in Russia to create loyal patriotic citizens and aid modernisation. This research 
critically analyses history in different spheres of Russian life, such as culture, politics, education 
and anniversaries. The research involves an in depth analysis of these spaces where the past is 
used for modernisation. An analysis of speeches, official documents and the media is conducted. 
This thesis also uses original semi-structured interviews conducted in the Russian Federation 
with history teachers. This includes the first with trainee teachers as well as an assessment of 
newer school textbooks, exams, homework tasks, historical monuments, public celebrations and 
events. Many paradoxes exist with history in contemporary Russia. While the majority of the 
population favour a patriotic past, the narrative is often passively rejected. The ‘preferred’ 
narrative is packed with inconsistencies, yet the aim is to prevent falsifications. While the past 
is used it to promote national unity, many episodes expose deep divisions in society. It must be 
equally rigid, attractive and malleable to the needs of a growing civil society to stand the test of 
time. History is not only a state matter, but it is a top socio-political issue to tackle in order to 
modernise the country as a whole.  
 
Keywords:  
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Introduction 
 
At his State of the Federation address 2012, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, proclaimed:  
 
In order to revive national consciousness we need to link historical eras and get 
back to understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even 
in 1991, but rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over one 
thousand years and we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our 
national development.1  
 
 
For the Russian nation to modernise in its own unique fashion, reacquainting with its past is 
essential. Since 1991, Russian history has been as uncertain as its future at the best of times. To 
build a modern state and national identity surrounding it, a narrative depicting successes and 
glory is sought after. A narrative that is in line with traditions and supported by figures, events 
and myths that underpin success act as a model of how to construct a new Russia out of the old. 
Complimentary to this, the past can also serve as an example of what to avoid. The ‘newness’ 
of Boris Yeltsin’s national idea and symbols of Russia were shallow and meaningless, but more 
importantly, did not create a sense of historical development in line with traditions that could 
explain the current situation.2 Yeltsin’s new Russia was polarising because it rejected the 
experience of the USSR as the country dove into chaos. This ‘decade without patriotism’ was 
symbolic of the deep pessimism and lack of hope. Russia had not defined its past, therefore, it 
could not map out a successful future. In other words, the past must be compatible with the 
current situation to define what Russia is and ‘should’ be.  
 
This thesis is an examination of the past and its contemporary relevance to state policy and 
construction of a national identity. This will henceforth be referred to as the ‘Putin Agenda’, 
which Russia’s president sets out to achieve national unity and stability. It will be referred to as 
the Putin Agenda because, as the prior paragraph sets out, the state under his leadership now has 
                                                          
1 President V.V. Putin State of the Federation Address, 2012  
2 Edwin Bacon, Contemporary Russia, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p.179  
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a clear idea of what Russia is and should be. This idea is rooted in the past but borrows from it 
where appropriate. This agenda stresses the need for continuity of the Russian state, tradition, 
culture and the necessity of Russia’s great power status. This requires a greater role and presence 
in geopolitics, enhanced security and a new national idea. All of the aforementioned must be 
based on success stories in the Putin Agenda. In addition, symbols are a commitment to this 
unity, assume many forms (textbooks, youth groups or monuments) and are the ultimate 
reinforcer of a contemporary Russian identity. The past can supply answers to the present when 
confusion and disillusionment occurs, often acting as a justification for state policy (see Chapter 
2). The Putin Agenda is determined to reconcile with the problematic and unusable past. 
However, much controversy surrounds its motives and policies concerning an already 
problematic period that divides the population and ruling elites alike. There are concerns that 
ignoring the traumatic episodes of the past will be detrimental to Russia’s development and 
bring great instability to the present. The period under investigation in this thesis (1881-1945) 
was chosen because it represents two separate Russias (the Imperial and Soviet past) that are 
filled with grandiose events and continue to effect the country today. Not only this, but it 
receives great attention from academics, the media and civil society alike. The period is a less 
straightforward one to grapple with, directly plays on the identity of the new Russians and is 
usable for explaining the country’s situation. This makes Russian history and its historic identity 
something of a mosaic on an awkwardly shaped canvas. It also makes the concept of history in 
Russia harder to comprehend as well. On the one hand, there is a new government funded 
textbook series, busts of Stalin in Moscow, historical monuments on the newly incorporated 
Crimean peninsula and films on the Great Patriotic War, which are fictional yet presented as 
fact.3 On the other, there is a memorial to the victims of the great terror in central Moscow, a 
monument of reconciliation for the Civil War and continuous reconstructions of churches. At 
face value, history appears to be some sort of game with inconsistent rules. Beneath the surface, 
it is an important quest to win the battle of ideas about the past to answer the most important 
questions of the day.  
 
                                                          
3 ‘Stalin’s Bust Unveiled in Moscow as Part of ‘Rulers’ Alley’’, Business Insider, available at 
<https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-stalins-bust-unveiled-in-moscow-as-part-of-rulers-alley-2017-9> , accessed 
15/12/2018; examples of these films are White Tiger and Panfilov’s 28 Men, which are discussed in Chapters 
Three and Six.  
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This research will address four issues. Firstly, to ascertain what the ‘glory days’ of Russian 
history were and discuss why these have been selected and others were left out, even ignored. 
Secondly, to assess how far and to what extent history impacts the identity of Russians today. 
Third, to investigate the nature of history in secondary education and public celebrations. 
Finally, this research will analyse history within the context of the Putin administration’s agenda 
considering issues such as order, continuity and patriotism.  
 
Education and public celebrations are two spaces where governments can largely control the 
narrative. They are places where the government can have its say and makes both ideal mediums 
through which to channel the preferred images of the past. The desired narrative is more evident 
in textbooks funded by the government, speeches made at celebrations and the images selected 
to represent it are symbolic of the legacy and mirage of continuity. However, the narrative is 
inseparable from Russian traditions. The link between history, culture and power is stronger in 
Russia than its neighbours, and stresses its own uniqueness. Therefore, it is also necessary to 
unpack the ‘Russian idea’ and components making up Russia’s historic identity. Alongside this, 
history has, since the beginning of the Russian Federation, been a high profile political topic. 
Political parties fight over the past’s legacy and seek to define the final say on certain episodes, 
the Soviet period especially. It also defines many of their policies and political positions. 
Moreover, Russia’s relationship with the outside world and former Soviet space has often been 
defined by the past and justified by auspicious episodes. The notable example identified is the 
Great Patriotic War (1941-45).  
 
While a broad scope, the boundaries of this research are defined as follows. First is to focus on 
the period 1881-1945. Russia has a thousand year history from which examples could be 
analysed, and are used by the Russian state. The period 1881-1945 contains important events 
and movements. These include conservatism and reaction, 1905 revolution, the First World 
War, fall of the monarchy, revolutions, the Stalin era and Great Patriotic War. These continue 
to impact the state’s legacy and Russian identity today, with the latter remaining the main force 
of historical unity and patriotism in the modern day. One Levada poll also found public interest 
in the period as a whole to be modestly high, compared to others (World War II 38%, the ‘Silver 
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Age’ 18%, 1917 revolution 13% and Stalin era 12%).4 This allows for a more comprehensive 
look at Imperial and Soviet Russia and the main issues surrounding both in contemporary 
Russia. Another boundary is restricting the field research to Moscow, Moskovskaya Oblast, St. 
Petersburg and Vladimirskaya Oblast. These regions are, generally speaking, more developed 
and have higher populations. Schools tend to be better funded with more modern equipment. 
This includes textbooks and better-trained teachers who are more representative of the 
demographics. Not only this, but education reforms in Russia are often slow to materialise or 
take effect. Therefore, the two capitals and their surrounding regions tend to be the ‘testing 
grounds’ and more able to enact the reforms (see Chapters Three, Four and Five). This is also 
why this research analysed a selection of the 2015 ‘state sponsored’ textbook series, as discussed 
in Chapters Four and Five, used by the interviewed teachers and schools visited. There are 
almost 100 school history textbooks in Russia today, yet in the regions included in this study, 
most use the same textbooks. Furthermore, most public celebrations and commemorations are 
centered in the largest cities, especially the two capitals. This not only provides easier access 
for the population, but also makes them more symbolic and tied to the country’s traditions.   
 
 
History in Russia today 
The Russian state is often at the centre of the national history. In many ways, the narrative aims 
to provide an explanation of state development and the political implications for society. Putin 
and his government seek to present itself as the natural historical heirs to Kievan Rus’, pre-
revolutionary Russia and the USSR. This requires auspicious episodes to reflect the goals of the 
modern state. When justifying the modern day situation, the new history must also explain the 
Russian experience of democracy because of the USSR’s collapse and global integration; both 
of which came because of events in the period 1881-1945.5 History is not just a study of past 
events, but a product and idea for modernisation and consolidating the nation. With this in mind, 
three main problems with history in Russia today are particularly bothersome for the state in its 
attempts to establish consensus around a usable past. These three problems are as follows: 
Russia does not have a non-imperialist history; the position of Russian society, President Putin 
                                                          
4 Russian History, Levada Tsentr, 03/04/2017, http://www.levada.ru/en/2017/04/03/russian-history  accessed 
03/04/2017 
5 Olga Malinova, ‘Sotsialnoi proektsii proshlogo’, PostNauka, uploaded to YouTube 31/10/2014, 
www.youtube.com.watch?v=KpCikWiKuBA&t=35s  accessed 16/12/2017 
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and the outside world are all at loggerheads concerning Russian history; the ‘official’ narrative 
remains a puzzle.  
 
The period under focus is a striking reflection of these three problems and show a high level of 
crossover between them. The Russians are still going through a post-imperial readjustment. This 
is something that took Britain and France decades and recent events show that this still not 
wholly complete. Both had to adapt to a rather less significant place in the world, and grappling 
with the basic question of whether they are a mono or multicultural state.6 While Russia has its 
own historical peculiarities, it is not principally different in this regard. There is also a clear 
distinction between the state and people often overlooked in the West. After centuries of 
incorporating other nations and peoples, the label of chauvinist imperialists is applied in the 
West to the Russian. Meanwhile, most of the Russian population are the descendants of serfs 
and peasants; they do not view themselves as brutal colonisers or oppressors.7 Russia must tell 
its story in a new language, and one that is free of any ideology or exclusive. While the new 
narrative embraces the Tsarist period, it also relies on achievements from the Soviet era – a clear 
distinction between Putin and Yeltsin. In this respect, the product and idea of history is 
becoming a collection of carefully selected events, periods and figures depicting the idea of a 
strong nation united behind a patriotic message on a march to greatness. While all nations do 
this, history is a fundamental part of the modernisation and governing process in contemporary 
Russia. The population is living through a highly politicised period where fragments of the past 
are used to explain the construction of skyscrapers over welfare reform. The past also stresses 
the messianic mission that has been commonplace in Russia’s state traditions. The message is 
adapted and shifts to reflect the mood of the government, and close attention is paid to the 
controversial segments of the past and how these influence the message. At best, these are 
downplayed and at worst ignored so they do not become an unwanted distraction. In creating a 
success story (and one of unity), certain things do not fit. Examples from this period would be 
the revolutions, Aleksandr Kerensky’s leadership and the Stalinist terror. These represent weak 
states, leaders and chaos while the latter is a humanitarian stain on the state’s record. As history 
is in part a quest for legitimacy and identity, not only can issues undermining the overarching 
message not be tolerated (to a certain extent), this requires incredible flexibility and a great deal 
                                                          
6 Email conversation with Mark Galeotti.  
7 Michele Berdy, ‘What Makes The Russians So Russian’, in The Moscow Times, Russia For Beginners, 
(Moscow: United Press, 2009), p.157 
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of effort to package them for consumption. ‘Russia’ has been an imperial nation, part of the 
Soviet experiment, and is now an independent, notionally-democratic state with an infant living 
memory. Selecting one thing over another to represent contemporary Russia and the Russian 
state says much about the identity it wants, and will have far-reaching consequences for the 
future. This is also where memory becomes important and proves to be quite an obstacle for the 
state in establishing a consensual narrative that brings society together. Russian society is not 
yet ready to reach a unanimous verdict on the USSR, yet it was equally disappointed with the 
reality of post-Soviet Russia and democracy.8 Externally, the Eastern and Western version of 
European history do not concur with the of Russian/Soviet (homogenous) one. This has caused 
tremendous geopolitical frictions, which in turn has sparked Russian lawmakers to invoke the 
past to justify their stance.  
 
The ‘feel-good’ factor, which is central to the use of history for this goal, is not helped by nuance 
either. It should be acknowledged that Russian history is, in many ways, a very traumatic one. 
This period is no exception. A traumatic history can be delegitimising for the state’s legacy if it 
is not handled properly, as it can undermine continuity and the positive notions surrounding it. 
Abusive regimes that were often uncaring, murderous, incompetent or all three mark many 
segments of Russian history. Yet, there are examples where these and the actions of its leaders 
are justified in the name of progress, modernisation, self-defense or to achieve some other 
greater good. One survey found that more than half of Russians (62%) agree that boards, busts 
and other attributes telling the successes of Joseph Stalin are needed in public places, including 
77% of young people.9 Another showed that more than 40% had in one way or another, justified 
the purges.10 The historical record means that the ‘glories’ are questionable and is an 
uncomfortable reality. For instance, how far was industrialisation on the back of Gulag slave 
labour? How many innocent veterans of the Great Patriotic War were sent to the Gulag during 
‘high Stalinism’ when they returned home? Every country has cruel and unhappy sides to its 
history, but Russia’s is largely painted in dark and bloody tones. Uncomfortable questions 
surrounding the glories are naturally quite unwelcome in seeking to establish a narrative. Most 
importantly, though, the handling of this demonstrates a core trait of the narrative, which asserts 
                                                          
8 Justyna Prus, ‘Russia’s Use of History as a Political Weapon’, PISM, No.12, 114, May 2015, p.1  
9 ‘Ustanovku pamyatykh znakov v cest’ Stalina podderzhalo pochti 80% molodyozhi’, RBK, 
https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/597057059a79472210e669c9  accessed 08/01/2017.   
10 ‘Bolee 40% rossiyan otpravdali Stalinskie repressii’, RBK, 
https://www.rbc.ru/society/05/07/2017/595cbe919a794737273b109e  accessed 08/01/2017.   
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that the hardship endured in this shared experience, was not in vain. Thus, key to modernisation 
is a reconciliation with the problematic past. As will be discussed below, this is a taboo in 
modern Russia and ‘criticism’ of the official narrative is deemed socially unacceptable and can 
even result in criminal charges. From the reverse angle, Russians might question the West’s 
sincerity throughout history, as well, which reflects the defensive tone. Did the Entente provide 
the Russian Empire with enough assistance on the Eastern Front? Had the Soviet state fallen 
during the Second World War, would this have genuinely troubled Great Britain or the USA? 
Why is so little made of foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War? These legitimate 
questions influence the historical narrative and besieged mentality.  
To develop this further, history has become unavoidable in the limited political debates, but this 
mix has seen questionable results. Objectivity in history is extremely difficult (if not impossible) 
whereas politics is purely subjective. If historical fact is replaced with a politically convenient 
pseudo-history, it risks morphing into propaganda. While many, such as Miguel Vazquez Linan, 
have stated that history has been utilised as a propaganda tool, this is not in fact the case. 
Vasquez Linan writes that in the media and state funded textbook, the ‘well defined priorities’ 
of ‘sovereign democracy’ (samostoyaltel’nost’) have become the only pedagogical objective 
and pushes the narrative that ‘Putin will solve all the problems as he picked Russia up off its 
knees before’.11 However, this thesis will argue that the past is not used as propaganda in modern 
Russia; rather it is a bargaining chip. Firstly, the state does not have a monopoly on the historical 
narrative for it to be readily mobilised as propaganda. Propaganda is more readily available than 
the current usable past, as well. The lack of consensus over the usable past means pushing an 
unpopular narrative could expose and widen the fractures in society. Secondly, the Russian state 
is continuously seeking a new basis for legitimacy, particularly because one party and president 
has ruled for most of the twenty first century. It is not uncommon in any democracy for parties 
and leaders to seek new forms of legitimacy. Russia’s democracy is young and the politicians 
have been in power for a long time. The past has proven a reliable legitimisation instrument in 
Russia before, meaning it will likely be used again. However, there is an underlying fear among 
Russian lawmakers of chaos and instability due to Russia’s historical experience. While Putin’s 
first presidency was based on order and stability, his third term was defined by a standoff with 
the West (see Chapter One). Meanwhile, his second term was characterised by economic 
                                                          
11 Miguel Vasquez Linan, ‘History as a Propaganda Tool in Putin’s Russia’, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 43 2010, p.173  
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redistribution, yet Western sanctions 2014 caused a retraction of Russia’s economy and people’s 
personal incomes (see Chapter Three). Applying references to a glorious past, or even the most 
recent past, appeals to the population’s patriotic sentiments and offers a ‘Russian solution’ to its 
own problems.   
There is an ongoing attempt to finally put the past to bed by seeking an all-inclusive way of 
being ‘Russian’ in the twenty first century. The aim of this is to create patriotic citizens proud 
of the motherland and its achievements in order to clear the way for modernisation, led by a 
strong state. Yet, here also lies what is arguably the biggest obstacle for any Russian government 
and president. This takes a substantial amount of effort to create and enforce. As this research 
will show, there is no guarantee or enough evidence to suggest that the population is buying into 
it. While Putin’s popularity has remained astronomically high into his fourth term and patriotic 
feelings are stronger than ever, the research carried out for this project has shown the population 
is equally prone to rejecting the narrative, as they are to buy into it. At the same time, many 
more remain ambivalent and uninterested altogether. A better-known example would be A.V. 
Filippov’s teacher handbook funded by the Ministry of Education and Science in 2007, which 
attracted enormous criticism for its portrayal of the Stalin era. Most teachers, meanwhile, have 
never even heard of it (see Chapter Five). Then again, as this thesis will demonstrate, it reflects 
that the narrative is more symbolic rather than a deep search for the truth and soul of the country. 
History is a source of mobilisation, but only if it is creative enough to convince people.12 Even 
among the elite and Russian lawmakers, there is no consensus on different periods, in particular 
the USSR. Putin’s speeches demonstrate this, as these are worded appropriately to suit different 
audiences. In fact, Putin’s personal opinion generates huge interest making headlines in Russia 
and the West alike. One example would be his comment at a meeting of United Russia (UR) 
party activists, where he said that Lenin placed a time bomb under the USSR (see Chapter One).  
 
The Putin Agenda  
All children currently in the Russian school system were born after Putin became president and 
remember only him and Dmitry Medvedev. They are very much a product of the new Russian 
state, and are recipients of the Putin Agenda’s message used to create a broad coalition, and is 
why education is of particular interest to this study. Before exploring the Putin Agenda more 
                                                          
12 This came up in two separate conversations the author had with Mark Galeotti and Boris Kolonitskiy.  
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thoroughly, it is worth stressing at this point that public interest in politics is not high. Just 32% 
claimed to be interested in the 2018 presidential election.13 Moreover, voter turnout for the 2016 
Duma elections was just 47.88% nationally, and was even lower in some regions (figures for 
the two capitals were 20% Moscow and 16% St. Petersburg).14 Certain issues are still taboo to 
bring up, but history has become a favourite fallback; people are always willing to discuss the 
past and it is an area where political points can be scored.15. Public politics is limited, meaning 
historical politics (istoricheskaya politika) immediately gains a greater significance. Certainly, 
the pride Russians have in their country largely focuses around history (46%).16 Critics have 
often labelled history as a useful distraction from the economic and political situation.17 A minor 
recession in comparison to the 1990s, more recent economic woes arose in the aftermath of 
Maidan. Russia was expelled from the G8 and placed under economic sanctions for annexing 
the Crimean Peninsula.18 The effects on the population will be noted in subsequent chapters, but 
while calling it a distraction is not in itself unreasonable, the past did prove to be a reliable 
instrument for the government to energise support against ‘hostile others’ and enemies seeking 
to weaken and undermine Russia. In this sense, an objective history is less important than 
securing the country and its interests, which is the top priority for the Russian government. The 
Culture Minister, Vladimir Medinskiy, wrote, ‘The facts themselves don’t mean too much. I 
will be more brutal: in the historical mythology, they do not mean anything… Everything begins 
not with facts, but interpretations. If you like your motherland, your people, history, what you 
will be writing will always be positive’.19 
Working within this context, Putin came to power in 1999 at a time when Russia was in a 
desperate situation. As Justyna Prus writes, bringing history into the realm of state policy was 
part of Putin’s way of ‘bringing Russia up from its knees’ and reversing Russia’s geopolitical 
weakness, caused to a degree by the West.20 Contributing to this was also a ‘flight from 
                                                          
13 The Russian Presidential Election, Levada Tsentr, 15/11/2017, https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/11/15/the-
russian-presidential-election-2/  accessed 14/12/2017  
14 Shaun Walker, ‘Russia stays loyal to the Kremlin in election with record low turnout’, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/19/russia-stays-loyal-kremlin-election-record-low-turnout  
accessed 14/12/2017  
15 Conversation with Boris Kolonitskii.  
16 Gordost’ za stranu i narod, Levada Tsentr, 21/12/2017, https://www.levada.ru/2017/12/21/17311/?fromtg=1  
accessed 21/12/2017  
17 Alexei Navalniy interview, BBC Hardtalk, January 18 2017  
18 In the Russian Federation, Crimea’s annexation is referred to as a reunification.  
19 V. Medinskiy, Voina. Mify SSSR. 1939-45, (Moscow, 2013), p.658  
20 Justyna Prus, Russia’s Use of History as a Political Weapon, p.1  
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sovereignty’ and retreat from traditions. Among the goals of the new Russian president were 
restoring his country’s international prestige, a greater self-assertion and consolidating society. 
Methods of doing this were rather limited; ideology is prohibited by the new constitution, which 
also established the separation of church and state. In addition, even though Russia was now a 
democracy on paper, the population was impatient, longing for great change and a source of 
optimism for the future. More importantly, the Russian people had never known or lived in a 
democracy. While this was true for most former communist countries, Russia found itself in a 
unique position. It was no longer a superpower with retracted borders and citizens living beyond 
those of the modern state. All the while, it was beset by crime and appalling socio-economic 
problems.21 History became an underlying force in rebuilding Russia, providing it with a new 
identity and sense of belonging and purpose in the modern world.   
The Putin Agenda, therefore, is comprised of consensus, patriotism, unity, stability and 
continuity. These are the auspicious ways to secure the country on the ‘right’ path and history 
acts as its scaffolding, but is also presented as the soil from which it grows. The goal of the Putin 
Agenda is to restore Russia to normality and uses Russia’s rich history a ‘proof’, which will be 
explored throughout. However, the subjective nature of history also means that the state can 
bend the narrative at any time, particularly as education continues to become more centralised. 
Although the destination does not change, the route might; examples from the past must justify 
this. As will be explored in subsequent chapters, the Putin Agenda is very much in the spirit of 
the ‘Russian Idea’ discussion born in the nineteenth century, which is self-legitimising by 
creating an aura of homogeneity.  
To create a historical framework that shows continuity, there must be particular characteristics 
and models of identification, which persist in the historical record. Those deemed positive are 
instruments in creating an identification with the state, state traditions, and stress the uniqueness 
of Russian culture. This is why culture, education and anniversaries are key to understanding 
the use and purpose of history in twenty first-century Russia. It can, for instance, explain the 
interest in the Cossack revival, linking priests to patriotic school projects and the emphasis on 
military victories in history lessons. These can bring the past back to life and make it seem 
relevant in the modern climate, and as chapters in this thesis will show, is easier during times of 
                                                          
21 Jake March, ‘Russian Nationalism Under Putin: a majority faith?’ in Katlijn Malfiet and Ria Laenen (eds.), 
Elusive Russia: Current Developments in Russian State Identity and Institutional Reform Under President Putin, 
(Leuvan: Leuvan University Press, 2007), p.33  
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crisis or poor relations with the West. This also explains why the revolution and civil war are 
left out, since these represent disruptions and can undermine the narrative. As will be discussed 
in Chapter Six, this is partly why the centenary received minimal commemoration or mention 
from lawmakers.   
 
 
The Use of History in Putin’s Russia  
Whilst ‘The Use of History in Putin’s Russia’ is a relatively broad canvas, previous works 
magnified only certain areas like education or the nature of the state under his presidencies (Igor 
Torbakhov).22 The most recent works have capitalised on timeliness, often coinciding with 
anniversaries of some kind. These focused on the retelling of Stalin (Thomas Sherlock), the 
Great Patriotic War (Elizabeth A. Wood) or the centenary of the revolutions (James Ryan).23 
Whilst scholarly enquiry is growing on the use of history, this thesis brings the different spheres 
together in order to explain how history affects state policy and the construction of a modern 
Russian identity. The claim of originality of this thesis is twofold, relying on two main features: 
qualitative interviews with history teachers, and a comparison of the major history textbooks 
published for use in Russia’s schools in recent years. Putin has attempted to draw on key 
moments of Russian history from both the Soviet and Imperial past, seeking to emphasise the 
greatness of the state and its people. This thesis will demonstrate how government policies 
surrounding patriotic education, state symbols and national holidays are a reflection of Russia 
as a historic entity. It will also explore this anniversaries and commemoration, which is a 
relatively new sphere of scientific enquiry.  
As well as the newest textbooks published in 2015, this research is also the first to interview 
trainee teachers in the Russian Federation. These interviews considered how the teaching force 
view the content, newer textbooks and exams. It also enquired about their own opinions 
concerning the period. By interviewing those about to enter the teaching force who were not 
                                                          
22 Igor Torbakhov, History, Memory and National Identity: understanding the politics of history and memory 
wars in post-Soviet lands, Demokratizatsiya, summer 2011.  
23James Ryan, ‘The Politics of National History: Russia’s Ruling Elite and the Centenary of 1917’, Revolutionary 
Russia June 2018; Thomas D. Sherlock, ‘Russian Politics and the Soviet Past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism 
under Vladimir Putin’, Communist and Post Communist Studies, 2016; Elizabeth A. Wood, ‘Performing 
Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of WWII in Russia’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 38, 2 
(2011).   
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born in the USSR, this research will provide insights into the generational shifts and indicate 
how likely the message of the Putin Agenda is to succeed beyond his presidencies. Quantitative 
methods would have missed the nuances and subtleties that were picked up. This group of people 
have not been previously interviewed and neither has any group of history teachers from 
Vladimirskaya Oblast. As such, the interviews provide insights into teaching in this region and 
its perception of Russian history. What makes this even more interesting is that region includes 
cities on Russia’s historic ‘Golden Ring’.24 Reminders of the past and the ideal image it should 
assume are an everyday part of life for this group. Vladimir is also a former capital and has a 
particular spiritual significance in modern Russia; the Grand Prince whom it is named after 
brought Christianity to Russia.  
This thesis also shows why the collective experience of the Russian people is often prioritised 
over critical reconstructions of the past by professional historians. This will not only show how 
the past is the negotiating space between state and population, but what these negotiations look 
like. It could be argued that history, as well as cherry picked sub plots, is an uncritical 
reconstruction of collective memory to suit the government’s agenda. This boils down to 
building a modern state based on the population’s legitimacy, and projecting a preferred image 
of the past aids this. Receiving the support of the population is key to securing this. However, 
this support is sometimes passive and out of indifference rather than genuine approval.  
The timeliness of this research is also significant. Firstly, commemorations of the revolutions’ 
centenary have been analsysed throughout 2017 in the Russian Federation first hand. This has 
allowed for a more comprehensive analysis of the period under focus and the revolution’s legacy 
in Russia today; the general lack of attention it received from the government is demonstrative 
of how it handles difficult topics. Secondly, the 2015 textbooks, published by the state’s 
preferred publication houses Drofa and Prosveshchenie, are also analysed. Prosveshchenie 
controls around 40% of Russia’s education market and is poised to grow to 85%. The 
government has also cut the number of approved school textbooks from 3,000 to 863 in the last 
fast years.25 The oligarch, Arkady Rotenburg, owned this publication and holding company until 
the summer 2017. Along with anniversaries, school textbooks continue to resurface and attract 
                                                          
24 ‘The Golden Ring’ is a ring of ancient cities and towns Northeast of Moscow. These played a significant role 
in the formation of the Orthodox Church and are where several important events of Russian history took place.   
25 ‘The Real Russia Today, Meduza, February 14, 2019, available at <https://meduza.io/en/brief/2019/02/15/the-
real-russia-today> accessed 11/03/2019. 
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attention. Choosing to analyse a certain period within these scopes enables a deeper 
investigation into the use of history in contemporary Russia and where the most contentious 
topics exist. Finally, many of the newer historical exhibitions and monuments that have been 
created since the start of Putin’s third term will receive analysis in subsequent chapters and is a 
particularly new sphere of enquiry.  
 
Approach and Methodology  
Twenty-one semi-structured open-end question interviews were conducted for this study, 
specifically for the chapters on education. This is because the transmitters of the message are 
often teachers and schools, where Russian citizens first encounter the narrative in a controlled 
and purely educational environment. The interviews are not typical of oral history in the sense 
that participants were recalling past events or experiences. As stated, this research is about the 
past in the modern day; however, the purpose of conducting the interviews remains the same. 
The interviews were designed to draw out underlying feelings and internalised attitudes about 
the past, and the reasons behind this.26 The practices began with wide, non-contentious 
questions, and followed the participants’ lead.27 The tone of the interviews, therefore, was very 
important and is something a survey such as those conducted by Joseph Zajda (2015) missed. 
However, the relatively small number of interviewees from European Russia means the 
conclusions have some limitations.  
 
Memory and sociological aspects must be also considered. As will be discussed, history, 
particularly in education, is about socialisation and upbringing in contemporary Russia. This is 
reflected through the laws on Patriotic Education, emphasis on Russian culture and ‘traditional’ 
pedagogy. A person’s individual history (experience) shapes their actions and views 
unconsciously.28 Pierre Bordieu referred to this as ‘habitus’. This is often used as a conceptual 
and methodological tool with sociological, cultural and education studies where capital is 
concerned. Memory and history are resources used in practices through different mediums in 
Russia, and are capitalised on in order to play on the group mentality. The long-term aim is to 
generate loyal and patriotic citizens, through constructing a social perception of the facts, which 
                                                          
26 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: oral history, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.175 
27 Ibid., pp. 229-231  
28 Pierre Bordieu, Sociology in Question, (London: Sage, 1993), p.86  
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suit the needs of the majority as well as the government.  
 
The interviews for this research are divided into two groups; qualified (eleven) and trainee 
teachers (ten). Most of the interviews were conducted face to face whereas three were via Skype. 
Teachers are the main agents of the message, and the interviews aimed to get a sense of the 
training, their feelings towards the education reforms and textbooks are and the challenges 
history faces. Moreover, to see how teachers are adapting to the new history and contributing to 
the shaping of new Russian citizens. However, a key purpose to comparing both groups is to 
see the success of the new history in winning over different parts of the population. There were 
some generational differences apparent, which are telling for the future of history in Russia. 
Questions ranged from teaching experience, their own history education, quality of the 
textbooks and their content, the new examinations, the broader picture of history in Russia today 
and for their own opinions about certain historical figures and events. This was to see how much 
of their opinions filtered through into classrooms and how far they line up with the ‘official’ 
narrative and Putin Agenda. The participant information for groups one and two are displayed 
below. The full names of each participant and their institutions are omitted as participants were 
offered the chance remain anonymous in the briefing.  
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The initial aim was to have ten in each group. There are, however, eleven participants in the 
first group because one of the school directors insisted on both of her school’s history teachers 
being interviewed. Important to highlight here is that two teachers in Moscow started teaching 
(in some capacity) as a teenagers. The reason one gave was ‘you understand there was nothing 
[jobwise] I was heading toward. There was an opportunity to go into teaching and I like 
children. To be honest, I had nothing better to do and there was a need for teachers.’29 In the 
second group, some were already teaching at schools in Vladimirskaya Oblast while 
completing their final year of study. Two others already had teaching jobs lined up for after 
their graduation, and two others went into the profession within a year.   
The candidate also approached the Ministers for Culture and Education and Science as well as 
President Putin via his spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, to discuss the themes of this thesis. The 
Russian President was unable to find time in his tight schedule. The Ministry for Education 
and Science replied in Spring 2017 that it would respond to the enquiries made within thirty 
days, however, this was never received (Appendix A). The Minister for Culture, Vladimir 
Medinsky, did not respond to both requests.  
As well as the interviews, to critically assess the nature, use and purpose of history in Russia 
today a wide range of various sources were relied on, as several topics are explored. School 
history lessons and patriotic projects were observed to get a feel for the new patriotic history 
and assess its implementation. Statistical data from polling companies (notably Levada, 
VTsIOM and FOM) and international organisations are also used. This thesis also made good 
                                                          
29 Interview with Irina, school history teacher, Moscow 14/03/2017.  
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use of government documents, speeches from lawmakers, educational texts used by students 
and teachers alike, newspaper and magazine articles (from Russia and the West), films, 
museums and exhibitions, public events and historical monuments in the Russian Federation.   
 
Common Themes and Literature  
 
This research explores several different topics relating to the use of history in Putin’s Russia. 
Though interconnected, the themes of each chapter are still quite distinct, and for this reason, 
the key literature will be reviewed within each chapter. However, some common themes emerge 
when considering history as a whole in modern Russia. These should be broken down and recent 
research taken into consideration in order to fully explore the topics of this thesis.  
First is the notion that history is, primarily, a resource. Whilst this will mostly be explored in 
the next chapter, following chapters demonstrate the ways in which this resource is extracted 
and capitlised on. Ilya Kalinin has most notably written on this topic. He argues that it is not 
only a blueprint for how to achieve goals, but like any natural resource, the ‘nostalgic’ past is 
key to the modernisation process.30 This is why the ‘battle for history’ is important to the state, 
as securing the past will enable stability and order. A major attempt at distraction from a slight 
economic downturn has been nationalism surrounding events in Crimea. This deployed history 
in support, though as will be stated in Chapters Three and Six, it alone could not fill this void. 
Unlike natural resources, the past cannot be monopolised or have one author (see Chapter One). 
As Michael Waller states, in modern Russia monopolies have to be resisted.31 This is primarily 
for reasons of credibility and so that the state can distance itself from an authoritarian label. This 
also shows a slight paradox. Although the Marxism-Leninist discourse has gone, some elements 
of Soviet patriotism remain (Chapter Four). The main idea here is to use examples of what has 
worked in the past in order to modernise, and is why erecting a statue of Kalashnikov was so 
symbolic. It connects Russia’s greatest victory to progress and has familial resonance. 
Alongside this, establishing a modern identity based upon nineteenth century concepts of Russia 
                                                          
30 Ilya Kalinin, Nostalgic Modernization: the Soviet Past as ‘Historical Horizon, Slavonica, 2011.  
31 Michael Waller, Russian Politics Today, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.108 
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coupled with Soviet elements seems contradictory. This is until both are framed within the 
context of the Putin Agenda and presented as a fitting cultural scheme to build on.32  
Following on from this, the Russian and post-Soviet aspects of history, memory and myth must 
be understood. Although Russia is signed up to international programmess surrounding the 
nature of the communist past, its issues with communism are unique and do not affect other 
nations’ in the same way.33 The Russian experience is often dismissed in Eastern and Western 
Europe, alike. This has far-reaching consequences that are still affecting the nation today and 
influence the construction of the historical narrative. Weber wrote that legitimacy is the capacity 
of a system to engender and maintain belief that the existing political institutions are most 
appropriate for their particular society.34 Thomas D. Sherlock extends this further to note that 
non-democracies often rely on myths more since they have greater challenges in maintaining 
public support.35 Whilst a reconstruction of the past must be approved by society and cannot be 
one sided, myths can provide structure and content to the ambiguous or abstract. Historical 
narratives in Russia must have a strong symbolic significance, which means that objectivity can 
suffer.36 This is because when myths are over relied on, facts have the ability to discredit the 
desired version and diminish its meaning. Yet, it is the ambiguity of myths, which also determine 
the values negotiated by the state and society (see Chapter 2). Typical for nations in transition 
to democracy (which Russia still is), the political space is open for debate, yet it is essential for 
the Russian state to maintain the upper hand. Unlike liberal democracies, the society tends to be 
less stable and tolerant of competing ideas, which could prove ‘harmful’. This is why the control 
over the ‘resource’ is sought after by the state, according to Olga Malinova.37 Furthermore, and 
according to Sherlock, this is why anti-regime sentiment becomes privatised and fear of the 
alternative is exploited. A recent example of this was at his annual press conference 2017, when 
Putin responded to a question from TV personality and socialite, Kseniya Sobchak, (who ran 
for president in 2018) about ‘real competition’ in elections. Raising the candidacy of Alexei 
Navalny, Putin’s responded to Sobchak in line with the agenda outlined, saying that “These 
                                                          
32 Olga Malinova, ‘Politka pamyat’ v post sovetskoi Rossii’, PostNauka, Youtube, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4mysej5Mx8&t=3S5s  accessed 16/12/2017  
33 One example would be Resolution 1481, January 25th 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, which states that the communist parties of all former Soviet Bloc states should reassess their history and 
seek to distance themselves from it. This will receive more analysis in Chapter Three.  
34 Weber quoted in Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.49  
35 Thomas D. Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia, p.10 
36 Ibid. p.5 
37 Olga Malinova, ‘Politka Pamyat v post sovetskoi Rossii’.  
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people you refer to are, excuse me, Russian Saakashvilis… and you want these Saakashvilis to 
destabilise the situation in the country?”38 Using the Colour Revolutions as an example from 
the ‘recent past’, of how to govern Russia and avoid ‘Westernising’ has proven affective (see 
Chapter Three), and so this argument is preserved.  
When relating to the past, particularly the USSR, myths and memory do create problems. As 
will be explored in several chapters, a positive repackaging or idealisation of the darker episodes 
in Russian history (Stalin’s rule will receive a great deal of attention in this regard) limits 
society’s ability to define a political identity in civic and democratic institutions. This also 
represents a fundamental difference in both the narrative and values system in contemporary 
Russia and the West. The focus is less on human rights and democratic freedoms. Instead, 
military might and cultural legacies are a preferred focus. The patriotic education and 
celebrations have focused less on Russia’s path to becoming a democracy, and more on 
depictions of strength in recent years.39 The state and people remain traumatised by the 
experience of democracy in the 1990s, and the nostalgia for unity displayed in the heroic 
segments of the past is Russia’s coping mechanism for the modernisation process.  
Another notable factor comes from the Russian sociologist, Boris Dubin. He contends that a 
lack of change in Russia makes the past appear closer, and therefore, the need to protect the old 
belief in a grand mission, great power status and heroic ordeals is an insurance policy at state 
and societal level.40 The longevity of tradition gives the country a sense of hope that its future 
has been previously mapped out and the sacrifices were not in vain. A symbolic reunification 
with the past is therefore a major factor in securing the future. This thesis will further explore 
these ‘traditions’, what they mean in modern Russia and how legitimising it is. This will appear 
in each chapter of this thesis. In addition, it is necessary to consider the consequences of the past 
entering the public space and the current environment. Nataliya Zubarevich’s theory of ‘Four 
Russias’ displays the many divisions within Russian society and how these can be manipulated 
to legitimise the Russian state.41 It further sets out how events since the annexation of Crimea 
                                                          
38 ‘Kseniya Sobchak Can’t Figure Out If She’s A Journalist, Candidate or Social Justice Warrior’, Vesti News, 
YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2O1d4USMMb0  accessed 29/12/2017  
39James C. Pearce and Anastassiya Yuchshenko, ‘Defending Russia, Securitising the Future: How the Past 
Shaped Russia’s Political Discourse Regarding Crimea’, Europolity, June 2018, p. 
40 Boris Dubin, ‘The “Special Path” and the Social Order in Today’s Russia’, Sociological Research, vol.50 no.3 
May-June 2011, pp.56-76 
41 N. Zubarevich, ‘Four Russias: rethinking the post-Soviet map’, in Regionalism(s): A Variety of Perspectives 
from Europe and the Americas. Innsbruck : Institut fur Foderalismus, 2014, p. 71-88.  
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in 2014 and following sanctions has impacted the government narrative surrounding ‘Russia’ 
and how each group responds. This thesis will analyse how the past directly affects each group 
in their daily lives and how far it can be used to obtain support for the ‘Putin Agenda’.  
Concerning education and patriotic citizenship in contemporary Russia, Joseph Zajda has 
written extensively on this subject. Zajda analysed textbooks, teachers and reforms to the 
education system, surveying 200 history teachers in four Russian cities. While his findings 
provided useful insights, the overall conclusions were rather simplistic. Providing a basic 
demographic outline of the teaching force, it fails to consider why a unilateral narrative was 
welcomed by some or what the true reasons for finding the textbooks unsatisfactory are. 
Textbooks are informed by the concept of modernisation, which as previously mentioned, can 
limit the moral boundaries of state behaviour.42 Although this can spur civil society to engage 
in a more open discussion about the past, less attention and assistance from the government and 
media is devoted to the complex narratives, simply because these do not promote a patriotic 
spirit. Both groups interviewed for this research showed a willingness and desire to broaden the 
historical discussion, have a more open discussion about the negative past, but also what the 
obstacles to this are. Michael W. Apple has also written on this, and argues that the school 
curriculum becomes a way of controlling the population by promoting its social and economic 
values.43 Eleftherios Klerides supports this, stating that textbook readers are treated as members 
of a nation and passive observers. The textbooks must be positioned in a sensitive way, with the 
language ruling out the ‘unacceptable’.44 This is also the case with statues, memorials and 
commemoration events. These are a reflection of how the state wants to portray the nation, and 
the success of this narrative will affect its legitimacy. Then again, as Lisovskaya and Karpov 
highlight, not every idea is represented by a symbol. Value-laden ideas related to historical, 
political and cultural issues can replace concrete symbols.45 Therefore, a state sponsored 
textbook and monument has the same meaning as an anniversary or concept. Furthermore, the 
omission or facts from a textbook and decision not to erect monuments also reveal a lot about 
how a nation wants to be perceived. Uncomfortable topics can highlight a vulnerability of the 
                                                          
42 Thomas Sherlock, Making Sense of Self-Representations: how the United States and Russia view their 
contentious pasts, Global Affairs, No.2, 2012, available at  http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Making-Sense-of-
Self-Representations-15574  accessed 29/11/2017  
43 Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, 3rd edn., (London: Routledge, 2004), p.59 
44 Eleftherios Klerides, Educational Transfer as a Strategy for Remaking Subjectivities: transnational and national 
articulations of “New History” in Europe, European Education, vol.46,1, Spring 2014, p.16  
45 Elena Lisovskaya and Vyacheslav Karpov, New Ideologies in Post Communist Russian Textbooks, 
Comparative Education Review, vol.43, 4, pp.525-526  
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state or society, and the self-suppression of a broader discussion often suggests the wounds have 
not fully healed. For this thesis, the revolutions and Civil War are stand out examples that will 
be critically assessed.  
What these themes show overall is that history as a negotiating space between civil society and 
the Russian government reflects the grey transitional zone the country currently sits. Most of 
the criticism centers around the government trying to push its view and agenda and trying to 
drown out voices from civil society. This reflects the desire to ‘win’ the battle for history but 
also the problem of openness, which started during Perestroika. History is a deep socio-political 
problem for these reasons, and should be treated as such.  
 
Structure  
While a relatively broad investigation, this study does not cover every aspect of the past in 
contemporary Russia. However, to understand the use of history in Russia today, its application 
and socio-political ramifications, several spheres should be assessed. As Anna Sanina writes, 
patriotic education is a good example of how a political idea can lead to the formation of social 
structures, and how, over time, these can restore the original political goal.46 However, this alone 
would not be sufficient. In order to understand the roots of the patriotism, the national identity 
should be understood as should the political battles surrounding the past. It is these which feed 
into other areas, such as education and anniversaries, and the materialisations of the past reveal 
a lot about the complexities of history in Russia today.  
 
The first chapter lays out the problems of history in contemporary Russia, and the issues with 
conceptualising the past. No government can simply set out to establish a new history and hope 
to create consensus around it. Although history is a resource and has been used differently by 
each Russian state, its subjective nature cannot be monopolised. A negotiation process must 
occur and is on going. Creating consensus around the past requires a lot of creativity. Moreover, 
the state is contending to be its sole author and is in an ideal position to be, yet cannot afford to 
be seen as ignoring facts in creating a consensual past. The figures and events of the period are 
also tough to grapple with and presenting them requires immense effort and flexibility.  
 
                                                          
46 Anna Sanina, Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia, p.30  
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The second chapter unpacks Russian national identity and the concept of ‘Russia’. While the 
founding myths remain important in the development of Russian national culture and state 
traditions, here, it is argued that the Russian identity is a multi-history, since it relies on episodes 
from the past from a range of different ‘sub-plots’ to support the myth of the state, an organic 
culture and their greatness. Moist mother earth, Stalin and White Army generals can be equally 
used as examples of what it means to be Russian, and to foreigners is often confusing. This 
chapter will consider which episodes from the past continue to play on the Russian identity, 
nostalgia and how these are used to justify the modern political and social discourse. The 
recycling and repackaging of imperial and Soviet identity need to be considered. These assume 
a new meaning, play a different role in the twenty first century, and stress the need for continuity.  
 
The third chapter looks at the politics of the past in Putin’s Russia. Politics are unavoidable as 
history in post-Soviet Russia is a high profile and contentious topic. In addition, it is a socio-
political problem, and this past has an affect beyond the borders of the modern Russian state. 
Like the previous chapter, this will show how the position of Russian society and the outside 
world is fully at loggerheads with the Russian government when it comes to the past and explore 
the development of the Russian state and its relationship with history. Moreover, those political 
questions surrounding it are still unresolved, meaning reconciliation is ongoing as is the state 
building process. Righting past mistakes to help maintain stability is central to the Putin Agenda. 
In this sense, Putinism becomes a narrative (or continuum) with a formula of how to safeguard 
the country’s interests in light of the past.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the education system and the significance of history within it. 
Education and history as a subject are key in demonstrating the use and projection of the past in 
modern Russia, and how it is becoming more centralised. In essence, both history as a subject 
and education as a whole are being used as channels for the state to accomplish its goals by 
getting through to the population at the early stages. After all, the population legitimise any 
government and its message by accepting it. The updated school textbooks and renewed focus 
on teachers to transmit the socially acceptable history are just the tip of the iceberg. However, 
the modern school system, not unlike the Soviet one, appears to use a patriotic emphasis as a 
mask for modernisation. Patriotic education is used as the means to assist the national revival 
without actually modernising the schools system, despite the many problems Russian education 
has.  
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The fifth chapter looks at the teaching process of history in Russia today. This chapter relies on 
the conducted interviews, which shed light on how and why the government’s version can be 
rejected. The re-establishment of traditional (imperial and Soviet) pedagogy and citizenship 
education show the importance of continuity, and that to establish a modern country it must be 
done through past techniques and means which have been proven successful. This chapter 
analyses how the textbook narratives line up with the Putin Agenda, what the challenges of 
teaching the history are and whether or not at the grassroots level the aims are being achieved 
instead of students being taught to simply pass the new (and unpopular) exam.    
The sixth and final chapter scrutinises anniversaries and memorabilia, as this is where the 
narrative manifests in public for the majority of the population to access and participate in the 
patriotic past. Concrete (sometimes literally) examples of statehood, greatness and triumphalism 
are rife. These are by far the most mythologised representations of the past in an attempt to 
recreate the glories for modern consumption. While the greatest military victories, leaders and 
cultural figures are examples of how the country wants to represent itself, they also show the 
limitations of the past, with the darker episodes in particular. In addition, this chapter shows the 
extent to which civil society is involved in the creative process, sparking questions about whom 
anniversaries and memorabilia are designed for in the first place.  
History has to symbolise the link between the state and modernisation process, and is 
fundamental in accomplishing this. Russia as a whole never fully answered the fundamental 
‘who are we?’ question facing it after 1991, and this process only properly began in Putin’s 
presidencies. The use and nature of the historical narrative in Russia says a lot about the 
character and intentions of the state, but also the consequences this has had for it and the 
population. It is becoming increasingly important for the state to be viewed in a positive light 
through the lens of history and uncritically. Being critical is perceived as unpatriotic and 
undermining of national unity that helped Russia through tough periods in the past. Continuity 
is therefore, at the core of the narrative to ensure the views persist.47 Not only this, but for 
normality to return the state must lead the modernisation process to secure the country as it did 
in the glorious past. The format of the past is also becoming more defined by the state, and the 
ways in which this is applied and the obstacles it faces will now be explored.   
                                                          
47 Ola Cichowlas, ‘How Putin Manipulates Russians Using Revisionist History’, Forbes, 
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/05/how-putin-manipulates-russians-using-revisionist-
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Chapter One  
 
The Problems of History in Putin’s Russia 
 
Like a natural resource, history must provide people with something essential. As will become 
a consistent theme throughout this thesis, history can supply answers to the questions of the 
present. It can explain what is, what ought to be and why.48 The past acts as a model for social 
norms and development. Yet, and as is always the case with the past, its subjective nature makes 
it a competition to maintain the rights to production, reproduction and royalties. However, in 
order to ‘win’, the past must be attractive to influence the consumer’s worldview so that they 
can accomplish the goals of the producers. The bigger problem here stems from the subjective 
and fluid nature of history. The past cannot have one sole owner meaning competition will 
always exist, particularly surrounding the big questions of the modern day.  
 
What makes Russia unique is the ferocity, variation and pace of the competition. In Russia, the 
past has always been a ‘go to’ cultural mediation tool for the state (historia, magistra vitae). On 
at least four occasions, Russia has undergone re-writes and revisions of its past: the fifteenth 
century, the reign of Catherine the Great, the USSR and finally post-Soviet Russia. On each 
occasion, these revisions served the same purpose. Russian history often being a history of the 
state, and with it, its continuity and survival meant that each needed a back-story propped up 
with tales of greatness, success and an ‘organic’ depiction. In post-Soviet Russia, the past has 
seen two major transformations. Firstly, under Boris Yeltsin, where narratives were hollow 
(Imperial Russia) or negative (the USSR). The second began after Vladimir Putin became 
president, which saw a shift in focus to a patriotic history stressing continuity, sovereignty and 
stability (see Chapter Three), and with other subtle changes reflecting the themes of each 
particular term. More importantly, the past in Russia today is primarily seen as an important 
modernisation tool. Yet, the complexities in (re)packaging the past for modern consumption 
reveal a lot about Russia’s ability to modernise and its constraints for the near future.  
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This chapter unpacks how the past is the ideal resource for state construction and the obstacles 
it faces in the selection process in constructing a narrative. Apart from the inability to have one 
sole owner of history, the modern Russian state also has to neutralise and normalise the past, 
the period 1881-1945 in particular. This requires meticulous negotiations as the narrative must 
be rooted in facts and evidence, which are inherited not produced, as well as special actors and 
loyal adherents. Russian history must be placed into a wider framework. It must fit within an 
international context as well as a homogenous one, and be consumable instead of obligatory. 
Historical debates in Russia today are very active, vibrant and high profile, which is encouraging 
to say the least. However, the constraints of the modern state and population often give way to 
political trends, myths and gross over simplifications. A great deal of sympathy is needed, the 
possibility of rejection from a polarised society is high and mishandling the past could open 
such fractures that harm the general well-being of the country. Modernisation, building 
consensus and creating a modern identity through a patriotic past have become increasingly 
centralised in order to prevent a rupture that could lead cause instability; a very Soviet way of 
‘making sure’. More importantly, these attempts are symbolic to the ongoing state building 
process, Putin Agenda, and add a sense of validity. It is centralisation without monopolisaton, 
which will now be analysed.  
 
 
The Past is a Resource  
 
This idea is most prominently put forward by Ilya Kalinin.49 History is a prime resource for 
national and state construction. Links to the past are useful because they provide a sketch for 
how to accomplish goals. The main goal in the Russian Federation is modernisation, and for 
this to be achieved, the nation must maximise the use of its natural resources. As Olga 
Tukhaniya writes, Russia has a thousand year history beneath our feet, layers oozing with it.50 
The past is a favourable resource for the Russian state because, unlike oil for instance, it does 
not require physical extraction; in many cases, the existing history simply requires 
repackaging. Yet, as with any resource, somebody is expected to profit from it, and as is 
usually the case in Russia, it is the elite. Their payment, according to Kalinin, is political 
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loyalty (from above and below). This is because, for modernisation to occur in Russia, there 
needs to be a level of political order to allow for the past’s reproduction (and at the level of the 
elite’s interests).51 By treating the past as a resource, it becomes one indivisible subject, with 
the people led (unified) by the state who grants access to the past. Unsanctioned access 
(falsifications) is blocked and in many cases condemned as attempts to destablise Russia. The 
past then becomes more homogenous and less open to critical interpretations. Russia by no 
means has a closed history, yet in recent years, differing opinions or challenges to the 
‘preferred’ narrative have resulted in legal repercussions.52  
The profits from the ‘knowledge economy’ come from mobilising the culture. The affirmation 
of tradition and unity from below confirms said nation’s sovereignty, legitimacy and direction 
for the future. Rejecting history, as John Tosh notes, is a blow to a regime’s legitimacy.53 A 
break with the past can create a new order whereas reminding people of past glories plays on 
nostalgia, memory and grants people partial access to the past. In modern times there can be no 
sole owner of history, yet the battle for history continues because the state argues that for Russia 
to return to ‘normality’ (or modernise), the past must be reconciled with (normalised). In short, 
the knowledge economy and resource of history can generate patriotic energy among Russian 
citizens to be loyal. This is precisely why the patriotic education programmes were introduced, 
yet while they appeared to come out of nowhere, they are not in fact ‘new’. As will be examined 
in subsequent chapters, these were based on USSR citizen education, which also emerged during 
a time of crisis.  
 
Whilst oil and gas form the basis of Russia’s material wealth, istoricheskaya politika is an 
attempt to influence a worldview, which acts as political loyalty to the state. Istoricheskaya 
politika subjects the population to the state’s will, values and ideas system to allow for a 
smoother and beneficial modernisaton. The media is a powerful ally in this regard too, as its 
forms are mediums, which grant further insight into the past for modern citizens. The fact that 
the most popular news and television channels are owned directly or indirectly by the state 
benefits this enormously, and prevents perceived falsifications. It also massively helps that the 
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majority receive their news information from television.54 As one of the trainee teachers 
remarked in the interviews, ‘our parents and grandparents believe everything they hear on TV. 
And I mean everything! Our generation gets its news from the internet and unfortunately, we 
believe this, too.’55 The aforementioned values system is an already existent one, but due to 
Russia’s recent past experiencing seismic transformations (the First World War, the revolutions 
and Soviet collapse to name ideal examples), there is a fear of it being ‘lost’. The leadership is 
advancing its own norms to make Russia look attractive, legitimate and credible (as resources 
make nations appear powerful), but its success will depend on the state’s ability to go beyond 
the Soviet legacy, use new mediums and reject anything hinting at neo-imperialism.56 There is 
still a perceived need for resurrecting and reconstruction in order for the modernisation process 
to be successful and the ongoing battle for history means profits are not being fully felt or 
coming in (yet). A nation and its people need a historical consciousness in the same way they 
need natural resources. It is key to the functioning and harmony of society.  
 
 
 Writing and re-writing narratives of history  
 
Paul Riceur wrote that narrative is a fundamental part of human understanding.57 The value of 
life is significant and to conceive of existence, a person must have an understanding of their 
origins. Developing this further, many historical theorists such as Simon Gunn and Ludmilla 
Jordanova assert that historians are in the position of judge. Selection is a central skill for the 
historian, particularly if the material or issue is tricky.58 Attraction is, therefore, also necessary 
to make it consumable and recognisable.59 However, as Gunn aptly notes, the historical reality 
is gone and beyond reconstruction.60 This leads to an over reliance on ‘quasi plots’ (particular 
past events, periods and figures) to cover any gaps in the narrative, highlight what is important, 
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and identify the ‘socially correct’ answers to explain what is sensitive to Russia’s current 
position. Whilst this will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters, it is worth noting 
that the fundamental transformations that Russia experienced thtoughout the last century 
demonstrate that the historical narrative is not a straightforward one to construct.61 Much of the 
citizenry were born in a different country (the USSR) with a different story told in a purely 
ideological language. They were brought up on songs about the Soviet people and a different 
special path to communism, as the lyrics in the former national anthem stated. This demonstrates 
how history is inseparable from human consciousness and the desire to create a past based on 
success stories can give way to a narrative rooted in nostalgia and patriotism lacking historical 
specificity.  
 
Different Russian states have used and viewed history’s purpose differently. Political and 
economic goals have affected how each sought to define the past and retell it. For Vladimir 
Lenin, Russian history was viewed through the lens of politicheskaya pravil’nost’. Whilst 
literally translated as ‘political correctness’, it contained references to the correct (and incorrect) 
politics or ideological viewpoints, ultimately reinforced by the ‘right’ interpretation of history. 
For the revolution to be successful, history had to be interpreted correctly. The implication of 
this is that political events can be read through the past.62 Stalin continued this by creating a 
single history textbook for all Soviet schools which demonstrated how only one ‘right’ 
interpretation of history was acceptable in the construction of socialism. Soviet public holidays 
were the ultimate reinforcement of this, designed specifically to match the ideological message. 
A huge consequence is that political truths gained greater status than those discovered through 
more traditional means, such as research and data collection. Incorrect interpretations of the past 
made one an ‘enemy of the people’; history meant nothing more than complying with the party 
line. One glaringly obvious problem was finding periods that fit into a Marxist scheme that were 
applicable to all of society.63 The problem of constructing a narrative in the Soviet system, which 
already had self-imposed restrictions, was that its contradictions and hypocrisy could be easily 
exposed. That is why during the Perestroika period, opening up history would be the USSR’s 
own undoing. Stalin’s reappraisal of Ivan IV, Peter I, the knights of ancient Rus’ and victory in 
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the Patriotic War of 1812 helped promote loyalty to the state and its leadership who defended 
Russia against hostile (capitalist) enemies and charted its unique path of modernisation. 
However, the narrative largely placed everything into an economic framework to explain 
society’s development and justify the implementation of socialism. National histories were of 
secondary importance to create the idea of a Soviet people. After Stalin’s death, his legacy 
became complex for the regime to retell, but the Soviet state now also had an achievement it 
could rally round; one of shared triumph and success which was experienced by the entire 
population. The first history of the Great Patriotic War, Istoriya Velikoi Otchestvennoi Voiny 
Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-45, appeared 1960-65 and was a six-volume set.64 There were many 
obstacles and restrictions in its construction, and the legacy of Stalin and his personality cult 
was just the tip of the iceberg. The USSR was now involved in an ideological struggle with its 
former allies, and much of the population could lay claims to the achievement. Many veterans 
would later hold high-ranking positions in the Soviet government. Hence, this profound 
achievement became such a unifying event, and one that could not be undermined at any cost.65 
Some of Zhukov’s letters and memoirs, which many thought would provide an objective view 
of the war, were often met with criticism or simply not published. Under Brezhnev, a twelve 
volume set was published to much debate, although some sub plots were never objectively 
examined. The events of 1941 particularly stand out (or rather do not) in this regard. This was 
due to the perceived harm it would cause the state. Victory Day itself became a ‘memory to 
Victory’, and is essentially the same tone as in Putin’s Russia without the Soviet ideology.   
 
The importance of the USSR’s narrative to Putin’s government derives from the need for 
national unity before normality in politics. In the USSR, the diverse population was united 
around Marxism-Leninism as the ‘right’ path to modernisation, whereas today it is a patriotism 
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of everything. One drawback is the publicity history receives. Arguments over the narrative and 
differences are very much in the spotlight and heavily scrutinised. This is unhelpful because it 
can expose weaknesses and gaps in the message the state tries to convey, yet shows how history 
is healthy for Russian democracy. Banning discussion makes the state look authoritarian 
whereas encouraging discussion shows how civil society is maturing. The Russian filmmaker, 
Andrei Nekrasov, refers to this as ‘Matilda syndrome’.66 The Soviet legacy still lives on in many 
respects, but glorifying certain aspects means that popular trends can take precedent over 
knowledge and fact. For instance, the tone of Putin’s presidencies has had a direct impact on the 
narrative’s shifts. His first presidency centered on restoring authority and order, the second on 
redistributing wealth and the third on a standoff with the West.67 In his third presidency, school 
history lessons on Crimea were introduced along with more military history and a revival of the 
Cossacks. During the first and second, reassessments of the Stalin era began to focus more on 
the positive aspects (modernising the economy and Stalin as an effective manager), Soviet 
symbols were reinstated and references to the Great Patriotic War increased. After Putin’s 
infamous ‘Munich speech’, Filippov’s state backed teacher handbook was published. This 
change in narrative is also reflected in the content of Putin’s speeches over the years, many of 
which will be analysed throughout this thesis. The tone of his fourth term 2018 began with the 
need for further economic development in the digital economy and a further redistribution of 
wealth. What this means as far as the past is concerned remains to be seen. A few days after his 
inauguration on Victory Day 2018, however, Putin vowed to never let any force falsify the Great 
Patriotic War and downplay Russia’s role in the victory.68 It is worth stating at this point, 
however, that Putin is, on occasion, genuinely sincere, but this usually in tandem with 
spontaneity. A good example is during the Oliver Stone interviews when he gave his opinion of 
historical Russian leaders.69 On other occasions, namely the unveiling of a monument to Russia 
in the First World War at Park Pobedy, he is politically correct to match the occasion and get 
the message across. In this particular case, it was about honouring the memory of the dead and 
needing to explain why Russia had no victory. The blame was deflected from the Russian state 
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onto the Western powers and revolutionaries (more on this in Chapter 6). 
 
The European history framework also poses problems in modern Russia. The Russian narrative 
of the twentieth century differs from Western and Eastern Europe, and internationally, it is not 
widely accepted. Integrating the narratives is a necessary thing, yet the current geopolitical 
situation makes this all but impossible in the near future. From Russia’s side, this is perceived 
as competition and a security threat, adding to the idea of Russia being surrounded by hostile 
others. In fact, history is written into Russia’s Doctrine of National Security. The battle for 
history in Europe is a very real one. According to Igor Torbakhov, there are three competing 
versions of European history: Western, Soviet/Russian and Eastern European.70 In the twentieth 
century, much of the Western and Russian narrative focuses on defeat of the Nazis and the Cold 
War, albeit from two different standpoints. Eastern Europe, by contrast, projects a narrative of 
huge tragedies and victimhood whose histories were sucked up by Stalinism and as a land where 
a lot of blood was spilled. While both Western and Eastern European history is designed with 
Russia in it, there is a tendency to cast it as ‘non-European’ or an oppressor (with the notable 
exceptions of Belarus and Armenia).71 Russia, in its new narrative construction, attempts to 
combat this ‘peverse habit’ of being accused of hostilities, most notably at the European 
Histories conference Vilnius in 2009. While an agreement was reached to incorporate the 
totalitarian experience into European history, no framework for doing so was properly crafted.72 
Russian lawmakers did not appreciate a resolution that stated Stalinism equally caused the 
Second World War. Another by the European Union (EU) in 2004 that recognised Stalin’s 
deportation of the Chechens and Ingush as genocide (Russia does not) also sparked critcism.73 
The former goes against its narrative of liberating Eastern Europe and overcoming a struggle 
with foes, whereas the latter contradicts the narrative that projects catastrophes as triumphs in 
contemporary Russia. This also demonstrates the importance of politics. All former Soviet 
republics have experienced a politicisation of history to create a cohesive national identity and 
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in some cases, identify ‘enemies’. In countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and the five 
Central Asian Republics, this was much harder to do. By contrast, in the Western world equating 
the USSR with Stalin seems obvious, whereas in Russia this is not so simplistic.  
 
Supplementary to this, Kalinin also highlights that the [Soviet] past is reproducible and is only 
reproduced instead of transformed or updated.74 The purpose of this is to neutralise the past so 
it does not threaten to split society, and recent events showed this might easily occur. In 2017, 
the Russian government handed St. Isaac’s Cathedral back to the Orthodox Church as an act of 
reconciliation for the Civil War. This alone was enough to spark protests in St. Petersburg.75 
Whilst many Russians may identify as Orthodox, the protests showed that, although public 
sympathies no longer lie with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, it did not necessarily place it with the 
other side. Since historical knowledge is inherited, it cannot ignore memory and nostalgia. 
Whilst tradition is the deepest root of identity, to create a national idea or story the past must be 
(re)produced to convince people of its validity. The many different competing versions of the 
past make the battle so fierce; disinformation, falsifications or unpopular trends are harmful to 
the fabric of society. Associations become important, so that cosumers can decide whom or what 
is the most reliable. When including school textbooks in this picture, teachers must decide which 
authors and publishers are the most convincing. Likewise, the publishers must consider how the 
product will be received. As Maria Repoussi and Nicole Tutiax Guillon state, teachers are 
negotiators of the message and this is why the state has begun to reassert its importance and why 
this thesis chose to analyse the education system.76 The Russian state views teachers as reliable 
agents and the ‘good’ textbooks are used as weapons in the battle for history with the hope they 
will be the basis for convincing people of the ‘correct’ narrative. The state sponsored textbooks 
for example have special stickers on the top-left of the front covers and on the title page the 
message ‘Recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science’ (see below). In this regard, 
textbooks and teachers can act as a passive or active opposition to the falsifications of history.  
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                                           Figure 1: Mark approving textbook by the Ministry of Education and Science 
 
If any narrative is to be successful there has to be some basis in facts and evidence. Constraints 
become evident because if the facts do not reflect the desired narrative and message, it will be 
rejected. If it is rejected or resisted then it cannot have the desired impact or benefits. History 
must be consumable like a product or resource, meaning its packaging is equally important. This 
is also, why the media is a powerful ally, as it can shape the narrative further. As the past is 
designed to be consumed, the media is better placed to enhance its attractiveness. School 
textbooks and monuments on the other hand are unavoidable and can rely less on their image. 
Then again, the huge demand for history also brings in another factor that works against 
objectivity. As Jordanova writes, the past (in whichever form it takes) is often commissioned to 
look better than it is.77 The shared experience is beyond normal human activity and the author’s 
imagination. For people to connect with abstract concepts, a certain measure of sympathy is 
necessary. The selection process is essential to this and as Barbara Hernstein Smith aptly notes, 
the narrative cannot be independent of its authorship.78 Moreover, since the author (or judge) is 
in many cases the Russian state or initiated on its behalf, the narrative must reflect its version of 
events. These are carefully chosen to establish a broad coalition of consensus and achieve the 
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goals of the state. Although views among the leadership often differ, the same conclusions are 
reached to help promote the appearance of unity to the population. This explains why some 
darker episodes are left out entirely, receive little attention or in some cases become exploited. 
If it is consumable, then a particular past segment can be manipulated to suit the producer’s 
goals. If it is questionable or controversial, it can have the opposite effect, although both explain 
why romanticism and myths become simplified and popularised in society. Exposing the true 
extent of the Stalinist terror added to the disillusionment in the 1980s, as did failing to create a 
positive definition of Yeltsin’s new Russia. 
 
Politics are important too, and as will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Three, the past 
often becomes a substitute for taboo political issues. Each political groups’ approach to the past 
are often a good indication of their political and ideological difficulties. The Communists cannot 
tolerate negative depictions of the USSR as this smears its own image whereas liberal groups 
want the state to abandon its ‘imperialist goals’ and align with the nations of Western Europe to 
modernise instead of using recycled historical patriotism as its motivation. In other words, 
groups and individuals understand patriotism differently, and their own interpretations of the 
past dictate this. While the state is striving to have its say on the past be the dominant one, unlike 
the Soviet era there is no attempt to monopolise it. Other versions are permitted and available 
in bookshops across the country, yet come with an unofficial warning. Marlene Laruelle has 
written about the huge variation of Russian histories one might find browsing through the 
average bookshop, some denying things like the Mongol invasion. Consumers can naturally 
draw their own conclusions, but a textbook possessing a ‘state recommendation’ sticker 
(Appendix B) on the cover can passively lead people in the desired direction.  
 
 
 The Problem of 1881-1945  
 
A number of vital questions arise concerning how to package this period for consumption. First, 
what is Russia? Is the desired image or model Russia of the late nineteenth century or the 1930s? 
As the editor of one of Russia’s liberal magazines Snob stated, ‘We do not know whether to 
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build churches or monuments to Stalin’.79 Both convey different messages and building both 
simultaneously sends conflicting signals. Alongside this, arises two other questions: Where is 
Russia? and who owns Russia? To champion the Stalin period over pre-revolutionary Russia 
means the Russian Federation is still primarily ‘Soviet’ and could benefit the Communist Party. 
To embark down a route of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality meanwhile empowers the 
nationalist anti-Western groups. This period requires immense flexibility because many ‘battle 
fields’ exist and are comprised of many ‘armies’ (communists, liberals, nationalists and so on). 
When selecting any figure from this period, each of the aforementioned groups would have 
entirely different opinions and interpretations. The state under Putin, therefore, seeks to find 
consensus among them, to foster national unity in order to become the main beneficiary. As 
Maria Lipman writes critically, as long as loyalty to the state is implied and the message is anti-
liberal and anti-western, one can glorify Stalin, worship the last Russian tsar and the secret 
police who executed him and his family.80 In principle, there is no difference between preserving 
churches and Stalinist buildings. One way to achieve this is to use its ability to influence the 
population through auspicious channels (education, the media and public celebrations). These 
channels represent a state and what is involved in the official history becomes ‘narrative’, 
especially if the issue is contentious.81 In the worst-case scenario, the issue is entirely omitted, 
although not without the majority’s approval.  
 
The question of how one dominant version can appease 147 million citizens is, in itself, also 
important to address. Of course, that would be impossible but it does not prevent attempts to 
centralise the history or state led efforts to establish a dominant view. Public polls and surveys, 
particularly those conducted by the Levada Tsentr, VTsIOM and FOM are quite telling of the 
divisions in society on the past, issues of identity and their potential roots, and this period is no 
exception. While this thesis will make use of these, the limitations of such surveys lie in what 
to do next. The results may be fascinating and reflect a relatively accurate picture of modern 
Russia, but they appear to have little impact elsewhere. The Russian and Western press are 
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happy to report the findings and academics to interpret them; but they are not used as an impetus 
for changes in the modernisation process, at least not by the ruling elites. Then again, they are 
useful tools for showing that commonly held viewpoints are often inconsistent and 
contradictory. An example of this would be on textbooks and certain figures. According to one 
poll in 2008, 70% of Russians ‘form their views about the past’ from secondary school history 
textbooks. Another conducted by FOM in 2014 of 1,000 particpants from 320 cities and 160 
villages, showed that only 1% ‘get their information’ of the First World War from textbooks.82 
This suggests it could only be certain periods and figures, and if this is the case, can explain 
why modern opinions of Stalin are inconsistent. It is not uncommon to find people, for instance, 
who support busts of Stalin and the rebuilding of churches. The historical record suggests such 
a position should be inconsistent. It could also be that Russians turned to other sources for their 
historical information 2008-14. Taking into consideration the polling discussed earlier by 
Levada on where Russians get their news, this is perfectly plausible. Even more so, when 
sizeable portions think the quality of education has ‘not changed at all’ (45% in 2017) or 
‘declined somewhat’ in recent years (21% in 2017).83 Moreover, 52% of respondants in the 
same poll thought history ‘needed more attention in schools’.84 This indicates that education 
may indeed be losing ground in the information space, and provide enough justification for the 
creation of new school textbooks. 
 
The process of neutralising and normalising the past for consumption also means an occasional 
‘glossing over’ of the more troubling or dark periods to focus instead on the positive sides. Stalin 
and Stolypin are the same (efficient managers) as part of the normalisation process, as are 
Aleksandr Nevsky and Zhukov (victors over the Germans). Normalising creates a living chain 
that can hold together a long past and stress continuity, national idea and version of national 
political culture. All of this shows that Russian history is a mosaic and one piece in the wrong 
place could ruin the consumer’s perspective or convey a different image than the desired one.85 
While the above-mentioned narratives are the most accepted, many liberal groups, intellectuals 
                                                          
82 The polls are available at: Vladimir Rudakov, Kak istoriya vernet dostoinstvo, Profile, No. 32(587), February 
2008, available at http://history.standart.edu.ru/info.aspx?ob_no=16528  accessed 12/04/2018; ‘Obraz Pervoi 
Mirom’, FOM, 31 July 2014, http://fom.ru/proshloe/11637  accessed 05/08/2017. 
83 Table 8.22 ‘How has the quality of education changed over the last year’ was answered by 1,600 respondants 
across Russia. See Russian Public Opinion 2017, (Levada Analytical Centre: Moscow, 2018). p.76 
84 Table 8.25 ‘What school subjects should be paid the most attention to’, ibid. p.78  
85 Ilya Kalinin, ‘Nostalgic Modernization: the Soviet Past as ‘Historical Horizon’’, p.158 
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and even those interviewed for this research would disagree, as within any democracy. 
However, challenging the narrative is much harder and attempts at this will be analysed in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
 
Is the past material, a metaphor or mythology?   
 
The construction and success of any historical narrative requires mastery, creativity, resistance 
and knowledge. In modern Russia, creativity is the most absent ingredient and is precisely why 
repetition, reproduction or ‘spin’ is so common. Kalinin is correct to argue that modernisation 
is motivated by nostalgia, as when one analyses speeches from the Russian leadership and other 
lawmakers, the message is to follow the example of ones ancestors to modernise. This is why a 
statue of the Kalashnikov inventor was erected in Moscow as it is linked to a success story and 
to encourage greater technological development. Using examples from the past puts things into 
a familiar language that is easy to consume. The Russian population and bureaucracy are not 
well equipped for a Westernised version of modernisation. In addition, this thesis will 
demonstrate how this has been widely rejected since the mid-1990s after Yeltsin’s controversial 
re-election, NATO expansion and Kosovo. Using the past as a metaphor is useful but when it is 
taken literally and or becomes mythologised both domestically and in the West, it can be 
harmful. There is a tendency for Western countries to depict Russia as having imperial ambitions 
and trying to restore the USSR, even though no Russian leader after 1991 has ever mentioned 
it. Furthermore, although metaphors by definition are not literally applicable this does not stop 
them from being taken out of context and materialising. When this occurs, metaphors can be 
used to justify almost anything and the lines between fiction and reality blur. History is, 
therefore, a socio-political problem, and not purely one or the other.   
 
The biggest problem concerning historical transformation in the modern era is its intensity and 
pace. It is difficult for the state and population to keep up, as too much is happening at once. 
History has remained a high profile topic as shown by the constant changes to history in the 
education system and thinking up of new monuments to erect. The focus on patriotism is also 
not from a critical perspective. This is problematic because ‘criticism’ is perceived as 
detrimental to democratisation. Reproducing the past is a fallback, simplistic and uncreative.  
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The purpose of producing new narratives is to respond to old ones. Therefore, as Werstch retorts, 
these must follow in the tradition of a nation’s ancestors (to whom its citizens are loyal) to 
highlight continuation and modernisation.86 Continuity can only be highlighted if the narratives 
themselves align, and the emerging narrative is a multi-sided history for the majority to 
painlessly digest a difficult past. The intention to normalise and the past for patriotic sentiment 
to help the country as a whole move forward is not disingenuous or dishonest, nor does it need 
be interpreted this way. Attempting to have only one correct version is criticised as authoritarian, 
especially when laws have been established to protect the narrative from ‘falsifications’.87 
Ultimately, the line between protecting against falsifications and creating one ‘correct’ version 
is thin and should be walked carefully. Moreover, establishing one school textbook is not 
necessarily undemocratic, and there is a great deal of public support for doing so. Nevertheless, 
the rocky nature of this means the problem of history is a tricky balancing act, which either 
could bring great gains or be hugely damaging as it was for Yeltsin and Gorbachev. The 
problems of history in Russia have unique characteristics, but its handling is not, altogether, 
different. History, regardless of its authorship’s origins, is socially and politically accepted 
truths. The Russian state simply relies on these for reconciliation and modernisation, despite 
supplementary problems it may bring.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 James V. Wertsch, Narratives as Cultural Tools in Sociocultural Analysis, p.528  
87 An example would be a law against offending veterans of the Great Patriotic War, O veteranakh, Federalniy 
zakon no. 5-FZ ot 12/01/1995, http://base.garant.ru/10103548  accessed 09/05/2016  
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Chapter Two 
Russia and Russianness: a multi-history 
 
Vladimir Putin told participants of a Leader’s Club session in February 2016 that Russia has no 
national idea besides patriotism and that there can be no other.88 The referred to patriotism is 
rooted in Russia’s historical identity. Using the past as a source for patriotism is designed to 
create a unifying identity. Instead of trying to forge a new Russian idea like Boris Yeltsin 
following the USSR’s collapse, Putin understood that restoring pride and belief in the future 
meant Russia had to recognise, revisit and reinstate aspects of its historic identity. This involved 
a reconnection with pre-revolutionary Russia, more specifically, its values and myths that 
(essentially) governed Russian society and constructed its global outlook for centuries. 
Moreover, it meant that Russia could no longer afford to ignore or demonise the Soviet 
experience. This should not, however, be confused with trying to restore the empire or USSR, 
as political commentators often claim. Historical reconciliation is a part of the healing process 
to make the endured experience compatible with the modern situation. The future cannot be 
mapped out if the present is uncertain. Progress cannot begin if the foundations are fragile and 
the population cannot unite behind something they lack the means to identify with. Dmitry 
Peskov stated that without the trust of the people, Putin cannot expect a positive impact of his 
presidencies.89 The lack of a ‘Russia for Russians’ was one of Yeltsin’s biggest shortcomings 
and Putin inherited a bruised and lost nation after a decade without patriotism.  
This chapter examines the ideas behind contemporary Russian identity, asserting that it is 
largely centred on historical patriotism. The preferred history that comprises this identity is not, 
as the government would like to portray, one long uninterrupted march from the days of Kievan 
Rus’ to Putin. Russia has experienced a number of transformations at state and local level. For 
this reason, it will be argued that ‘Russianness’ and the patriotism surrounding ‘Russia’ is a 
‘multi-history’. The term was first used by Stephen M. Norris, who contends that the past is 
                                                          
88Vladimir Putin’s speech at a meeting with the core group of Leader’s Club members, and informal association 
of small and medium sized business of various economic sectors, February 3rd, 2016, Novo-Ogaryovo Moscow 
Region http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51263 accessed 18/07/2016 
89 Ellen Barrynov, “Putin, in need of cohesion, pushes patriotism”, The New York Times, November 20th, 2012 
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being packaged for patriotic consumption in the media. Like Kalinin, Norris argues the patriotic 
culture is centred on Russia’s pasts so it can appeal to nostalgia.90 In establishing consensus for 
a new patriotism, the state must rinse out a sought after important meaning from the past, where 
the heroes and ways of life can serve as models for today (sub plots). Norris points to the 
difficulty in locating these ‘glory days’ and highlights the existence of a ‘multi-history’:  
 
[Russia is] the Siberian forests, Tsarist officers, maslenitsa, pre-revolutionary 
Moscow, church music, folklore, nineteenth century literature, the far north 
landscapes, Russia’s suffering, ancient history, art, izba, Slavic traditions, the 
Time of Troubles, New Year’s Eve, Brezhnev and military patriotism.91   
 
More than one Russia is possible at once. The shared historical experience, however big the 
contrast between different segments, is combined to provide a sense of ‘destiny’ and 
justification for the current situation. Even the darkest days, sometimes blocked out, are painted 
as ‘not in vain’ and continue to impact who the Russian people are. Experiencing two seismic 
changes in the twentieth century alone, this attempt to create an image of continuity and 
attachment to national values seeks to increase patriotic fervour by stressing the idea that Russia 
is a unique country with a rich history and bright future. Thus, a patriotic history becomes a 
complex picture held together by abstract links. Nevertheless, various polls show a feeling that 
Russia has ‘returned’ and that a big aid in this is restoring old identity concepts or ‘tradition’.  
 
This chapter will also analyse how the government tries to create patriotic citizens using a 
recycled identity. Recycling the past touches all parts of Russian life and lawmakers 
increasingly advocate patriotism as a substitute for ideology after the collapse of communism. 
In May 2016, the Head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin, said the 
community should jointly develop a national idea along with a strategy for its implementation 
in a legal base.92 While nothing has yet come of it, Bastrykin stressed that it should be ‘fully 
                                                          
90 Stephen M. Norris, Blockbuster History in the New Russia: movies, memory and patriotism, (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2012), pp.304-308 
91 Ibid. p.316 
92 ‘Chief investigator proposes law on Russia’s ‘national idea’, RT, May 26th, 2016.  
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based on the internal and external situation in which our state exists’ and highlighted the 
historical traditions, which he thought must be included.  
Since it is argued that Russian identity is established from a huge and jigsaw like multi-history, 
this chapter will consider which pasts are used to help form a modern identity. Those quoted by 
Norris hark back to a rosier time where life was ‘stable’ and organic, and these aspects will be 
analysed along with the period under focus. In addition, Russian schools teach Russian history 
from ‘the dawn of the Slavs’ up to the present day in a short period of time and must be sensitive 
to the country’s multi ethnic status. This chapter will also look at concepts of ‘Russianness’ to 
assess the consistency of ‘continuity’ in order to see how it must be adapted to suit the 
population.     
 
‘Russianness’ Through Patriotic Terms 
If any patriotic message is to be successful, it needs to be communicated in the appropriate 
language. In the Russian case, the patriotic terminology is increasingly recycled in order to 
project this continuity and establish a connection with the past. There is also an aspect of 
differentiation in the Russian identity resulting from a separate and unique existence in its 
historical experience. The strength of it can be measured through actions, but also in the actual 
subtext and depth of meaning. For instance rodina, can be translated as ‘motherland’ yet so can 
words like otechestvo (although closer to fatherland) and rodina mat’. Rodina, however, has a 
special connection to the soil and earth or the natural surroundings of the Eastern Slavs. It also 
features prominently during wartime, notably both Great Patriotic Wars, and is frequently 
referenced in anniversary speeches. Rodina is also deeply intertwined with the idea of a mother 
figure, sense of eternalness and place of birth. The pre- Christian Rus-ians had the Slavic Pagan 
goddess ‘moist mother earth’, concerned with fertility as well as the connection between body 
and nation. She was then replaced by Mary, the Mother of God, joy of all sorrows and lady of 
loving kindness. This demonstrates the importance of preserving life as it is known to Russian 
culture, with rodina so powerful a term that it has persisted throughout history. It greatly 
featured during the Great Patriotic War to help rally the people to what has become a sacred 
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triumph. It allowed the Soviet state to immortalise the dead, suggesting that the motherland 
takes them into herself for their patriotic sacrifice.93  
It is important to mention the concept of byt. It has no direct translation, but in essence, byt is a 
type of existence and being relating to real and everyday life.94 The byt is one example of how 
Russia’s historical experience was unique, special and separate. During in the USSR, byt is often 
thought to have been a unifying factor in Soviet life, as the regime created a uniform everyday 
life experience for almost everyone. It might also be added that the Kommunalka flats of the 
USSR were a unique type of existence and experience that the population endured together. 
Other concepts such as narod, sobornosti and obshchina materialised and represent the 
collectiveness of peasant life, which persisted for centuries. Some aspects of it are still evident. 
A collective spirit and togetherness is part of the Putin narrative, which strive to serve the 
nation’s interests as it once did the village community.  
 
Russian citizens today are referred to as Rossiyanin. The reappearance of this word in the 1990s 
was an attempt to be all inclusive of Russia’s many peoples in the different krais, oblasts, okrugs 
and republics. The purpose of this was to help unite a multi-national country, providing all an 
equal status.95 It creates a clear distinction between passport holders and ethnic Russians 
(Russkiy), however. It is also a true reflection on the Yeltsin years, which failed to make Russia 
and being Russian a positive thing. Positive historical connotations to underpin the identity have 
been core to rebuilding ‘Russia’ after the turbulent 1990s. If a country does not feel good about 
itself, it can stall the modernisation. The appearance of a unique people living a special existence 
can add fuel. 
 
Finally, another term used in a tweet by RT’s former editor, Margarita Simonyan, caught 
people’s attention following Putin’s election victory in 2018; vozhd’: 
 
                                                          
93 Elena Hellbirg-Hirn, Soul and Soil: The symbolic world of Russianness, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p.118  
94 Svetlana Boym, Commmon Places: mythologies of everyday life in Russia, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), p.30 
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Original: “Раньше он был просто наш президент и его можно было поменять. 
А теперь он наш вождь. И поменять его мы не дадим.” 
 
Transliteration: Ran’she on byl prosto nash prezident i ego mozhno bylo 
pomenyat’. A teper’, on nash vozhd’. I pomenyat’ ego my ne dadim.  
 
Translation: “Before he was just our president and could be replaced. Now, he is 
our Leader. And we won’t let him be replaced.”96  
 
This was not an isolated usage of term. In a one year period from 19 December 2017-2018, the 
term surfaced in 225 articles in the Russian newspaper Kommersant’, and was used mostly in 
articles about Lenin.97 In Vedomosti, there were 804 items although more were related to 
Stalin.98 Its connotations are significant not just for understanding Putin’s personal role in 
contemporary Russia, but also that of Russian leaders. Vozhd’ has three related but distinct 
meanings. First, it used to describe the chief of a tribe in Russian literature and fairy tales. The 
second is a military leader, although this usage is now obsolete. The third is the sense of Leader 
with a capital “L”. This might be someone who is a charismatic and inspiring leader in a sphere 
of science and the arts. More commonly, it is someone who is a father of the nation and source 
of inspiration.99 The term was used for Stalin, Lenin, Nicholas II and Catherine II, among other 
Russian leaders. It suggests that Putin has a special place in history with the great Russian 
leaders. More importantly, it suggests that Putin is the ideal leader for a country like Russia and 
that its leadership must possess certain qualities.  
 
                                                          
96 The Tweet was published on election night, 2018 and can be found here 
https://twitter.com/M_Simonyan/status/975694196555304965  accessed 05/04/2018.  
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Russia’s Founding Roots and Consolidation  
 
The multi-history and reliance on historical patriotism rooted in Russia’s cultural identity, 
spiritual and moral values requires some indulgence into an ancient past believed to be clear-
cut, reassuring and offering refuge from today’s world. This past should appear to offer lessons 
for today, often based on traditional values and morals. Monica Shelley and Margaret Winck 
contend that confusion and disillusionment cause a turn to the past, because conventional 
interpretations no longer meet human needs for explanation. Moreover, to support the myth of 
the nation, ancient myths that underpin it should be sought after.100 This ties in with Sherlock’s 
‘founding myths’ assertion, which serve as a blueprint. Moreover, a patriotic history emphasises 
the invisible ties of a community with a common fate, reinforcing the idea of one’s perpetual 
existence. In this sense, culture and history are inseparable. The territory and language are living 
examples of this and legitimises the myth of the nation with claims to ‘ancientness’. Territory 
and language are strong components of the Russian identity, but the myths and attempts to 
thwart cultural change as much as possible throughout the centuries serve as examples of its 
‘greatness’. This has involved symbolic assertions of power (derzhavnost’), either through the 
head of state, religion or military prowess to protect Russia’s earthly existence. The Russian 
identity has been formed out of the ‘besieged fortress’ mentality and adopted western concepts. 
In either case, the aim remains the same; to set Russia apart from other civilisations. Simon 
Franklin and Emma Widdis argue that in Russia, culture is presented as fact since it is largely 
self-referential. The tales contain the essence of Russianness and offer direct access to the soul 
of the people (narod).101 In addition, that ‘Russia’ is a cultural incorporation that lies between 
the lines of definitions, still presented as a question with a field of possibilities.102 Conflictingly, 
‘Russia’ is widely used as a political imperative, which establishes clear interests, boundaries 
and distinctions from other European nations. Many commentators often use ‘Russia’ 
interchangeably, when referring to the state, population or country itself. In this thesis, ‘Russia’ 
shall refer to the country as one single entity. The ‘Russian state’ and ‘Russians’ or ‘Russian 
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population’ are different entities not to be confused, and are treated separately.    
 
Examining Russia’s ancientness and founding myths, some continuity in how Russia retells its 
own history is apparent. Much of the founding myth has survived into the modern day and is 
adapted into rewriting/repackaging Russian history en masse. The ancient Russians who 
occupied the Slavic heartlands lived in communities that worked together and shared all the 
necessities of life in order to survive a harsh existence. These Slavic peoples indulged in a lot 
of myth making long before the Russian language and culture came into existence. This can 
explain why myth making in history is still prevalent; it has always been the norm in 
constructing history. Furthermore, no Slavic pagan ancient holy books or narratives are known 
to exist. Much of what is known derives from the skazki; purely fictional tales lacking 
dimension, often invoking heroic defenders (byliny).103 These myths set patterns of meaning and 
later came to define the Russian traditions and worldview. Modern day mythmaking also 
follows the same pattern, lacking dimension and relying on particular figures or events. Symbols 
have always been used to evoke strong meanings, which though ambiguous are still championed 
by the state to promote something larger than humankind. This pattern has continued into the 
modern day, most noticeably with the Great Patriotic War. It is significant as it shows a 
dependency on myth in reconstructing its national history.  
 
The state’s origins largely determined the Russian character. The state has always taken a 
leading role in defining the borders and culture of Russia. For some (Westerners) this link is too 
strong, whereas for others (Slavophiles) it is an essential part of Russia’s existence. This, like 
the period under focus, also continues to be mythologised and questioned, yet the ways in which 
the founding myth is told is evident in reconstructions of the past today. The role of the state in 
defining the national character and culture can also explain why ‘Russia’ is used so 
interchangeably; the state often has an omnipresent role throughout Russian history. Moreover, 
if Russia’s founding myths are questionable, it opens up a debate on the legitimacy of other 
myths coated in glory.   
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The conversion to Christianity was slow, but its purpose was for the Grand Prince Vladimir to 
consolidate his rule over a large and diverse set of pagan cults. To unify them under Christianity 
would help establish a sense of a nation, and with it, a central power (the state). Christianity 
provided Russia with two written texts in The Bible and a documentation of pre-Christian 
Russia, its first history. The Primary Chronicle written by the monk, Nestor, came some two 
hundred years after the arrival of Russia’s first ruler, Rurik. Like many segments of Russian 
history, this is surrounded in myth and controversy concerning its accuracy. It is the only source 
detailing Rurik’s arrival to Novgorod and becoming the first Rus-ian leader. According to the 
chronicle, the tribes called upon the Varangians to give them a ruler who would end the chaos 
and establish order over the fighting tribes (Rurik in this sense was the first vozhd’). This is one 
explanation as to why the distinction between state and population in Russia is always so clear, 
and this tone is evident in the Putin Agenda and narrative (see Chapter Three). Rurik’s origin 
remains contentious in because many self-professed patriots find it challenging to accept 
Russia’s foundations were not of purely Slav origins (the chronicle states that Rurik and his two 
brothers came from Scandinavia). Renowned Russian Slavophile historian, V.O. Klyuchevsky, 
is one example whose works are often in special sections of Russian bookstores. According to 
Klyuchevsky, the Povyest Vremenykh Let (Tales of the Bygone Years), has inaccurate 
chronology and contents. He concluded that it cannot be said for sure whether Rurik came of 
Varangian nature, though produced no evidence to support his claims.104 The tone of the 
chronicle is also undoubtedly romanticised and partial.105 In other words, Russia ‘had’ to be 
special for the new state to be legitimate, and for many, its ancientness is legitimising enough. 
In the modern day, a similar pattern exists where accounts of the past are often simplified, 
romanticised and the uncomfortable segments are sometimes refuted.  
 
The adoption of Christianity had far-reaching and long-term consequences in Russia’s historical 
development. First, many Slavic paganist traditions became intertwined with Orthodox 
Christianity, in a Christian-Pagan synchronisation. It was an obscure overlap since the peasants 
made no distinctions between religion, science and magic.106 In other words, ‘tradition’ should 
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not be forgotten. Nikolai Berdyaev also wrote that the Russian identity rests on an extra 
messianic foundation, including the idea of Russians being a ‘chosen people’, or 
narodboganosets (God carrying people).107 As a unifying force, Byzantine Christianity became 
synonymous with Russian identity, even though it was more socio-economic than socio-cultural. 
The Russian language has many examples of this. Words for peasant (krest’yanin) and Christian 
(khristianin) were used interchangeably. The old Slavonic word for an Orthodox Christian 
(pravoslavnye) has interesting connotations, too. Still used, Pravoslavnye derives from Greek, 
meaning ‘true believer’, whereas in Russian it can be literally translated as ‘praising rightfully’. 
In other words, only Orthodox Christians praise God correctly, not Catholics, Protestants, Jews 
or Muslims. ‘True’ Russians were Slavic as well as Orthodox, meaning Caucasians, nomadic 
steppe peoples, Tartars and many other indigenous groups were excluded from the collective 
identity. European foreigners who lived in Russia were also excluded and distinguished from 
Russian society, being labelled nemets, which derives from the Russian word nemoi (mute). 
Russia did not just become the easterly most point of Orthodox Christianity, but later assuming 
the throne as the ‘Third Rome’, never followed by a fourth. This provides further clarification 
of Russia’s belief in their superiority to other nations and peoples. The idea of a natural 
successor to the first Christian empire and solidification of a unique civilisation, is a powerful 
one that has remained in place since. As assessed later on in this chapter, contemporary Russia 
has elevated the ‘traditional’ religions to a higher status to reflect the diverse population and 
legitimise the notion of continuity in a different way.   
Since its conception, Russia has been subject to repeated invasion attempts from abroad and a 
struggle to control the internal situation. In response to this external aggression, the mentality 
contains a degree of vulnerability. Russian and Muscovy expansion took place as a way to secure 
the state and cultural traditions.108 The military plays a role in filling this gap, as the interests of 
the homeland were above those of the ruling class. State service for all, including the Tsar, was 
a sacred duty for everyone.109 Many historical symbols that returned to prominence under Putin 
add to the necessity of ‘defending the fatherland’ such as St. George, the patron Saint of 
Moscow, and the orange and black ribbons. Moscow’s crest on the imperial coat of arms further 
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licenses it as the true symbol of power and Russian sovereignty. The double-headed eagle, while 
a Byzantine symbol bought to Russia by Sophia Paleolog, further re-emphasises unity and is 
surrounded with greater myths pre-dating Christianity.110 This is significant because it 
demonstrates how even pre-Christian myths are of vital importance in the modern day, adding 
a sense of sacredness to symbols of state power. It is a further indication as to why the state and 
its role is so important in the ‘Russian idea’; the myth of Russia is in many ways, the myth of 
the state. To be successful, the state should be underpinned with tales of greatness and glory.  
The survival of the Russian state is also packaged as divine and sacred. The focus on the myth 
of origins and continuity is designed to paint Moscow as the heir to Kievan Rus’, making Putin 
an apogee of the past. One Moscow exhibition (analysed in Chapter Six) narrates that in the 
Mongol invasion Russia rejected help from the Germans because it would have entailed 
changing Russian culture, likely through religious conversion. Often taken for granted is that 
after Russia liberated itself, it was no longer considered as part of the ‘civilised’ world.111 Russia 
became a barbaric and backward ‘other’ never fully accepted in the family of nations. This 
divide of East and West would narrow under Peter I and Catherine II, yet with the ambition of 
maintaining Russia’s great power status; to be on par with but not part of the West. Or, as is a 
core theme of this thesis, to modernise. The foreign policy of Catherine II championed Russia’s 
protection and a dominant military presence in Europe, earning her the title ‘the great’, as a true 
defender of the motherland. Divine military patriotism continued under Aleksandr I and Stalin. 
The Patriotic War in 1812 changed the notions of ‘motherland’ as Aleksandr I proclaimed 
Napoleon’s eviction an act of divine providence, exerted through him, the Orthodox Tsar, who 
built the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in honour of the victory.112 The events on 
Poklannaya Gora, a sacred sight for Russians exerted this, as did other myths, such as a gush of 
wind blowing Napoleon’s hat off before entering the Kremlin through the foreign ambassador’s 
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gate and even the harsh Russian winter.113 The cult of the Great Patriotic War 1941-45 stresses 
a salvation message, in many aspects in connection with the Orthodox Church. Resurrecting the 
collective spirit of the peasantry, the message spread at the time was that the Five Year Plan 
prepared Russia for war against beasts, despite a surprise attack, and saving Europe.114 
  
The ‘Russian Idea’  
The ‘Russia idea’ is a recurrent theme reformulated by artists and intellectuals. It appears in 
different forms and times of ideological transformation.115 It surfaces at times of political and 
social unrest and takes on a special character depending on the timeliness, be it pre-revolutionary 
Russia, the USSR or the Russian Federation – including under Putin. Its principles are rooted in 
the nineteenth century tradition of publitsistika (essaying), which discussed the very nature of 
the motherland, its place in the world and destiny. It was how nineteenth century intellectuals 
and political figures came to see their country and explain it to the population. It communicates 
a set of values and principles identifiable with Russian culture and how it is ‘unique’. The 
‘Russian idea’ emerged out of Russia’s interaction with the outside world and shares principles 
of nineteenth century romantic nationalism in Europe, reaffirming particularistic values of 
history and geographic awareness (a personal connection with the land and nature).116 This is 
particularly significant because as Boym notes, nineteenth century Russian culture is coupled 
with literature, an emblem for national identity.117 Its purpose was to promote and generate 
cultural and political consensus. Yet, the paradox here is that the most notable Russian writers 
were largely read outside of Russia or among its ruling elites. The audience was largely foreign 
or wealthy ‘Europeanised’ city dwellers, opposed to illiterate peasants. Three key questions 
dealt with in the Russian Idea, according to Marlene Laruelle, are whether Russia:  
1. Is European, Asian or neither? 
2. Is a nation state, empire or multi-national federation?  
                                                          
113 On a tour of Kolomna in October 2014, the guide told us of an old Russian tale where Mary, the Mother of 
God, lays a white sheet over Russia to protect her. The significance of this is largely down to army and mythical 
attachment to shit.   
114 See for instance the Soviet war song Svyashchennaya Voina (Sacred War).  
115 Susanna Rabow-Edling, ‘The Role of ‘Europe’ in Russian nationalism: reinterpreting the relationship between 
Russia and the West in Slavophile thought’, in Michael Melancon (ed.), Russia in the European Context, 1789-
1914, (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p.98 
116 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, National Ideology and International Relations: three 
incarnations of the ‘Russian Idea’, European Journal of International Relations, vol.16 (4) 2010, pp.667-668 
117 Svetlana Boym, Commmon Places, p.103 
55 
 
3. Is a democracy, autocracy or ideocracy?118  
This is at the heart of the Slavophile and Westerner split, showing a lack of consensus over what 
Russia is. As Russia has a tendency to fall in between the gaps of definitions, history is the space 
where answers are sought after. ‘Russia’ assumes different forms at different times, but is never 
fully decisive and often contains multiple layers of justifications. The period under focus in this 
thesis suggests more than one Russia is possible at a time. The USSR was an autocratic 
ideocracy with an empire, but it was also a multi-national state, like the Russian Empire and 
Russian Federation. The empire was an Asian one but the state had European origins. The 
nobility viewed itself as Europeans, but the peasantry had little in common with the average 
European. One key element separating the Russia Federation apart from the Russian Empire and 
USSR is that ideology is prohibited by the constitution. While the USSR used Marxism-
Leninism, the Russian state pre-1917 used the Orthodox Church to define societal norms and 
cultural values, and do its bidding (and vice versa). This is no longer the case, although the 
church is still a prominent and influential organisation in Russia life. It makes a case for ‘Russia’ 
acting as a symbol for true morals and values, deeply imbedded in the national culture. Patriarch 
Kirill also became the first religious leader to address the Duma in 2015, where he used the term 
‘Russianness’ (russkost’) forty-seven times.119  
The Slavophiles idolise(d) the culture of rural peoples and the traditional, organic way of life 
always lived. Essentially, they wish(ed) to restore this mythical time. Many of their beliefs, 
aside from verging on fantasy, exert complete negativity towards the ‘decadent’ Western ‘other’ 
in order to establish a sense of organic and purity in Russian traditions. Danilesvky called 
Westernism a disease from which Russia’s social body suffers and that only historical events 
can remedy the spiritual decay. These events included carrying on the high calling of Israel and 
Byzantium to be the ‘chosen people’.120 Yet, more than the West being ‘the other’ from which 
Russia must be saved, the reverse has also manifested. Susanna Rabow-Edling writes that by 
the 1840s, both the radicals and conservatives came to believe that it was their task to help 
Europe solve its social and political problems, because the impasse of European culture had 
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destroyed the harmony and integrity of the human personality.121 Their solution and model to 
save humanity was the traditional obshchina (community), as the principles of land 
redistribution and social obligations would help eliminate poverty, among other things. Putin 
even proclaimed at the Sixth Annual St. Petersburg Cultural Forum that culture could save the 
world from radicalism and intolerance that is threatening ‘to our civilisation’.122 In addition, the 
views of the ultra-conservative think tank, Izborskii Club, are becoming closer to the official 
line. Izborskii’s formation brought together anti-Western and Eurasianist thinkers (like 
Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prokhanov) who push ideas of orthodoxy, militarism, 
revanchism, power and destiny to keep alternative governing approaches alive.123 These are 
quite vague, however, and Putin distances himself from Izborskii’s membership.  
A further but not final irony is that any romantic agenda has to stress an organic character in its 
culture. Whilst the Slavophiles had the upper hand in this respect, few examples showed that 
this culture could make a genuine contribution to the advancement of humanity. Concern and 
uncertainty about the backwardness of this ‘original’ Russian culture raised questions not least 
because the intellectuals who began this process of cultural identification borrowing 
systematically from Western models. While Russia could not imitate the West and hope to 
appear unique, there was also no ‘Russian base’ in the thinking. Therefore, Westerners had an 
advantage in making their case, because culture cannot develop in true isolation and without a 
specific role in the universal progress of history, Russian culture would become insignificant.124 
These two competing visions historically play off one another, since the Slavophiles can locate 
a positive history to promote while Westerners have the means to sell it. The problem with this, 
as previously stated, was the lack of consensus over what the positive past is. Westerners view 
Russia’s destiny in line with Europe’s and Slavophiles are homogenous and inward looking. 
Thus, the ‘multi-history’, or careful selection of the preferred past simply reflects the splits in 
Russian society.  
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Concerning the last two Tsars’ stance on the ‘Russian idea’, both men were bought up within 
the realms of the Westernised nobility, but believed in the resurrection of Grand Muscovy, and 
were a product this ‘multi-history’. The building of more churches and monasteries took place 
and the architecture changed to reflect this. The most notable examples would be the State 
Historical Museum and Gum Department Store on Red Square.125 Aleksandr III felt compelled 
to resurrect Russia’s roots in order to be respected abroad and restore order at home. The most 
important aspect, however, would be the focus on autocracy. Aleksandr III hated the 
revolutionaries who murdered his father and bought instability to Russia. Laws were introduced 
to combat radicalism and designed to bypass the courts in his ‘Statute on Measures for the 
Preservation of Political Order and Social Tranquility’. This remained in force until 1917, with 
Lenin labelling it the ‘de facto constitution of Russia’. As Daniel Beer notes, it effectively 
suspended the law.126 It could be argued that his son Nicholas II’s biggest misgiving was 
introducing the Duma. The Duma’s principles were based on Western ones; Nicholas had no 
intention of sharing power, but in order for this to properly function, some powers would have 
to be relinquished. Instead, the first two Dumas served to be his personal playthings and the 
divisions in politics and society made it very dysfunctional. Increased censorship, lack of shared 
power and failure to bring others into the political process show Nicholas never cared to 
‘Westernise’ his country, perceiving democracy as a weakness (an argument that persists). The 
only thing which really united Russians under his reign was the Orthodox Church. By 1918, 
practically all Russians were Orthodox and Moscow had a church on every street corner.      
The Soviet state relied on intense Marxist-Leninist propaganda, which ranged from the 
gloriously enlightened Moscow leadership, class enemies and the promise of a bright and 
prosperous future (New Jerusalem) to unify a diverse population. It was a different multi-
history, but one which also recycled old ideas. The Soviet state relied on its own heroes in 
replacing the saints, and the leadership cult remained. Soviet socialism was a new kind of 
Russian idea, one that Russified a relatively new European political ideology, sticking to the 
image permeating Russian culture of higher ideals (and leaders) beyond human control. For a 
while, at least, this worked well. The collectiveness and self-sacrificing through the promotion 
of wider socio-economic goals, particularly true of Stalinism, continued to be viewed as the 
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ideal way for society to function. Something it learnt from the nineteenth century Russian ideas, 
especially those championed by Nicholas I, was the general absence of civic institutions needed 
to demand loyalty.127 The civic identity had a weak underpinning. Sole reliance on the Orthodox 
Church and Russian language could only go so far, as could ideas of ethnicity because they are 
explicitly excluding. An important difference is that Soviet leaders were also party leaders, and 
the Communist Party was the vehicle and master of all walks of life, firmly in control of the 
country’s destiny. Nevertheless, Russian was the lingua franca, languages with no written 
alphabet started using Cyrillic and a great portion of Soviet culture had Russian roots. It still 
stressed the idea that the USSR was a home for all peoples and social classes since Marx 
preached that the worker had no nationality.128 For this reason, the Soviet government arguably 
set out to create a culture ‘separate’ from politics. A culture that required literacy and knowledge 
and had no time for material culture in order to overcome capitalism and eradicate 
backwardness.129  
The Komsomols and Pioneers became another way to share the ideas binding the nation together 
through socialisation and upbringing. Stalinism was a kind of proto nationalism, which although 
rigged with paradoxes, primarily focused on defending socialism in the face of hostile capitalist 
forces. Stalinism also invoked a positive usable past, the reason as Mark Sandle testifies, was to 
consolidate the system.130 Also a ‘multi-history’, traditions from Kievan Rus’ such as unity of 
the state and centralisation on a grander scale, were evoked and made up a large part of 
derzhavnost’. The new baroque-style buildings and heroes (Stakhanovites and New Soviet man) 
were all created to support the message portrayed and challenge and replace old ecclesiastical 
ways. Furthermore, everything came to serve a specific purpose, people included, who were all 
expected to participate.131 The Five Year plans, while not part of Marxist doctrine, were justified 
in the name of socialism. Stalin believed that in order for utopia to be achieved, yesterday’s 
people had to be exterminated as a historical necessity. To reach this ‘promised land’ the journey 
had to be ‘sped up’ to purify life quickly.132 The Khrushchev and Brezhnev years also adhere to 
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the ‘Russian idea’, the latter possessing an important lesson for the modern era. The Khrushchev 
Thaw and his socialist fatherland’s competition with the capitalist West has parallels with the 
old Slavophile belief that Russia should save others.133 Under Brezhnev in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the USSR had to stand out from other socialist countries, as a superpower 
experiencing a lack of fundamental changes (‘stagnation’) that needed masking. ‘Developed 
socialism’ had to create the impression that the USSR was still on a special path towards 
communism and more advanced than other socialist countries. The fundamental problem was 
that the message was disjoined from reality, and the population were no longer illiterate peasants 
prone to barefaced manipulation. This is why history in the modern day must be recognisable, 
otherwise people feel patriotic or legitimise the narrative.  
 
Yeltsin, Putin and the search for Russia  
 
Yeltsin claimed after the Soviet collapse that Russia needed a ‘new idea’ and quest for a new 
identity. The problem was it paid little attention to patriotism, national symbolism or a positive 
history. This made an already difficult task extremely complicated. The education system 
received a new set of values, but the historical narrative was a negative and complex mosaic. 
Public celebrations were mediocre and without new national heroes. Monuments were taken 
down and not replaced and street names reverted to their pre-revolutionary ones usually without 
explanation. According to Lynn Williams, nations whether new, transitional or old need to 
construct a single cultural identity to match the new political identity.134 History has to be 
assimilated into the official culture with the appropriate language. Moreover, if the political and 
cultural identity directly match, this can cause over centralisation. The USSR is an extreme 
example of this, and Yeltsin wanted to avoid this scenario. Article 13.2 of the 1993 Constitution 
prohibits state ideology in the Russian Federation, with article 14.1 proclaiming Russia a secular 
state.135 No vehicle was selected to take any such patriotic message or ‘Russian Idea’ to the 
population. Anything cemented in policy never filtered through to the disillusioned population. 
When dealing with the issue of Soviet nostalgia or the ‘Soviet Idea’, its supporters and the 
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Communist Party (KPRF) could rely on the rosier aspects of public memory to generate support 
in elections with Russia’s deteriorating position and polarisation.  
Yeltsin appeared keen to align Russia with the West and demonised the USSR at home. One 
major consequence of this, which still exists, is that it created hostility. This is a core part of the 
Putin narrative (explored in the next chapter), which essentially states that Russia fell victim to 
unfair treatment from the West and their domestic situation was taken advantage of. ‘Liberal’ 
or Western ideas became increasingly unpopular as many political decisions reflected the 
political reality (see next chapter). More importantly, such political parties have had an inability 
to develop an ideology of ‘liberal nationalism’ to legitimise this form of democracy based upon 
the free market and non-imperial borders.136 NATO enlargement added to making Russia appear 
weak and denying it access to the European political space Yeltsin sought.137 Yeltsin did suggest 
replacing NATO with the OSCE, feeling it would take Russian concerns more seriously, as well 
as those of Eurasia as a whole. Europe and Russia sat at different stages of evolution meaning 
that no full assimilation was ever likely, especially if it could only occur on one side’s terms. 
Moreover, a weak Russia goes against the ‘Russian Idea’ and this hurt Yeltsin’s popularity. In 
addition, Russia’s failure to Westernise led to criticism from Western powers. This is despite 
the West continuing to have a direct, but passive influence on Russia. Completely embracing 
Western influence strays Russia from its special path, but becoming a humanistic and organic 
nation also has constraints.    
Putin’s leadership instantly had a different tone. Some of the most repeated words in the 1993 
Constitution (sovereignty and integrity) have become a cornerstone of the message, along with 
exercising the greater powers of the presidency, than say France or the U.S. The lens of history, 
on the other hand, is focused on continuity, combining state borders with a multi-cultural and 
ethnic tone. Without the people’s belief in the system, Putin lacks a mandate to revive the 
Russian Idea. In Putin’s own words, history is a crucial part of rebuilding Russianness. In 2012, 
he said  
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Russia must build the future on strong foundation that is patriotism, while seeking 
to preserve and enrich [Russia]. Becoming a modern and developing nation and 
simultaneously maintaining national features to prevent losing an identity requires 
respect for [our] history, traditions and spiritual values of our people spanning a 
thousand years.138  
 
This explains why the role of the Great Patriotic War, heroes and sacrifice are so important. The 
Great Patriotic War solidified the Soviet identity. More than a century before, the Patriotic War 
confirmed the myth of a sacred and holy Russia. Today, they are used to unify the multi-ethnic 
nation by emphasising the diverse population’s shared experience. Something that sets Putin 
apart from the old Slavophiles and Westerners is the ‘modernisation’ element. Modernisation 
involves a central focus of urbanisation, communications and development of modern political 
institutions, such as the army and nation state. The re-centralisation of power and role of the 
state in defining this is also key. In terms of continuity, it restores the concept of a strong central 
figurehead and strong state, something often deemed as necessary for Russia. A Levada poll 
from 2015 found 85% were proud of the armed forces, an increase of 21% since 2012.139 In 
addition, others showed that 88% believe in a strong and hard government with a further 38% 
wanting Putin and Russia to be tougher, and 61% preferring order and stability over democracy.  
Culturally, ‘Russianness’ is still being fought over, though with far more concreteness than 
Yeltsin. As Jeffrey Murer stated, feeling oneself as Russian and the notion of rodina does not 
prevent one from speaking a Siberian, Finno-Ugric, or Altaic language.140 He concedes that the 
Russian language is important for separating oneself from the Finns, Lithuanians etc, but this 
statement does match up with many recent television documentaries and the Russian 
Constitution, which as a way of inclusion suggest non-ethnic Russians are a part of the ‘wider-
Russian identity’. Examples would be Article 3.4 of the Constitution and Kto my? (who are 
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we?), a documentary on the culture channel Rossiya-K (‘K’ is for kultura).141 Modern 
discussions of the Russian idea help make historical continuity visible, especially on television, 
where the effort to keep history alive is massive. A majority of the population believe television 
provides reliable information, and therefore, those channels run directly or indirectly by the state 
can reproduce a cultural and political consensus more effectively.142 This was also true of 
Putin’s decision to restore imperial and Soviet symbols to the public sphere. As previously 
mentioned, symbolism is central to defining Russianness and reflects this as a ‘multi-history’. 
This was a battle Putin had to win to secure his own legitimacy. The Russian compatriots are 
another example of trying to establish a wider Russian identity that goes beyond the state’s 
modern borders. Putin views compatriots as a resource to achieve certain aims and restored the 
idea of a larger homeland for the compatriots, who featured prominently in the Foreign Policy 
Concept 2013. The countries who fall under the Moscow Patriarchy are included in the 
‘compatriots’ definition, yet Putin at one time stretched it to all Russian speakers beyond the 
‘historic homeland’. Since Crimea, there have been attempts to disassociate Russians abroad 
with their country of residence to establish political or emotional loyalties.143 There are many 
paradoxes and inconsistencies with the compatriots, however. While often used as Russia’s 
‘excuse’ to intervene in the affairs of the former Soviet states, cultural norms and traditions must 
be desirable instead of enforced if the message is to be genuinely successful. At present, it is 
hard to ascertain the degree of success with the compatriots, but some recent developments have 
proven popular. After Maidan, the Russian state made it easier for Ukrainian refugees to obtain 
education grants and places at school and university using their Ukrainian passports, and for 
foreigners serving in the military to gain Russian citizenship.144   
Regarding the place of religion in Russia today, there is a clear closeness between the state and 
Orthodox Church without official connection. However, since 2012 a new policy for state run 
schools to teach the ‘fundamentals of religious cultures’ was enacted.145 The new fourth-class 
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course teaches the ‘traditional’ religions of Russia – Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism 
– which are transmitted from one generation to the next.146 Whilst the intention is to promote 
inter-religious harmony and tolerance, this law, according to Lisovskaya and Karpov, is 
deliberately exclusive. Firstly, nothing is taught of Western Christianity, and Orthodoxy is 
presented as the ‘first among equals’.147 The focus of ‘traditional’ religions creates a privileged 
status for them and in recent years, the ‘nontraditional’ religions have had their rights 
curtailed.148 This is an attempt to solidify the wider Russian identity and break down the barrier 
of religion. After the Soviet collapse, religions were able to claim the peoples of a certain 
territory or ethnicity as their own, regardless of whether they followed a particular religion or 
not. Placing all under the ‘Russian’ umbrella through a shared history is essential to upholding 
stability, particularly in more sensitive regions like the North Caucuses.  
 
Then again, Putin believes that the Orthodox Church was and is doing a lot to educate Russian 
citizens in the spirit of patriotism, love for the motherland and spiritual values.149 The Orthodox 
Church is an instrument of soft power, which provides a moral justification to the situation in 
Russia today. It does so via stressing the ties of family as well as reinforcing the notion of 
spiritual unity and the code of conduct in society, yet with a sense of national identity added. 
While the former Patriarch Aleksei advocated an active partnership between church and state, 
he did so in a very cautious and diplomatic manner. Dmitry Medvedev also trod carefully with 
patriotic statements. Kirill is far less cautious. The indirect message that Russia’s universal 
mission is alive and well helps to quell domestic threats if the population feel a greater sense of 
spiritual togetherness. A VTsIOM poll in June 2015 found 47% of Russians believe the church 
‘should ideally influence society’s spiritual life, but not intervene in political affairs, yet 64% 
approved of the secular principle.150 Traditionally anti-Western, the Orthodox Church’s 
classical isolation and xenophobia went hand in hand with the counter sanctions during Maidan 
2014. Their role as the unifier of all the Russia’s and specific culture that developed in Russia 
includes Ukraine and Ukrainians in its own definition. The emphasis the Church places on 
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ethnicity and nationality has sparked a sense of betrayal among Russians, to the point where 
Ukraine has been viewed as increasingly unfriendly to Russia. In general, their mission and 
reason for central inclusion is as the ‘tradition keeper’.151 Thus, continuity thrives as the new 
Russian Idea restores past glories to improve today’s ills, as the organic way is the ‘right’ way.  
Putin has also sent conflicting messages to the West over what kind of Russia he is trying to 
construct. Recently, there has been an attempt to distance Russia from the West. How Putin 
refers to the West is often ambiguous, as it has been historically. As Igor Zevelev states, the 
construction of a self-image is in part formed by what other’s think.152 To this end, Russia’s 
foreign policy rhetoric often influences public opinion and the historical narrative alike. For 
instance, when the ‘besieged fortress’ mentality emerges, like in the Foreign Policy Concept 
2016, the state becomes more assertive and the narrative starts to champion ‘strong leaders’. 
The ambiguity is partly to create distance but also to display sovereignty and assert the state’s 
interests. Putin has referred to Western countries as ‘friends’, ‘partners’ and even ‘colleagues’ 
like in the aftermath of the Crimean Annexation.153 It suggests that while a working relationship 
is desirable, their interests are principally different and perhaps incompatible. Russia as the great 
military power and potentially threatening ‘other’ plays into the Putin narrative this way, too. 
The desired image is one of a state capable of defending its interests. This encourages a modern 
day mythologising of the leader; the t-shirts depicting Putin bare chested on horseback in the 
Siberian Mountains or wearing military uniform are all designed to create this effect. While a 
working relationship has been desired since Putin became president, it is clear that he and the 
Russian population fear Western involvement in domestic affairs. The reason, as noted, is a 
distortion from the historic and moral consciousness has more than once led to state weakness 
and loss of sovereignty. The memory of the 1990s is still fresh, and the arrest of figures like 
Mikhail Khordokovsky was widely popular. In 2016, the Duma also passed a law giving 
Russia’s courts to oppose any international law if it conflicts with home law.  
 
This has played its part in restarting discussions about whether Russia is a unique civilisation 
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and given way to the new philosophy of Eurasianism. While Putin initially continued to co-
operate and work closely with Europe, it has become increasingly clear that he wants to build a 
different system based upon the historic peculiarities of Russia. The widening gap between the 
West and Russia since 2014 caused a pivot eastward to focus on ties with the former Soviet 
republics. The roots of this arguably start in 2004 with the Colour Revolutions, reflecting the 
supposed struggle between the ‘Atlanticists’ and post-Soviet space. Eurasianisms’ most famous 
advocate is philosopher and political activist, Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin rejects liberalism, 
Marxism and fascism, and is a staunch nationalist who believes that the ideal society is based 
upon tradition. According to Dugin, history must be the history of traditions, with politics 
playing a secondary role.154 Tying in nicely with the Putin narrative, Eurasianism’s goal is to 
create a Eurasian socio political network to counter the American dominated ‘Atlanticists’. The 
Eurasian Economic Union is seeking ever-closer union and additional members to equal the EU. 
This is also a reactionary response and signs of the besieged fortress mentality, whereby the 
state feels surrounded and encircled by western powers seeking to undermine it. Important to 
note here is that Eurasianism has not really taken off and Dugin is mostly known outside of 
Russia. Eurasianism became a reactionary approach to protect and secure the country’s interests 
in a homogenous fashion. Its significance for Russianness stems from the focus on the ‘near 
abroad’ and what is similar between them that separates their interests from the West. It could 
act as a self-fulfilling prophecy concerning Russia’s destiny; neither Europe nor Asia. It keeps 
alive the continuity aspect and would be a final rejection of the Kozyrev Doctrine.  
 
 
Conclusion  
Putin’s ‘Russian idea’ is strengthening Russia’s ties to its past, highlighting the right way for its 
future development is organic, through traditions which set it apart from the world. The refocus 
on the history of ideas and Russia’s unique experience is designed to increase a sense of 
patriotism that is rooted in past glories and a lost time. It should also be stressed at this point 
that the historic identity and the reassessment of the past is not conducted from a purely moral 
standpoint. Hence, the darker sides are easier to incorporate or dismiss without huge uproar. 
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Continuity helps foster the idea that the USSR was separate neither from Russian history, nor 
in vain. Moreover, that despite the radical change of direction, the ‘Russia that we lost’ has not 
disappeared forever. Inventing a new Russian idea proved to be impossible, meaning falling 
back onto past ideas of Russia as a humane, spiritual great nation with a long history of a country 
largely unaffected by the outside world, which also reached great achievements, is more secure. 
The multi-history that Russianness is also reflects the nature of istoricheskaya politika, which 
will be analysed in the next chapter.  
If one argues that Russia is unique, it must be specified what it is different from; in this case, it 
is different compared to the average European country. The difference comes from a historical 
experience that developed separately from the European context, and when it collided, 
systemically borrowed auspicious aspects that became ‘Russianised’. There may be an eventual 
clash with the principle of modernisation while trying to maintain ancient traditions and 
principles, as well as imperial and Soviet customs. This would require a further revaluation of 
Russia. Moreover, if Peter I, Stalin and Putin are considered worthy models, the reinterpretation 
promises significant and far-reaching outcomes.  
The Slavophile and Westerner split continues in Russian life, although now under the labels of 
conservative (or patriots) and liberal. The conservatives argue to see Russia and the Russian 
state from a homogenous standpoint. This is why they have an easier time appealing to people’s 
nostalgia. Today, conservatives also want a return to a mythical time, or at least, to see the more 
auspicious values and principles championed and put centre stage. The lines of division and 
politics of history for championing a better Russia will be explored in the next chapter. The calls 
for the restoration of the Romanov family to Russia and Soviet style health and education system 
reflect how important continuity is in Russian society. They also show that more than one Russia 
is possible and exists in the minds of the people. Putin, therefore, seeks to uphold the traditions 
as a consensus builder as well as restorer of Russia and protector of its interests.  
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Chapter Three 
The Politics of History in Putin’s Russia 
 
As Russian history is often related to the state, the ‘glory days’ or rosier episodes are those when 
it was strong and the country on a clear path fulfilling its messianic mission. In the absence of 
ideology and a state religion, a cherry picked past stressing the role of the state (derzhavnost’ or 
‘stateness’) helps fill the void. State power is symbolic to the idea of ‘Russia’ as it fills the role 
of protector and oppressor; Putin is its current face. In the new Russia, the treatment of history 
is also a question about democracy. How the state handles the past directly reflects its own 
image. Therefore, the political battle for the possession of history is not a façade, but a key part 
of completing state formation. It is also an ideal channel for their message. According to the 
Putin narrative, the state has to assert itself in order to safeguard the nation’s interest.155 Like 
Aleksandr III and Nicholas II, Putin has a continued idea of what Russia is (and was). To re-
assert this, the state must smooth over the fractures of history and focus on a positive past to 
consolidate the nation.156 Whilst this idea is a recycled one (and therefore a product of the past 
itself), it should be stressed that its main purpose is to use the past to explain modern 
complexities and set the agenda of what Russia ‘should be’.  
This chapter will analyse the Russian state’s formation post-1991 and focus on how 
istoricheskaya politika (historical politics) was the hot iron used to solder a crumbling state back 
together. It was also the fuel that started a fiercely contested political battle to secure Russia’s 
future and shape its identity. As well as analysing the necessity of history in the state building 
process, this chapter will demonstrate the complex political issues surrounding the past, 
promoting it to Russia’s population and using it as a backdrop and legitimisation tool for policy. 
History is a space where the government can make deals to resolve social conflicts, define itself 
and be used as a marker for progress. This explains why istoricheskaya politika has become so 
prevalent, and this chapter will explore its use and purpose in politics. This chapter also 
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considers how Russian foreign policy is a response to the domestic situation, and the role the 
past had in selecting Russia’s image projection abroad. The past has come to define the chosen 
method of foreign policy, as well influencing the development of Russian political culture post 
communism.  
Russia’s past remained an unavoidable political debate for the government, but the way it has 
been handled since 2000 added to Putin’s own personal credibility. History became a progress 
marker and reflection of the country’s status in a positive light by focusing on the ‘glory days’. 
In general, history is a soft power tool (cultural influence) that can explain the state of Russian 
democracy. It also acts as a glue to hold the country together, filling the vacuum created after 
the collapse of the USSR - whereby the ideology and Communist Party which held the country 
together, vanished. Consensus on a ‘continued’ Russian state (the legal successor to the USSR) 
asserts istoricheskaya politika’s necessity. Putinism centers on stability, unity, social consensus, 
sovereignty and patriotism as the building blocks of state consolidation. These all flow and 
derive from the ability of the Russian state to exercise its power. Sovereingty and stability are 
considered as key to securing some form of democratic governance in Russia. These were absent 
in the initial state building process post communism. By focusing on these aspects, safeguarding 
history and preventing ‘falsifications’ keeps the myth of the state and Russia alive. Symbols are 
the ultimate reinforcement of this, serving as a constant reminder of the state’s longevity.   
Russia is unique because no political consensus formed after the collapse of communism. While 
it had historical traditions of power and statehood it could fall back on, the selection process and 
path forward has been boldly contested. Boris Yeltsin wrote in his Midnight Memoirs, that had 
Russia chosen to be the legal successor of its pre-1917 self, the world would have viewed it and 
its people differently. The relationship and interpretation of history would have also been 
different. A supplementary point is that in other former European Soviet bloc nations, the search 
for a usable democratic past was easier and consensual. Meanwhile, many segments of the past 
are still fought over in the political space, most recently the legacy of the 1917 revolution and 
murder of the royal family. The government slowly came to conclude it was a tragedy in order 
to avoid alienating key segments of the population. Abroad, however, the state has been quite 
quick to evoke a patriotic past in its responses to gain its support. As such, the past is a channel 
for its own message and definition.  
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The post-Soviet Russian state as a product of the past  
 
Russia witnessed a ‘flight from sovereignty’ during the 1990s.157 State structures had broken 
down and society was falling apart. One can approach this from two angles. On the one hand, 
liberal democracy or ‘western ways’ ignored the reality of the Russian situation after the USSR’s 
collapse, as Allen C. Lynch maintains.158 On the other, as Lilia Shevtsova argues, Russia did 
not know how to handle its newfound freedoms.159 It lacked a democratic legacy to build on 
which meant transitioning to liberal democracy would be problematic. The rediscovery and 
popularity of pre-revolutionary Russia in the 1990s was a distraction in the new state 
construction. Using history as an influential tool in the transition phase further emphasised the 
absence of liberal democracy in Russian history, and supports the case for rejecting it as a 
suitable model.160 The conservative ‘red-brown’ opposition were better placed to make links 
with the past for legitimisation. Communists claimed ownership of much of the twentieth 
century, and could rely on nostalgia up to a point. Nationalists, meanwhile, fixated around 
concepts of pan-Slavism and orthodoxy. Yet, both shared an opposition to the anti-national 
character of the Yeltsin reform programme, and in this case, history was utilised as ‘proof’ of 
their superior beliefs.161 Yet the line between myth and fact was often blurred.  
 
What should also be considered is Russian lawmaker Konstantin Kosachev’s proposal, outlined 
in 2010 on Ekho Moskvy radio station. Kosachev focuses on Russia’s legal status as the official 
successor state to the USSR, as opposed to the Russia of 1917. According to Kosachev, as the 
USSR’s legal successor, Moscow should elaborate on a ‘historical doctrine of principles’ that 
would once and for all disclaim financial, legal and moral responsibility for the Soviet 
authorities’ actions on the former territory of the USSR.162 In essence, this proposal boils down 
to two points. Firstly, that Russia should fulfill all international obligations of the USSR as its 
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successor state, however, still refuses to accept responsibility for any crimes it committed. 
Secondly, and in addition to this, the state does not accept any claims of violations, international 
and domestic, from the Soviet authorities.163 The Soviet past cannot simply be ignored, and the 
decision to utilise beneficially was only natural.  
Working within this framework, the use of history in regime transition highlights constraints on 
what is realistically achievable.164 History is often a passive force driving democratic change, 
but in the Putin Agenda, it is used to forward the principles of derzhavnost’ and 
gosudarstvennost’ (statehood) which historically required a central figurehead to rule. It also 
demonstrates how a lack of historical consensus and failure to come to terms with the past are a 
stiff obstacle in transitioning to democracy. As discussed in Chapter Two, the state defines the 
national culture. For istoricheskaya politika to be successful, it requires reappraisal of the nature 
of the state in order to reconcile with the past to plausibly refer to it as normal or a ‘return to 
normality’. Although every former communist country underwent a revision of its past post 
1991, Russia’s governing traditions were of derzhavnost’ and gosudarstvennost’. Although 
Yeltsin attempted to move Russia as far as he could from the USSR’s legacy, an alignment with 
the West was not so straightforward. Czechia and the Baltic states had a democratic past to 
consider during state formation, which allowed them to deflect blame for the communist 
oppression onto Moscow; Russia had to reconcile with the Soviet state’s past differently. The 
October Revolution meant accepting the blame and or an admission that the promise of 1917 
were never fulfilled. For the state to be successful in the new political reality, it had to fall back 
on its past as a global power and strong central organ supported with examples of achievement. 
The absence of a strong state or leader prevented the conditions for a majority of Russians to 
feel pride in their country. Instead, the Russian state appeared weak, humiliated and unable to 
carry out basic functions.  
The nationalist opposition to Yeltsin latched onto this idea, proclaiming that such a weak state 
could not be truly ‘Russia’, as derzhavnost’ and gosudarstvennost’ alike cannot accommodate 
Yeltsin’s shortcomings. For Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Liberal Democrat Party (LDPR), this 
weakness specifically entailed openness to foreign influence as a direct cause of the country’s 
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ills.165 Moreover, the lack of any structure delayed the modernisation process that Russia 
desperately sought. Yeltsin’s desired shift towards greater democracy was met with the 
population harking back to a time where a strong state ruled over a stable prosperous country. 
This naturally became sentimentalised amidst the growing chaos. As David Lowenthal notes, 
nostalgia only has to look attractive and part of this attraction is the glorious triumphing over 
the turbulent.166 What this demonstrates is that one of Yeltsin’s keys to establishing a successful 
government was to win the history battle. Unfortunately for Yeltsin, there were no successful 
historical figures or periods he could relate to or rely on for legitimisation. The failure to appease 
Soviet nostalgia and nationalist sentiments undermined his rule. National symbols were 
meaningless, and by trying to avoid statism or authoritarian like behaviour, patriotism suffered. 
As a result, Yeltsin stopped demonising the USSR when it became hugely unpopular to do so.167 
However, the untimeliness of this also had consequences for other ‘liberal’ political parties; 
Yeltsin’s record discredited Westernism and democracy as a whole. Russia continued 
descending into chaos without a past of which it could be outwardly proud.  
Like any nation, Russia had to choose a history suited to its national interests that reflects the 
goals of the new state. The Putin Agenda stresses the need for national unity before normality 
in politics and in turn creates the image of hostile others undermining Russia’s special mission. 
At the same time, it shows that Russia as a whole, the state especially, is still grappling with the 
Soviet legacy. For this reason, it is unsurprising that one of Medvedev’s priorities was to combat 
the ‘falsification of history’, with the 2009 commission.168 It served as a protection of the state’s 
legacy and status, yet it was also introduced after the Georgian War. Here, the international 
community widely condemned Russia’s actions. This can be viewed as both a reaction to the 
outside world, but also as an attempt to rally the population. As Danu Marin writes, the military 
is synonymous with historical patriotism in Russia.169 No patriotic message can work without a 
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strong military, as Nicholas II experienced after the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05. As both were 
somewhat bruised during the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, thus, it could also capitalise on 
a current situation that concerned an area in Russia’s historic areas of special interest. There was 
also a meticulous focus on the Great Patriotic War that went hand in hand with legitimising its 
intervention as ‘peacekeeping’, a term that Putin and his governments have often used to justify 
interventions in the ’near abroad’.170  
It became clear to many that only a strong state could bring stability. The recent past ‘proved’ 
that the state was the only actor who could lead the way since the population was ill equipped 
after centuries of absolutism and seventy-four years of authoritarian communism. In addition, it 
pushed the idea that state formation was incomplete (and arguably, is still developing). For 
democracy to succeed in Russia, the institutions have to function.171 History is a necessary 
backdrop for this concept as it can provide insights into potential alternatives. It allows us to 
carefully select specific events, which in the case of contemporary Russian, adhere to the official 
narrative.172 Thus, as the state acts and establishes central motifs, it makes casual links to build 
up the desired account. While this account is not challenging to locate, the concept of 
istoricheskaya politika remains a puzzle. It is not an official policy, nor is it a Soviet-style 
propaganda replacement. The usable past is cherry picked, so istoricheskaya politika lacks any 
consistency. It cannot be referred to as ideology either; ideology is consistent, narrower and 
more directly mobilised. Putin has also advised against imposing a particular worldview, stating 
‘we have already gone through all of this in our history, as you know, and we have no intention 
of returning to the past’.173 The aim of istoricheskaya politika is simply to secure legitimacy and 
essentially serves as a political currency to cash in and defend the governing style. History is 
above politics and can justify the present situation. In order to secure legitimacy, however, the 
population must largely be behind the state so its actions go largely uncontested. Istoricheskaya 
politika is not only inseparable from Putinism and its message; it is the soil it stems from. 
Istoricheskaya politika is a careful balancing act and not a blanket term. The Stalinist terror is a 
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thorn in the state’s side, whilst the Great Patriotic War is vigorously promoted. From a 
humanitarian perspective, the terror is a black mark on the history of the Russian state that can 
undermine its authority. Whilst a condemnation of the terror has been unavoidable, Putin 
quickly realised another constraint would be to deny the achievements of the Stalin period, 
because certain segments of the population remain rosy eyed over it. Stalinism and the Soviet 
experience have become embedded into the national identity. Ignoring Stalin’s rule is equal to 
disregarding tradition and undermining loyalty to one’s ancestors who endured this experience 
together.  
 
The Putin Agenda, presidencies and politics of history  
 
The Putin Agenda pushes statehood to preserve Russian history, and with it, Russia as a great 
political power.174 Putin’s rule is presented as part of a historical continuity, which is keenly 
emphasised. His style of governance presented as a natural result and inevitability of Russian 
history. This is depicted in recent school history textbooks and can explain the return of the 
‘besieged fortress’ mentality post 2012. It can also explain why the state acts defensively 
concerning negative interpretations of the past. Since Russian history often concerns the state’s 
legacy, its reputation is at stake. A level of safeguarding and protection from ‘falsification’ is 
required to preserve its image. This takes a substantial amount of effort to push the message as 
modern and different mediums are needed. Whilst the darker sides are acknowledged, these are 
kept at arm’s length. The justification for ‘glossing over’ is the need for the federal government 
to manage affairs more directly. What some believe to be censorship and control is viewed by 
the majority as an integral part of state culture. For these reasons, the Putin Agenda and use of 
history is a soft power element of national security. Russian history was noted as a threat in 
Russia’s National Security Doctrine 2009: ‘attempts to re-examine views on Russia’s history’. 
The document spelled out that ‘social cohesion’ would help to combat ‘falsifiers of history’ by 
fostering the spiritual unity of the Russian Federation’s multi-ethinic people’.175 This was 
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timely, as it followed Filippov’s textbook, the Foreign Policy Concept 2008 and History 
Commission 2009. At the very least, history became a priority amongst priorities opposed to a 
major preoccupation of the Russian state.   
 
A huge part of istoricheskaya politika and the agenda is the narrative based around the chaotic 
Yeltsin years with mounting problems. It is the starting point for securing legitimisation. The 
past is also used to define the Russia of today equally, by what it is not – chaotic and problematic 
– as opposed to the stability and success rhetoric of Putin. After Yeltsin resigned, there existed 
a real desire to catch up with the West, strengthen the state institutions and restore order. Russian 
history is riddled with examples of this, means to achieve it (strengthening state power) and this 
continually feeds into the narrative. Since 2012, however, the besieged fortress mentality has 
returned in response to how its actions abroad were received by the international community. In 
both cases, this appeals to the nostalgic sentiments of different groups. On the one hand, this 
made sense as part of restoring Russian pride meant basking in the achievements of its former 
self, and Crimea was an ideal means. However, an effective middle way had to be found. The 
ill-defined and lack of a democratic identity was an added burden of state formation, and 
Yeltsin’s mishandling of the past were a supplement. Russia had a centralised unitary state 
throughout its history, which meant Statism (see below) in some form would inevitably feel 
more natural; or as Catherine Danks argues, because the expectations of democracy fell short of 
the reality, a more authoritarian path first may have been auspicious.176 This is a common view 
expressed by ordinary Russians and experts alike. As Richard Sakwa writes, the history of the 
Russian state can easily be interpreted as a history of missed opportunities in reform.177 
Aleksandr III’s reaction was a response to his father’s reforms, and the 1917 revolutions due to 
his son’s unwillingness to relinquish power. Instead of dwelling on the missed opportunities, 
invoking memories of struggle and everyday hardship as a point of comparison served as a 
powerful message to the population who felt the economic downturn of the 1990s and post 
Crimea. Istoricheskaya politika promises a better future when the crisis is over, as does the Putin 
Agenda. The (preferred) past is a message of hope for a better, tranquil future. 
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Initially, the past under Putin was celebrated in ways reminiscent of the Brezhnev era. The tone 
was about the country’s achievements and self-congratulatory.178 After 2012, it grew 
increasingly patriotic and as will be analysed in subsequent chapters, now focuses on the need 
to overcome enemies and hardship. The struggle with foreign powers after the Ukraine Crisis 
caused a retreat into the besieged fortress mentality and a message of encirclement to flourish. 
This supported by greater references to the Great Patriotic War, revisions of the Stalin era and 
admiration for leaders like Aleksandr I.  
 
Despite depictions of strength and power, the Putin Agenda demonstrates that the state is acting 
from a position of vulnerability. This includes, but is not exclusive to, defending itself from 
‘hostile’ external forces, the possibility of rejection by CIS countries of its soft power strategies 
and internal unrest in the form of political opposition and Islamic extremism. Further signs of 
an inconsistent historical narrative are displayed here, meaning the Putin Agenda’s narrative 
follows very straightforward, rigid lines. Primarily centered on continuity and restoration of the 
great power status, it also requires strong emphasis on stability, unity, social consensus, 
sovereignty and patriotism. All of these factors play off each other and the absence of one 
weakens the rest. The main underlying factor in much of this is the use of history as a prop to 
assert ‘great powerness’. Some sort of historical evidence is required for this otherwise 
consensus cannot be built. Moreover, if continuity is to be successful, then exhibiting ‘proof’ is 
essential. The chosen past has to reflect those ideals sought after. The agenda is, therefore, a 
particular formula dependent upon certain ingreidents. The removal of one disrupts the flow of 
progress and makes the other concepts redundant (see diagram below).179  
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Diagram 1: The Putin Formula (Pearce, 2017) 
As Putinism centers on unity, consensus, centralisation, a strong state, sovereignty, patriotism 
and close attention to Russia’s geographical position, according to the underlying narrative as 
outlined by Edwin Bacon, these areas were ignored during the 1990s causing the flight from 
sovereignty, and with it a departure from tradition and a disregard for Russia’s history. For as 
long as a reconciliation with the past occurs with Russia’s development in a distinct and unique 
direction, stability is maintained, as it was in the ‘rosier’ parts of history. When establishing the 
national interest, the strongman image helps to foster opinions that Putin is capable of going 
toe-to-toe with foreign leaders and defending national interests.180 It furthers the notion of how 
Russia should be ruled placing Putin on the same shelf as previous leaders known for standing 
up to the West and ruling with authority (Aleksandr I). With regard to this historical narrative, 
the term ‘continuum’ can also reflect the state’s desire for historical continuity. Thus, for this 
historical continuity to occur the past must be reconciled with.   
As well as derzhavnost’ and gosudarsvennost’, another term surfaced in the mid-2000s to 
explain Russia’s political situation; samostoyatel’nost’ (sovereign independence). Vladislav 
Surkov, the Kremlin’s chief ideologue, first introduced the term ‘sovereign democracy’ as an 
attempt to intertwine the ‘Russian idea’ deeper into policy and legitimise greater state control, 
but did so unsuccessfully.181 Putin and Medvedev’s use of samostoyatel’nost’ was a replacement 
to reflect these ideals adding to the historic myth of the state. The narrative then dictates that if 
the state cannot act freely and if the institutions do not function, then Russia cannot be a 
                                                          
180 N. Zlobin, ‘Putin’s Beseiged Fortress’, The Moscow Times online, 
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putins-besieged-fortress/453155.html>  accessed 14/09/2015 
181 “Transcript of Speech by Vladislav Surkov at “Delovoi Rossii” Business Forum, 17th May 2005, 
<www.integrum.ru>: Nasledie Otechestvo, accessed 05/12/2016.  
77 
 
democracy. This does not only refer to the Yeltsin years, but also the Dumas of Nicholas II and 
Provisional Government. The leaders were weak, so were state institutions. The state as the 
historical protector of Russia must use its past as a shield since it bears the battle scars as a sign 
of proof, further highlighting how the state acts from a position of vulnerability. Historically, 
Russia has seen the top struggle to control below and today’s situation is no different. The past 
now reflects the need for a strong state as a traditional Russian value.    
Under Medvedev, this model remained largely intact, however, his foreign policy direction 
began to focus more on CIS, SCO and BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa). The deterioration of Russo-Western relations has seen this trend continue. When 
analysed closer, this pivot shows Russia began to exploit the civilisational role it has in the post-
Soviet space more than previously. To successfully exploit Russia’s civilisational role, specific 
attention must be paid to the past in order to demonstrate why this is an ideal path to follow. 
This in turn gives ammunition to Eurasianist thinkers and ‘fifth columnists’ in the Izborskii 
Club. Putin was concerned about greater ‘liberalisation’ under Medvedev and the global 
financial crisis added to this. Deficits became the norm post-2010, which had an effect on local 
governments and people’s personal income. Seventy-seven out of eighty-three regions were 
running fiscal deficits in 2014.182 In 2011-12, demonstrations occurred in Moscow, which 
discredits the Putin Agenda, as national unity behind this message appears absent. From the 
beginning of Putin’s third term, the narrative alone could no longer suffice; the state needed to 
arouse patriotic emotions to generate popular support.183 After the Crimean annexation, Russia’s 
geopolitical position was painted as a struggle to overcome like the Great Patriotic War.184  
 
The politics of history and the Russian people 
 
In order to show the complexities of implementing istoricheskaya politika, this section uses 
Nataliya Zubarevich’s ‘Four Russias’ model to analyse the domestic situation. According to 
Zubarevich, the new political reality (post-Soviet Russia) has created ‘Four Russias’ marked by 
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persistent economic and social differentiations. These groups are labeled Russia One, Two, 
Three and Four - the latter two often grouped together.185 One drawback of this model is that 
this is largely based on regional differences when taking into account the values and way of life 
in each group. Ethnicity is not considered and the Russian Federation has over one hundred 
different ethnic groups. Second, Russia’s middle class is small, very diverse and are not wholly 
confined to Russia One. Finally, the dispertion of the population matters. Out of 147 million 
people, around 110 million are in European Russia, and the urban population 2010-2017 was 
109 million (74% of the total population).186 The first two groups are much larger, more diverse, 
and mostly West of the Ural Mountains. This model is useful in the sense that it views ‘Russia’ 
not as a single entity. Differences in salary, employment, standard of living and access to 
resources show what people are likely to value, and by extension, how the past can be utilised 
nationwide. 
 
When istoricheskaya politika is utilised it means different things to each group due to their 
personal experiences and circumstances. Thought the past is not a major preoccupation of the 
majority, if the past is not plausible, the population may not legitimise the state or accept its 
explanations for contemporary ills. As politics is limited, public discussions of the past can mask 
the lack of actual policies that improve ordinary citizens’ lives. Whilst the Russian state 
apparatus could initially rely on their own effectiveness, the situation post 2008 changed. As 
noted by Vasile Rotaru, the Medvedev interlude and Putin’s third term saw the Russian state 
switch to a ‘moral’ position of justification as the economy worsened.187 This largely impacted 
foreign policy, but certain domestic laws using historical justifications were also enacted.188 
Since education, the media and public celebrations cross the boundaries of state and society, it 
is unsurprising that some government officials might favour a single school textbook. If all 
citizens receive the same narrative, it can help to unify the population and establish responsible 
citizens through a shared history. As Russian society, the state leadership and the West are 
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continuously at loggerheads with each other, istoricheskaya politika needs to be immensely 
flexible as well as rigid to suit all parties.  
 
Russia One has a higher economic status and consists primarily of those in the largest cities 
(millioniki189) where wealth and access to the outside world is most prevalent. Around 30-40% 
of this group make up the established middle class. Russia Two are those in small cities and 
large towns. Economic success has varying degrees, but wages and living standards are 
generally lower. Russia’s Three and Four are referred to as ‘on the margins, but not marginal’. 
They are the rural heartland of small towns and villages totaling around one quarter of the 
population. Like Russia Two, they are experiencing ‘depopulation’ in search of greater stability. 
Russia’s Two and Three are most likely to possess nostalgic sentiments for the USSR, since the 
union’s shared economic system offered financial stability.190 These towns and cities retained 
their industrial specialisations from the USSR and are often one company towns or have a large 
number of public sector workers. They value stability, employment and wages more than Russia 
One since their income is lower and livelihood dependent upon limited and specific actors. The 
government and KPRF are keen to exploit their discontent with inadequate modernisation, as 
both can rely on connections to the past for their own benefit, as the ‘true bearer of people’s 
values’. The KPRF can use the Soviet era support system as its ammunition whereas the ruling 
United Russia (UR) relies on the Putin narrative. Russia One is a mixed bag particularly the 
small middle class. During the 2000s, the share of public-sector employees grew rapidly. In 
their case, modernisation has been limited to higher consumption standards. Their values remain 
generally statist, illiberal and the demand for institutional modernisation is minimal.  
The response of each group to the Crimean annexation was telling of istoricheskaya politika’s 
success, because the economic downturn resulting from sanctions was experienced differently. 
The economy contracted by 3.7% in 2015, and in January 2016, the ruble hit the ratio of 82 units 
per US dollar (compared to 35 in January 2014).191 The patriotic past was mostly aimed to win 
over Russia’s Two, Three and Four, who are less educated than Russia One and more easily 
convinced by the rhetoric. These residents feel as though they are the ‘providers’ for Russia and 
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are more likely to believe their hard work is being undermined by an external force.192 Diverting 
people’s attention from economic woes to a glorious (stable) past benefitted the government in 
the short term. Putin’s popularity remained high (figures in the next paragraph) and UR won 
handily in the 2016 Duma elections. Among Russia’s Three and Four, the annexation enjoyed 
massive public support as it reaffirmed their traditionalist and often anti-Western sentiments. 
The state could also place the blame of current hardships on ‘malicious foreign enemies’.193 
Both groups have a lack of experience with foreigners, lower education and less access to certain 
resources, thus, were also susceptible to the rhetoric. Russia One was the most affected; the 
worsening conditions of the labour market and frozen wages in the private sector negatively 
affected their personal wealth. Boasting the highest levels of education, income and 
consumption standards meant they had the most to lose.  
 
No rhetoric or patriotic message works without the involvement of the population, meaning 
those beyond the millioniki are a key resource for state security and continuity. When relying 
on a patriotic past in Russia One, its very mixed ideological and demographic status is helpful 
in the sense that the more acute groups within it can be ignored. No popular uprising would 
work without the involvement of Russia Two, who remain behind Putin. Although Putin’s 
popularity declined throughout 2018, his figures were still high (66% in Decmber).194 Any 
uprising looks unlikely due to the shared fear of chaos that this would bring.195 As previously 
mentioned, the 1917 revolutions, Colour Revolutions and Maidan can all be utilised to exploit 
fears of instability. However, and as will be explored in Chapter Four, big cities are still top 
priority and receive the majority of state funds. That is why the interviews in this thesis were 
conducted in Russia’s One and Two, in order to get a broader sense of history’s development in 
education. Russia One’s education experience will set the bar for the rest of the country’s 
development. Zubarevich is correct that bigger cities and towns are more likely to oppose the 
government’s direction, and therefore, its interpretation of the past. However, in the service to 
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policy, history is always a readily available resource to win over key sections of society, most 
of whom reside outside of Russia One.  
 
History and party politics 
Political parties, both ‘opposition’ and those in Russia’s state legislature (‘systematic 
opposition’196), often engage in istoricheskaya politika to set their agendas. With the KPRF, a 
large segment of the twentieth century has a direct impact on its credibility. Apart from the 
ruling UR, the KPRF remains the largest and most established political party. Its association 
with the Soviet political system makes it quickly goes on the defensive when the USSR is 
portrayed in a negative light. Invoking past figures and events that represent glorious 
achievements helps to keeps them relevant and in the public eye. History is a popular topic and 
although it has no real ideological challenges from the left, its electoral performance has suffered 
in the past two decades. The use of history is now a question of Russian democracy, meaning 
that the party who wins the most support can use the past to set the political tone. This combined 
with the KPRF’s inability to respond to social injustice has seen it lose credibility. For his part, 
Putin was successfully able to take the wind from its sails upon coming to power by reinstating 
old Soviet and imperial symbols to public life. The nostalgia surrounding these transformed into 
credit for Putin’s own initiative to bring sections of the population into public life. As such, the 
KPRF has been lefted stranded, clinging onto any leftover nostalgia.  
The KPRF named 2016 ‘The Year of Stalin’, and decided to use his image in the 2016 Duma 
elections.197 Though he was not a prominent campaign symbol, their electoral chances were 
looking bleak enough that some polls had them trailing the LDPR. The hope was that Stalin’s 
image would attract media attention and with it, non-traditional voters to the polls. In that same 
year, the Communist-led government of Novosibirsk paid for twenty-five billboards with 
Stalin’s portrait as part of the Victory Day celebrations.198 By all accounts, this election tactic 
was a failure, yet it shows the party’s desires to protect Stalin’s reputation and reap the benefits 
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of any nostalgia surrounding the achievements of his rule. Zyuganov has called for the re-
Stalinisation of Russian society on the grounds of modernisation and revitalising the support 
system. This was not necessarily a out of place. As recently as 2017 public polling showed 46% 
of Russians had a favourable opinion of Stalin.199 Although Putin and Medvedev have 
condemned totalitarianism and the terror, it is still the most poverty stricken in Russian society 
who admire Stalin.200 The reasons likely come down to the crumbling infrastructure after the 
USSR’s collapse, most notably things such as healthcare and welfare (pensions in particular). 
The 2016 elections saw the KPRF champion these issues as well as education, which as will be 
discussed in Chapter Four, suffers from a lack of public funds and credibility in contrast with 
the Soviet model.  
The KPRF moved very quickly a year out from the centenary of the October revolution in an 
effort to protect Lenin’s legacy in modern Russia, as negative interpretaions could have harmed 
their standing during a year of reflection on the KPRF’s history. In late 2016, MPs were already 
calling for banknotes and coins with Lenin’s portrait and Aurora as part of the celebration.201 
Likewise, an alternative communist Party (Communists of Russia) who broke off from the 
KPRF in 2012, also proposed fines of up to 5,000 rubles and obligatory community service for 
‘revolution deniers’ (those who deny the achievements of the revolution). Its leader, Maksim 
Suraikin, stated in his letter to Duma house speaker that those making empty statements not 
only bring chaos and disorient the younger generations, but seek to disrupt stability of Russian 
society.202 These requests all fell flat, however, as did the KPRF’s book to mark the centenary, 
Time For Selection, Time For Action! While these arguments were taking place, in February 
2017, Moscow and St. Petersburg still had winter and maslenitsa203 decorations out with no 
signs they were planning anything major to commemorate the February Revolution. A solemn 
business-like approach appeared to be the auspicious way to commemorate the revolution.  
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By contrast, the ‘liberal’ parties of Yabloko and Party of People’s freedom (PARNAS) sought 
a denunciation of the October Revolution, demanding an international declaration be signed 
denouncing the totalitarian Communist regimes. Yabloko’s leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, was 
particularly vocal in this regard. Yavlinsky claimed that no legitimate government had existed 
in Russia since the provisional government and that the Romanovs’ murder should be 
recognised as an actual political crime.204 What Yavlinsky perhaps failed to realise was that two 
resolutions condemning communist regimes, from the COE and OSCE respectively, already 
exist. 205 The KPRF has practically ignored both, and the Russian state also does not consider 
these legitimate. Zyuganov has referred to the USSR a counterweight to the imperialists and 
globalists and the country would never forget the treacherous behaviour of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
He also praised Stalin for recognising the need for an alternative world and listing off each 
achievement, starting with the Great Patriotic War.206 What Communists and liberal parties 
share is that these demands serve only to keep them relevant. To revisit Kathleen Smith’s 
argument, ‘democrats’ in Russia have an incapacity to create new symbols and convert past 
glories into symbolic capital. The original messages have to be subverted, and this would take 
a cosmic shift to benefit such parties.207 Unlike the countries of Central Eastern European 
countries, Russia had no unifying or viable pre-1917 legacy for ‘liberals’ to utilise. Despite the 
intention to pursue democracy, Yeltsin’s governments also did not rush to destroy Soviet 
monuments. After the 1993 elections, Yeltsin rehabilitated the memory of those executed by 
Lenin’s orders at Kronstadt, despite no positive historical continuity entailed.208 The narrative 
of the Civil War as a great tragedy has continued after the revolution’s centenary, which shows 
patriotism cannot grow out of negative sub plots. It is also another reason the government were 
very cautious in how they treated the legacy of 1917. The immediate outcome had nothing 
positive to champion patriotic fervour. For his part, Putin spoke cautiously surrounding the 
legacy of the revolution leading up to 2017, usually referring to loss:  
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This is a good moment for looking back on the causes and nature of these events in 
Russia. Not just historians and scholars should do this; Russian society in general 
needs an objective and deep-reaching analysis of these events. This is our common 
history and we need to treat it with respect.209  
 
Although the memory is still sensitive, the anniversary year was when the Russian government 
had to have its say on the revolution. This will be explored more in Chapter Six, but it should 
be noted that Putin’s response inevitably met backlash from every other political group. The 
KPRF accused the government of ignoring the revolution and its achievements, while liberals 
blasted the ‘glossing over’ and no condemnation of the revolution’s darker sides. Whilst the 
Great Patriotic War can tell a tale of immense suffering, brutality and hardship overcome by 
tremendous sacrifice and bravery, the revolutions get contentious due to the aftermath; a minor 
party taking control, Civil War, the monarchy’s execution and the Red Terror. In contemporary 
Russia, supporting Nicholas II is to denounce faith in the revolution and vice versa. Moreover, 
although the majority of Russians support Lenin’s burial, to bury him would lower his status. 
Nicholas II and his family were buried cannoised as saints in 2000 following their burial in 
1996.  
All parties use history to argue for different forms of statehood because it can be a powerful 
vehicle for doing so. The past frequently featured in the presidential debates of 2018, as well. 
Using history to play on people’s nostalgia and deeply rooted sentiments occurs in all parties 
and at different times in post-Soviet Russia. For now, the ruling UR and Putin personally have 
become the carriers of Russian history.  
 
The Use of History in Foreign Policy  
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The past and foreign policy are both a space for humans to make sense of the world, where its 
meanings and representations manifest. The use of history in Russian foreign policy has become 
an explicit and key component during Putin’s rule.210 In his first term, Russia and the West 
increasingly became two separate entities after the Iraq War, despite Putin’s initial assertion that 
Russia is, historically, a great European power. At the same time, NATO expansion and the 
bombing of Kosovo made Russia determined not to allow the West remain as the ‘norm maker’; 
differences over Iraq signaled a greater divide to come in how each would approach its foreign 
policy goals. References to the past have become the ultimate soft power generator and means 
to achieve foreign policy goals, particularly in the post-Soviet space after the Colour 
Revolutions.  
According to Tsygankov and Tsygankov, Russian foreign policy is a reflection of its historic 
development and the needs of the state. Therefore, its foreign policy is a product of the ‘Russian 
Idea’ and traditionally assumes one of three variations; Westernism, Statism and 
Civlisationalism.211 Westernism sees that Russia’s destiny and interests are, as the name 
suggests, ‘in line with other ‘Western’ European nations. By contrast, Statism values the 
autocratic model of power but allows for relative accommodation with the West. Based on 
cultural opposition to the West, Civilisationalism focuses on what is principally different, 
unique or organic to Russia. As implied, this variation claims that Russia is a separate 
civilisation in its own right whose mission is to spread its values to the world. This ties in with 
the inconsistent concept of the Russkiy Mir (Russian World), which usually refers to the post-
Soviet space. When Russia’s Foreign Policy Concepts of 2008, 2013 and 2016 are analysed and 
compared to events on the global stage under Putin, Statism most resembles his foreign policy. 
However, an experimentation with Civlisationalism begun post-2008, with Medvedev declaring 
that Russia’s foreign policy is ‘civilisational’ for the first time.212 The CIS countries are key to 
Russian national security and extremely important for continuity and stability. Statism is also 
the ideal channel to achieve the aims of the Putin Agenda, as the state can exert its power in a 
more ‘natural’ way. The 2016 concept continued to stress the state’s priority of defending 
sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and consolidating Russia’s position as a center 
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of influence.213 It too viewed liberal democracy as a weakness and a demoralising experience, 
as the West gave minimal assistance in supporting democratic institutions. The consequence of 
this and its own history is that Russia simply understands authoritarian states better.  
Yeltsin initially used foreign policy to obtain a separate recognition in the West to the USSR. 
Russia’s interests abroad had to be defended, however, and opting for closer Western ties meant 
relations with the ‘near abroad’ were downplayed and damaged. This was a small break with 
the past, and this move towards the West was a step to secure Russia’s prosperity within a new 
global framework. Russia and the West would be allies during peacetime, but one important 
difference was for the new alliance to be based on shared democratic values.214 Yeltsin’s view 
that Russia had a natural affinity with the West was a betrayal in the eyes of pro-Soviet and 
nationalist groups because while this alignment with the West intended to secure Russia’s 
position within Europe and serve as a solution to the mounting problems and identity crisis; it 
had the opposite effect. Yeltsin’s justification for this was to negate the USSR’s legacy and 
Soviet experience.215 The Communist Party-led government held responsible for the ills of the 
modern day had operated as a statist entity. Yeltsin wanted to avoid a return to those ways at all 
costs, essentially rejecting Russian history. Westernism failed in the 1990s due to a conflict 
between the newly forming system and Russia’s political culture. Politicians, who continued to 
occupy the Russian government after the Soviet collapse, were a part of the Soviet system with 
no democratic or Western experience. ‘Liberals’, undermined by nostalgia, still believe Russia 
should abandon the unrealistic hope of reinstating a lost past and maintaining a strong and 
continued influence in former Soviet republics.216 Many groups among Russia’s polarised 
population saw this as surrendering to Western domination, a flight from sovereignty and even 
civilisational weakness. The crumbling internal situation also affected Yeltsin’s ability to 
project a great power image abroad. Although he tried to maintain Russia’s prestige and great 
power status, the military campaign in Chechnya, failing economy and ongoing political strife 
at home badly damaged Russia’s role in global affairs.217 Furthermore, his inability to prevent 
NATO expansion created the impression that the former super power was now a downtrodden 
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second-rate one, due to embracing the West. Derzhavnost’ and gosudarstvennost’ traditionally 
focus on sovereign autonomy, and the global situation effectively made these redundant. In the 
face of history, Russia was now a state in retreat unable to project power abroad or control its 
territory.  
 
The realisation that Russia needed a model better suited to its own political culture directly 
affectd Putin’s handling of foreign affairs. Putin secured legitimacy because of his own ability 
to control current affairs. This would later include control of the past domestically, as history 
could draw upon recent examples highlighting how openness to the West caused internal 
fragility. Russo-Western relations had to be mutually beneficial and ‘catching up’ needed to 
secure Russian interests, since this legitimised samostoyatelnost’. The relationship was initially 
pragmatic on Putin’s behalf, yet downplayed to show an ability to act independently. Moreover, 
as a re-evaluation the past occurred, both Putin and Medvedev could make use of references to 
it as a way to explain to current situation. Stalinism’s isolationism, along with the victory in the 
Great Patriotic War, is the most popular and recent in Russian collective memory that points to 
how the country overcame the feeling of encirclement and foreign aggression are contributors 
to this mentality. In addition, the newly forming narrative surrounding the First World War is 
also usable. It preaches that Russia’s imperial nature and status as protector of the Slavs meant 
that its position could have been compromised without acting. Equally, Russia’s global standing 
today means it too should act or be compromised.  
The Statist approach was a natural response to the circumstances facing Russia. The 
recentralisation of power consolidated order and stability and externally, it was used to achieve 
the same goals. However, the Colour Revolutions showed a sense of vulnerability, and Putin 
attributed the revolutions’ causes to the structural weakness of those national governments and 
accumulating social and economic problems.218 Strengthening the state to avoid this scenario 
was preferred, and in this case, the past became a response to Western soft power.219 U.S support 
for the revolutions also heightened the state’s sense of vulnerability. Ukraine and Georgia in 
particular sparked security concerns, as the events unfolding in these two countries had more 
potential to undermine Russia’s internal situation and destabilise the region. In Putin’s own 
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words, ‘the events went beyond current law and the constitution’.220 In essence, this grouped 
Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan into a family of nations with Russia based on their shared 
history. The sudden U.S. interest of establishing an airbase in Kyrgyzstan also contributed to 
the hysteria. The thought of NATO missiles and soldiers on Russia’s borders or in countries 
where its citizens lived, especially in Sevastopol, could halt the state’s ability to exert soft power. 
Moreover, the CIS countries helped aid Russia’s economic recovery and are vital to its security. 
Expansion of the EU also entailed an extension of its borders closer to Russia and led to the re-
appearance of the ‘besieged fortress’ mentality and allowed the state to blame the revolutions 
on external actors.221  
There were early indications that Medvedev’s foreign policy may embrace Civilisationalism. 
His first trips abroad were to China and Kazakhstan. By 2008, Russia had restored credibility 
on the international stage and could now enjoy new relations with other nations. Strengthening 
economic and security ties with CIS and EEU (Eurasia Economic Union) countries is often 
complimented by emphasising a ‘shared history’. Russia can invoke a special relationship with 
all former Soviet countries, and in turn apply a restricted degree of sovereignty for these states 
to promote its own concepts. Along with a shared history, the entire former space shares 
particular cultural or business links with Russia. Belarus is viewed as part of the core of the 
Russian World along with Ukraine. Both Belarus and Moldova belong spiritually to the same 
Russian Orthodox Church and as the Russian Patriarch argues the heart of the Russian World is 
Russian Orthodox faith and that “spiritually we [Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova] remain 
one nation”, meaning Moldova is in the same category of ‘special’ status.222 The three Caucasus 
and five Central Asian republics also belong to the community of countries who have special 
relations with Russia, sharing a long history of ‘brotherhood’ with Moscow, as all were a part 
of the Russian Empire and USSR. The EEU has seen Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan become members, with Tajikistan also seeking membership. As well as ties through 
the Orthodox Church, Russia guarantees Armenia’s security. Central Asian countries rely 
heavily on wages earned by migrant workers in Russia. Since economic ties remain robustand 
appear to be strengthening, it provides Russia the ideal tools to promote its own ideas and 
                                                          
220 Interview on Radio Slovensko and Slovakian television company STV, 22 February 2005, 
www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22837  accessed 01/11/2016 
221 James Sherr, ‘How Russia’s Relationship with Europe has Evolved’, BBC News online, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35154633>  accessed 08/03/2016. 
222 ‘Vystupleniye Svyateishego Patriarcha Kirilla na torzhestvennom otkrytii III Assamblei ‘Russkogo mira’’ 3 
November 2009, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html, accessed 17/01/2017.   
89 
 
national interests with a great degree of flexibility. In so doing, it stands as a modern day 
example of their shared history, much of it based around economic ties and Russification. 
Eurasianism and Civilisationalism are of the same cloth and emphasise that Russia can only rely 
on the ‘Russian world’ or historic areas to fulfill its historic mission.  
The promotion of a shared history is quite noticeable in Russia’s media projects throughout the 
post-Soviet space. Komsomol’skaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty have special editions in CIS 
countries and Russian language TV channels, books and films are widely popular, as is history. 
The memory of the USSR is still quite vivid among the older generations who remain nostalgic 
for its glory. Film is particularly effective at evoking nostalgia because it only has to be 
attractive. Two examples would be Panfilov’s 28 Men (2016) and White Tiger (2012). Watched 
together by Putin and Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Panfilov’s 28 Men sparked 
controversy because the story is in fact a myth that was taught as historical fact in the USSR. 
Funded by 35,000 individual donations, Panfilov's 28 Men, is the story of twenty-eight soldiers 
in the Red Army's 316th Rifle Division killed in action on 16th November 1941 after destroying 
eighteen German tanks, many of them Central Asian. Its main purpose is to tell a story of 
heroism in the defense of Moscow during the Great Patriotic War, and the molding of fact and 
fiction means both films are a way of keeping the sacred myth of the Great Patriotic War alive, 
and with it, the historical bonds of the former USSR.  
A shared history does not necessarily bring people together. The former Soviet republics can 
cast Russia in an unfavourable light, making it unable to generate auspicious results. Examples 
of this are Ukraine’s ban on fourteen Russian journalists and TV channels claiming they do not 
respect equidistance and equilibrium.223 Kazakhstan is promoting English far more as a second 
language and has switched to the Latin alphabet whereas Belarus started paying more attention 
to the local language in schools after its role in the Minsk talks. Belarus’ own history also allows 
it to dip its toes into Europe and flash its sovereignty. A final example directly linked to a past 
event comes from Moldova who in 2015 presented medals to its veterans without the hammer 
and sickle. This disrespected an agreement made at the CIS Summit 2013 where all member 
states agreed to give similar medals to veterans bearing Soviet symbols.224 Yet, in 2015, 53% of 
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Moldovans claimed to trust Russian media who vigorously promoted the victorious pro-Russian 
Socialist candidate, Igor Dodon, in the 2016 presidential election.225 Although rejection is 
possible, Russia remains attractive in the former Soviet republics and the shared past is essential 
to this.   
Russia’s relationship with the West post 2012 saw a profound refusal to not listen to the other’s 
arguments or even admit these can exist.226 In Russia, anything perceived as slightly ‘anti-
Russian’ is labelled as ‘Russophobia’. The Ministry of Culture even set up a commission to 
counter Russophobic media campaigns. That means anything contradicting moral norms or 
targeting Russia’s history or traditions is to be treated as a threat to national security.227 The cost 
funded by the government was around $30,000 and shows this was perceived as a serious threat 
to internal stability. History was used as a strong justification after the Crimean annexation and 
involvement in Syria. After Crimea, the state applied references to the Great Patriotic War as a 
defence mechanism as its legacy was fought over on the international scene. Putin and many 
Russians were enraged when he did not receive an invitation to the Auschwitz liberation 
memorial. This was due to mistrust over the events of the Ukrainian Crisis and wariness of the 
domestic political implications it might have in Poland.228 It was particularly insulting because 
Soviet troops liberated the camp. At the memorial, Poland’s leader claimed that a ‘Ukrainian 
effort’ helped liberate the camp; a comment Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov called 
‘sacrilegious’.229 Later in the year of the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war, a majority 
of invited world leaders rejected Putin’s invitation to attend Moscow’s military parade. Russian 
public opinion followed the line that the West was trying to deny Russia of its victory. Signs of 
this would be regular wearing of the orange and black ribbons usually worn on Victory Day 
celebrations. The worsening of Russo-Western relations post-Crimea saw many members of the 
public start wearing this as a symbol of their patriotism, whilst vulgar memes (Appendix B) 
with references to the Great Patriotic War also began appearing on social media. Obscenity 
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aside, the connotation is that Russia (led by the state) will once again overcome foreign 
aggression.  
The Western sanctions and Russia’s strong sense of military patriotism, which Putin personally 
appears to possess, triggered an increase in Russia’s military budget to $81 billion in 2015, with 
some of the new technology displayed at the seventieth anniversary Victory Day parade in 
Moscow.230 The message behind this was to show Russia had no intention of backing down 
from its interests and would defend them if necessary.  
Although the ruble plummeted and GDP contracted in 2015, most of the population appeared 
publically un-phased as patriotic feelings increased. Even in 2018, two-thirds felt ‘no impact’ 
of Western sanctions.231 Crimea’s annexation shows this as it was presented as a gift from the 
government. Historic nostalgia surrounding Crimea is rife, particularly as a symbol of military 
glory; it was no surprise to see national pride drastically increase after the annexation of Crimea. 
One poll showed that 80% of Russians felt proud to live in Russia.232 Most of this pride was 
centered on Russian history (46%) which suggests the government can rely on historical 
patriotism as a legitimisation tool for its actions abroad. It can also be assumed that the sanctions 
were largely viewed as a small price to pay. Rossiya 1 produced the documentary Krym, put’ na 
rodinu (Crimea, the way home) which is the ultimate portrayal of the government’s view. The 
premise was that Putin revealed Russia’s willingness to defend the peninsula from a military 
attack.233 The title further confirms the nature of Crimea being a gift from Putin who during the 
film spoke of how he assumed personal charge of the issue. Only three million watched it, 
however. Following Maidan and the Crimean Annexation, Russian media began to depict 
Ukraine and the post-Maidan government as ‘fascist thugs’. This was an attempt to appeal to 
nostalgia from the Great Patriotic War against the idea of Ukraine moving closer to the EU and 
NATO, who ‘orchestrated’ the events. It is also fair to claim that many Russians feel Ukraine 
was ‘lost’ after the Soviet collapse. This is a further reflection of a Russia’s concern over 
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‘traditional’ and civilisational territory. As previously outlined, Russia has no non imperialist 
history and sees Ukraine and its affairs within its historical and emotional right to intervene in; 
the civilisational tone of Krym put’ na rodinu is hardly surprising.  
 
Measuring the success of a patriotic past, a profound shift in public opinion occurred, at least in 
the short term. A Levada poll focusing on Russia’s ‘friends and enemies’ listed Russia’s enemies 
as follows: Ukraine was second highest (58%), then Turkey (29%) after a Russian plane was 
shot down after briefly entering Turkish airspace, Poland (24%) Latvia and Lithuania (23% 
respectively) and Germany (19%) also scored highly. This revealed a huge distaste for EU 
sanctions. Relations with the U.S stood at new lows, with 59% of Russians describing it as 
‘hostile’.234 The figures aid the Civilisationalist stance, showing that Russia’s historical destiny 
does not allow it to travel a similar path to its European neighbours. This was mirrored in whom 
Russia considered ‘friends’. The top five countries on this list were Belarus (50%), Kazakhstan 
(39%), China (34%), India (18%) and Armenia (13%).235 In the summer 2016, more than two 
thirds of another Levada poll said they were ‘not concerned’ about further isolation from the 
West.236 By 2018, the number of Russians who viewed Ukraine as an ‘enemy’ had decreased to 
29%. By contrast, 68% now saw the U.S. as an enemy, whereas only 6% said the same of 
Germany.237 The surprise election of Donald Trump appears not to have improved U.S.-Russo 
relations. Furthermore, the Polish government also approved a law calling for the dismantling 
of Soviet memorials in Poland.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The start of this chapter included a discussion about the legacy of 1917. The fact that no official 
consensus has formed at a state level shows that istoricheskaya politika is an incomplete process, 
much like state formation. That is why the past is a necessary component of the Putin Agenda. 
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Although Russia has many examples of a usable past, it is with the unusable one the state 
apparatus struggles to reconcile. The past shows why Russian politics is chaotic and political 
parties rarely come to an easy agreement on anything. Moreover, stressing a patriotic history 
masks areas not dealt with, such as welfare, and represents a soft re-politicisation of history to 
justify the modern situation.  
Although history is both a state former and consolidator, and the Putin Agenda has a clear-cut 
image of what this past is, the ‘sales process’ is littered with political obstacles. The forming 
state uses history as a channel for its own message and goals. Istoricheskaya politika works 
because the Russian population can rally around a shared experience and relate to one another 
via a complex medium. Access to resources poses as a problem and solution for stressing this 
patriotic past and the state continues to exercise its muscles in this sphere. In one sense, using a 
single narrative and school textbook means each section of society has access to the same 
information, as is the case with state run media. On the other hand, while it reaches more of 
society as a whole it has the potential to alienate the most active parts who could turn against 
the government (Russia’s One and Two). Therefore, its success has so far been modest. By 
2017, the patriotic fervour surrounding Crimea was burning out, meaning the government will 
likely need something new.   
Russia uses history to reassess its place in the world and chart an auspicious foreign policy 
direction. It is better placed to understand authoritarian regimes due to its own past. From a state 
level, the relationship is more logical and these countries will always be vital to Russia’s national 
interests and security. As witnessed in some former republics, notably Ukraine and the Baltics, 
a shared history can be rejected, which adds to the vulnerability complex of the state. Yet, what 
a shared history does highlight is that the situations each former republic faces today means they 
cannot simply walk away from Russia (and vice versa). The former parts of the Russian Empire 
and USSR will continue to play a role in shaping Russia’s future because of the past created by 
the Russian State.  
Overall, history represents the Russian state’s current stage of development as it tries to secure 
itself. Without a clear cut past, the future is a blip on the map ahead in all spheres of life and 
government affairs. Istoricheskaya politika can be a reliable legitimisation force because it is 
malleable to suit the state’s interests and play on the emotions of the population. Both 
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complement each other and are an inevitable part of modern Russian political debates. This 
debate, as will now be examined, is explicit in the education system.  
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Chapter Four 
Russian Education Policy: modified patriotism to a 
continued system 
 
Since the USSR’s collapse, history in schools has led the way in showing the need for reform 
in the education system, and highlighted how the absence of ideology has been problematic. 
Despite history being at the forefront of educational reform, it remains only one subject in a 
long list of priorities for the modernisation process, which the Russian government has to tackle. 
Moreover, the changes to education are often coupled with general transformations in Russian 
society and culture since 1991.238 The rehabilitation of a patriotic education goes hand in hand 
with post-Soviet events in Russia as a natural response. Like in Soviet times, it also began during 
a time of crisis.239 A key part of the Putin narrative is an attempt to reawaken a social memory 
of a glorious and usable past is the result of an identity crisis and lack of stability stemmed in 
the 1990s. Education is one practice where the priority of stability, love for one’s homeland and 
superiority of the state can be instilled.240  
 
History is an ideal subject for the message to come through, as readers of the textbooks are 
addressed as members of a nation.241 In general, school is the most important way of any state 
to interfere in children’s individual lives and is precisely why emphasising a useful, positive 
history of Russia is used as a political tool.242 The past is used worldwide as a unifying force 
that can help shape identities and foster coalitions among the native population, and Russia is 
no exception.243 As in Soviet times, schools play an active role in creating a new identity and 
there exists, among the Russian population, a great desire to know where the country is heading. 
It has also become a part of ‘upbringing’ (vospitanie) in contemporary Russia. By rebranding a 
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system, which the majority of Russians believe had the highest standards in the world, it helps 
build on the notion that Russia has a bright future awaiting its citizens. While huge steps to 
improve and modernise the education have been made, their implementation has proved to be 
tremendously difficult and not entirely successful. Schools, teachers and local authorities alike 
have not taken warmly to Western reforms. As V.V. Mironov retorts, the reforms themselves 
are not properly thought out and are, therefore, doomed to backfire.244  
While a key area for reform and tool in the modernisation process, education is affected by many 
external problems. Corruption and a lack of investment have always been a major issue facing 
the education system, particularly in the countryside, where not unlike the Brezhnev era, 
regional authorities receive unequal funds and support in comparison to big cities. To make 
matters more complex, the priorities pushed by both Yeltsin and Putin require much greater 
funds. The economy and society of today (as opposed to, say, the 1980s), has a different set of 
needs because it functions differently. The needs of society have changed and so the education 
system has been rebranded in order to satisfy this. The timing of the Patriotic Programmes is 
important (oil and gas revenues) as they crystalised Putin’s policy of a national revival. The key 
word, however, is rebranded; the education system itself, its standards and goals of the Patriotic 
Programmes are not too dissimilar to the 1980s. As previously mentioned, there is little 
creativity or new innovations surrounding education policies.245 What has changed, particularly 
with history, is the number of textbooks, their content (and therefore the curricula and 
examinations) and emphasis on what a patriotic Russian citizen is. This is why having a patriotic 
focus on history is central to upbringing in Russia today. Gaining a thorough understanding of 
one’s own past and place in the world is central to the Putin Agenda and is used to extract love 
for the motherland. Putin, like his predecessors, recognises the power of history and has used it 
to accomplish his and the state’s goals, thereby adding to his own legitimacy.246 The bills 
concerning patriotic upbringing and patriotic education are, as Anna Sanina writes, hollow 
documents.247 While well intended, with the aim of creating ideal Russian citizens there are no 
performance indicators, or ways of measuring success. There are also attempts to extend 
patriotic upbringing outside of schools. Many youth movements now exist, some state funded, 
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the most recent of which is the ‘Russia School Children’s Movement’, whose purpose is to 
socialise children and promote positive values, morals and create good citizens in the new 
Russia, and bears some resemblance to the Soviet pioneers.248 Another indicator of the lack of 
creativity and value placed on Soviet institutions. Finally, the new textbooks must also be 
considered to see the complexities of establishing a single account of the past.  
 
The structure, aims and problems of the current system  
 
The Ministry of Education and Science claims that the state policy in regard to education is 
based upon, first and foremost, the priority of human values; life and health; the fostering of 
civic duties; and a sense of responsibility to society.249 In addition, it stresses the unity of the 
nation’s cultural and educational dimensions, of both national and regional cultures in the 
Russian Federation as a multi-national State.250 A usuable past is therefore essential, as a part 
of this Agenda, as education at its most basic form, ‘is to prepare students to live and work under 
the current state, and to be socialised into its national culture’.251  
The Russian state guarantees all Russian citizens a “free, basic secondary general education”.252 
History is what Margarita Pavlova calls a ‘profile subject’; one that shapes the profile of a 
student and that is elective after the age of sixteen. Students must therefore make a choice about 
their future direction, and since most do not take the history Unified State Exam (YeGE) at 
eighteen, it is essential to shape such a citizen early on, so that he or she is prepared for the new 
Russian world. At least, they are expected to be familiar with the social norms and how to uphold 
them. In this sense, history is more linked to citizenship education, and the Patriotic Programmes 
were designed to strengthen those ties.  
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Schools use the same class structure and grading system as in the Soviet model. Children begin 
primary school at the age of six and spend the first four years of their education with the same 
teacher and classmates. At eleven, they attend secondary school until age sixteen for a basic 
(secondary) education. Afterwards, they enter the last two years of secondary school for what is 
known as a general education. Here, students select either a vocational or an academic 
education. In 2015, there were 13.4 million children attending 53,500 secondary schools across 
the Russian Federation.253 The dropout rate in Russia is one of the lowest worldwide, meaning 
few miss a full education. The last two years of (general) education are very similar to a U.S 
high school in format and purpose. In an academic education, some subjects like Russian 
language and Mathematics, are compulsory. Students must have five subjects in total, and at the 
end of these two years will sit YeGE. Getting a place at university is the main goal and 
universities have had to respond to the changes, as well. Previously, every university would set 
its own entrance exams and the potential student would have to attend in person to sit them. 
YeGE was designed to be fairer, less corrupt, enhance efficiencies of the university system and, 
arguably most importantly, to enhance school leaver’s mobility.254 YeGE has created a new 
sense of competitiveness, whereby universities can simply select the best students by looking at 
their test scores opposed to the potential student’s profile. This exam adheres to the unified 
European standards. On completion of the exam, students receive a grade one-five (lowest to 
highest). Part of the history exam is conducted orally with a teacher and external examiner. 
While its ‘success’ will be assessed in more detail later, it is worth noting at this point that 
YeGE’s biggest problem is cheating. Part C, the oral part, allows the student to cram in 
information to memorise hours before the exam begins, and the multiple choice section answers 
have been published on the Russian social networking site, VKontakte, in the past. Corruption 
also remains a problem, as parents are known to bribe or pay extra fees if their children fail to 
obtain the necessary grades.255 Without reliable data on bribery in education however, it is hard 
to speculate the scale of this problem.  
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There are three types of secondary school in Russia, which can affect the learning styles and 
outcomes of a student’s education. Besides regular state schools, there are Gymnasium and 
Lyceum schools. Gymnasiums often receive a lot of external funding, but are designed to study 
subjects in more depth. They may have a particular subject focus (one school that was visited 
for this study specialised in history) or their funding source may influence the tilt of the 
curriculum. For instance, St. Basil’s Gymnasium emphasises Christianity and Russian 
patriotism, and is strongly connected to the Orthodox Church. The students do a lot of scripture 
reading, have Tsarist like balls and even have prayer and bell ringing sessions.256 The purpose 
of such activities ties in well with Putin’s socialisation and patriotic upbringing since Orthodox 
Russians may be viewed as more suitable to take care of Russia in the future as ‘natural patriots’. 
Lyceums on the other hand are connected to a particular university and prepare students to enter 
the institute. Both may prepare students for the skills they need in the wider world, but given 
their affiliations, do so in very specific ways. Then again, these options may be beyond a 
student’s availability; students may only attend a school in their registered area, meaning there 
could be only one or two schools. Parents often bribe Gymnasium schools to admit their 
children, as a way around this.257 Around 1% of Russian children attend private schools, mostly 
in bigger European Russian cities, or abroad. They have become more popular among wealthier 
members of the population partly due to the belief in the value of education, but also because of 
defects in the state school system. Private schools often use experimental teaching methods and 
go beyond the capabilities of regular state schools. The average price of a private school is 
17,000 RUR (approximately £180) per month; while this may seem inexpensive, the average 
salary in 2017, according to state statistics, was 30,738 RUR (approximately £362) per 
person.258 Added to this, household income expenditure was 51,227 RUR (£603).259 For most 
people, private education is too expensive.  
While much attention has gone to human development since 1991, the education system itself 
has had to integrate with the production and economic processes, which graduates will 
encounter in adult life.260 Modernising the system as a whole means school leavers must possess 
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the knowledge and skills required to meet the needs of the labour market. Skills are an aspect 
that 70% of employers felt graduates lacked in 2003.261 Around 50% in 2006 believed that 
education levels are not up to standard.262 The situation has changed little. While 55% of 
Russians currently hold higher education degrees and rank fourth in the world in terms of 
educational attainment, Russia comes forty-second in terms of applied skills.263 On top of this, 
the defects and legacy of the Soviet education system, particularly from the 1980s, crept into 
the new era and remain to this day. This is one factor arguably not just holding the education 
system back, but the country itself. The generational issue effects all walks of Russian life as 
different people were socialised in different regimes. Adults, depending on when they were 
born, hold different beliefs considered inadequate to the current system, and it is they who make 
up a large portion of the teaching force. With forcing through a new agenda, comes the big 
question of whether the population has the ability to re-learn?264 Richard Sakwa writes that such 
leaps into modernity delay achievements for Russia; there are many historical examples of this, 
but education is a living case study of this.265 In the 1980s, school facilities were generally 
inadequate (basic at best), overcrowding was common and schools generally lacked equipment 
and materials due to short supplies.266 Although Gorbachev’s reforms acknowledged this and 
recognised the need to create a ‘new school’ that could cope with the global technological 
advancements, this idea has stayed in development stage since perestroika. Moreover, the new 
openness about history at the end of the USSR contributed to its collapse and the almost total 
dysfunctioning of the education system. This demonstrates the size of the problem that Yeltsin’s 
government faced in the early 1990s. The task of creating a new system that improved the lives 
of ordinary Russians was a monumental one that despite huge changes, many of the population 
believe is now slowly changing. As previously mentioned, a continuation of Russianness is 
evident, and a fair comparison of the Putin Agenda can be made with Decembrist, P. Petsel, 
who argued autocratic modernism was more urgent for Russia than democracy or human 
rights.267 The intention, therefore, is to move forward regardless of any potential drawbacks; 
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education is no exception. Yet as Mira Berglesson argues, it is a cultural trait of Russians to be 
more focused on the result as opposed to the process.268 The population as a whole is quite 
suspicious of democratic processes, which can explain why many reforms are often forced 
through despite the risks. It can also explain why many education reforms simply fail or have 
no impact. The new Russian system is about irreversibility, and creating change quickly reduces 
the chances of any opposition forming who could undo the progress. Overall, though, reforms 
have been slow and few.    
In the first years of the Russian Federation, schools had to cope with huge numbers of enrolment 
on top of needing to repair or restructure the schools. In recent years, demographic trends have 
seen a decline in the population and school entrants. In 2011, secondary schools had 43% fewer 
children of school age attending schools than 1996-97.269 This trend of decline is expected to 
continue until 2025 with no reason to expect immigration or migration to impact this in any 
significant way. Russia has also seen a huge decline in the number of teachers in the twenty first 
century.270 Fewer young people are viewing teaching as a credible profession, partly due to the 
low salaries, standards of training and state support. In 2017, the average salary of education 
workers was 28,094 RUR.271 Although, as will be discussed is the next chapter, many teachers 
often earn considerably less particularly outside of Moscow. It therefore remains an 
unprestigious profession with a low social status.272 On top of this, Putin announced plans in 
2010 to cut the number of teachers given Russia’s demographic crisis, which also means certain 
schools are facing closure; 30% were shut 2000-2011 and class sizes continue to decrease as 
some regions experience depopulation.273  
The largest and most immediate problem facing schools, however, is finance and funding. 
Article 40 of the Law on Education stated that 10% of the country’s GDP is to be spent on 
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Education, although this was abolished in 2005.274 In 2018, the figure was 3.6% of GDP and 
10.9% of total public expenditure for all levels of education combined.275 In 2012-2013, the 
federal budget contributed 574 million rubles to education with a further 111 million from the 
regional budget.276 Estimates of education spending in the USSR are hard to verify, though most 
estimates are approximately 7%.277 While the current figures are almost double what the UK 
(5.3%) and US (5.5%) spend, the initial target was unsurprisingly never achieved. In addition, 
the actual money that is spent on education is usually ‘left over money’ (ostatochniy printsip) 
that is often delayed. The economic situation of the 1990s, recession post 2014 and level of 
corruption makes this hardly surprising. Although state funding has gone up, financial shortages 
in other sectors face similar and more pressing problems, namely healthcare. Education has 
often been the last financial priority of any post-Soviet government, which is contradictory 
given the symbolic importance it is in creating a new Russian identity. Despite the lack of 
funding, the state has nevertheless been able to meet the needs of schools, though it is becoming 
much tougher and the rural regions suffer most. This could be another factor in making 
patriotism the antidote to Russia’s internal problems. The Republic of Dagestan for instance has 
reported many unsafe buildings and 61.5% of schools across Russia needed new furniture 2012-
2013.278 The neglect of some schools and regions is an important factor in understanding why 
the Soviet pedagogical practices and model is still in place throughout much of Russia. While 
schools are highly centralised to support the state’s objectives most of the focus appears to lie 
with European Russia, where around 75% of the population lives. Therefore, schools must make 
use of what resources they can gather and fallback on methods they believe to have been 
successful in the past. School autonomy is also a good example of this. In fact, teachers have 
more freedom than the school as a whole. Around 84% of schools in Novgorod boast full 
autonomy and responsibility, whereas the figure in Krasnoyarsk, though unknown, is 
undoubtedly far less. The more financially dependent, the less independent a school is. This 
extends to universities, as well. Moscow State University (MGU) and St. Petersburg University 
(SPGU) get larger chunks of state funding due to their international standing and competency 
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in certain areas. This creates another funding issue and one where history (and the humanities) 
falls victim to sciences in subject priority; education has to meet the shared ‘needs’ of society 
and the economy or else the state will not survive.279 The reality is that students are more likely 
to have to pay for a degree in the liberal arts and humanities, which has contributed to the decline 
in popularity for subjects like history. Teachers and schools still have the right to choose 
textbooks and the curriculum. In practice, they may be quite restricted due to finances, 
bureaucratic pressures and even location. In any given Moscow bookshop, it is possible to find 
around twenty school history textbooks, whereas in provincial towns in Western Siberia, like 
Nizhniy Tagil, the number is more like two or three. This can benefit the state’s initiative to 
create ‘unified’ textbook published by its own publishing house, Prosveshchenie. Although as 
the next chapter will show, textbooks are far from guaranteed to work.  
 
New Education Policies and Their ‘Success’ 
 
Many of the policies are aimed at strengthening citizenship through modernisation, and history 
has its own special place in this regard. While Yeltsin attempted to do the same, he did so with 
limited success as the population had little or no faith in the country. Russia and its population 
felt bruised and battered by the system change, which meant attempts by the state to generate 
patriotic feeling were futile. The traditionalist and liberal split is also evident in education, as 
the former see education as upbringing (vospitanie) and the later focus on the teaching process 
(obuchenie). It is a battle that traditionalists are winning. Contemporary patriotic education is 
influenced by USSR citizen education. Patriotic education was first written about in 1925 by the 
People’s Commissar, Anatoly Lunarchosky in Moral’ s Marksistskoi tochki zveniya (Morality 
From a Marxist Perspective), which was consequently adopted into the Soviet constitution.280 
Here, Lunarchosky encouraged revolutionary patriotism and pride in the fatherland, to help 
create loyal Soviet citizens in the new regime. Under Stalin, ‘Soviet patriotism’ was necessary 
to protect socialism. While this stayed important following his death, the meaning varied over 
time and changed with the different leadership.  
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Schools are now expected to take the lead in promoting good morals to go hand in hand with 
patriotism and love for the motherland. Of course, this involves some disassociation of native 
peoples from their lands in Siberia, the Far North and Far East, which can have consequences. 
The State Programme for Patriotic Upbringing of the Citizens of the Russian Federation is the 
ultimate reflection of promoting the right morals and the Putin Agenda. According to Laruelle, 
this is one of three elements in Putin’s patriotic agenda, the other two being the Orthodox Church 
and symbols.281 Proposed by the Ministry of Defence, this programme reflects the reconciliation 
between youth and the army and a continuation from the Soviet era. This policy consists of four 
stages taking place over a period of twenty-one years; 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 
2016-2022. Although each has unique goals, the overarching aim of these programmes is to 
encourage the younger generation to foster greater love for their country and a readiness to fulfill 
civic (military) and occupational duties.282 In order to achieve this goal, a series of measures 
have to be implemented under different departmental and regional programmes involved and 
based on the state programme. In essence, it is an attempt to redefine citizenship and its 
relationship to nationality, the latter has become much stronger since the breakup of the USSR, 
and the former lags behind somewhat. It ensures a type of political socialisation which 
introduces the abstract notion of citizenship. It further shows how institutionalised post- Soviet 
Russia is, since the state still seeks to embed a wider message within the framework of everyday 
life. It also aims to counter youthful indifference, cynicism and egoism.283 As far as each school 
subject is concerned, patriotic education mostly surrounds history in order to educate children 
of their native land. Although, each subject now relates something to Russian history. Religious 
education has already received mention, but another recent example would be in a Novosibirsk 
fourth class Mathematics contest. Although Mathematics questions often have a militaristic 
slant to show Russian superiority, one particular question was a clear reaction to Western 
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sanctions: "A dollar is worth twice as much as a ruble, and a euro is worth three times as much 
as a dollar. What is better, 17 rubles or 3 euros?"284  
The first patriotic programme was hurried, poorly funded ($6.2 million) and as a result poor in 
quality. It focused on the military component and used words and phrases such as duty and 
military patriotic work. However, there were no performance indicators to match the goals, 
meaning its success is hard to measure at all. There is also little evidence at this point to suggest 
it has reduced the rise of radical nationalism, which rejects tolerance as harmful. The second did 
have performance indicators, but the result’s definition was so broad and ambiguous that it is 
practically impossible to measure. Based on civil education, this programme was to ensure the 
continuation of a free and democratic state, the formation of a high patriotic consciousness and 
loyalty to the fatherland.285 Its performance indicators included moral and spiritual, increased 
tolerance, reducing ideological confrontation, unity, friendship among nations, reducing social 
tensions and development of the economy. As Sanina writes, it was very ill-conceived and 
unsystematic.286 Sergei Golunov agrees, writing that the aims of such programmes are both 
ambitious and difficult to measure.287 Something certain, however, is the ‘Colour Revolutions’ 
2003-2005 impacted the course of the second programme, and in response to these, a pro 
government youth movement, Nashi (ours), was created in 2005. Nashi is both privileged (well-
funded and organised) and loyal to the president and prime minister. Their manifesto celebrates 
Russia as the ‘geopolitical centre of the world economic system encircled by external 
enemies’.288 This is somewhat Stalinist in rhetoric, although was of course not the intention. It 
possesses a sacred character of both the Patriotic War 1812 and Great Patriotic War 1941-45, 
with no other interpretation of either allowed. The third programme was approved by decree, 
was hereditary in nature and more specific yet more simplified. The fourth barely changed, yet 
reflected the new threats facing Russia (geographic situation, high security and economic 
conditions).289 Unsurprisingly the only concrete task was ‘military patriotic education’ opposed 
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to civics, which is also not free of an Orthodox influence. One example of how this ties in with 
history in the curriculum is that schools are now duty bound to have one history lesson 
concerning the Great Patriotic War dedicated to local history. One school in Novgorod for 
example takes its ninth class students on digs to nearby forests to find remains and items of 
soldiers from the Second World War.290 Another in Vladimirskaya Oblast attended by the author 
invited a local Orthodox priest to speak at the beginning of the school year for the ‘Day of 
Knowledge’, as well as a local government representative.  
Patriotic upbringing reflects the divide between conservatives and liberals as it tries to come 
between both, promoting anti-Westernism with multiculturalism and sovereign democracy with 
conservatism.291 The contradiction is evident, because promoting tolerance should, in theory, 
reduce feelings of hatred to other nationalities, yet many other patriotic movements are 
incredibly hostile towards ethnic minorities. One example of this is ‘St Spyridon the Triumphant 
Orthodox’ club in St. Petersburg aiming to bring children to the church through sport and 
military.292 It prepares children as young as five for a career in the army taking them camping 
and taking part in military exercises. There are also some clubs who offer training in 
ratoborchestvo, an old Slavic fighting tradition, where blind folded participants learn to dodge 
knives and bullets. These clubs were followed by the U.S State Department issuing travel 
warnings on its website for certain regions like Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh as 
large of pro-Russian groups were heading towards the Ukrainian border as well as highlighting 
which foreigners are most likely to be targeted for attacks.293 In recent years, it is these regions 
which have seen some of the biggest surges in nationalistic groups, so again, this comes as no 
immediate shock. It would seem the policies are somewhat undermined by recent events as the 
rhetoric gets blown out of proportion to the point where these groups promote and practise 
dangerous forms of nationalism opposed to modest pride in one’s ancestry and optimism for the 
future.  
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Regarding YeGE, the success needs further investigation and the exam itself more time to 
mature. Thus far, one major criticism is that it tests only a passive knowledge of the chosen 
subject. Schools, although free to choose their textbooks and curricula, still have to adjust it to 
the exam papers, making education a challenge to pass an exam. This undermines the need for 
knowledgeable citizens who gain a greater attachment to their motherland if in practice the exam 
is a simple stepping-stone to university. Elena Minina also tells of one student who on the 
multiple choice section simply ticked answers in a zigzag pattern and obtained a ‘4’.294 
Regarding preparation, YeGE self-study books for history contain page upon page of 
information on all periods of Russian history (Appendix C). One for instance, in the section on 
foreign and domestic politics of the Soviet government, 1917-18, contains a table, which takes 
up the entire page and has two columns of the ‘main direction’ (usually a few words) and key 
events listed.295 Almost every page looks the same and there is rather a lot to absorb. That said, 
a quick glance through on the morning of the exam allows the student to memorise chunks of 
information without needing any context or substance to support it, which these books do not 
provide. This has some reminiscence of communist style education here. Debates were non-
existent and less connections made on certain topics, and studying usually meant memorising a 
lot of information. This has not gone unnoticed by political figures. The LDPR drafted a bill in 
January 2016 to scrap YeGE and re-introduce the old entry exams of universities and institutes. 
The bill claimed that YeGE ‘brought no results manifested in quality of graduate’s knowledge’, 
reflect the student’s knowledge and in actual fact wastes millions of dollars in state funds296. In 
more brutal fashion, Gennady Zyuganov claimed ‘it [YeGE] prepares mediocre gray 
personalities with fragmented thinking, incapable to grasp global problems and form minds 
capable of answering the challenges of the modern era’.297 This bill never passed, and Putin is 
supporter of YeGE. Another issue is whether YeGE clashes with Russian pedagogical traditions. 
It is not an uncommon view that people were better educated in the past because tests were 
viewed to be more indicative of a person’s actual knowledge. With history in the USSR, this 
was quite a grey area as will be explored below, but there is never the less a certain disregard 
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for western education policies brought to Russia via the Council of Europe or other 
organisations. In 1857, Ushinsky claimed that any training or teaching cannot be imitated in 
Russia because the national character is different.298 There is much to be said for Ushinsky’s 
views as every historic tradition has a rational approach behind every system, and in Russia, it 
has always been about cultural socialisation. This explains why reintroducing Tsarist and Soviet 
pedagogy methods and patriotic programmes is desirable to some, including the current minister 
for education, Olga Vasileva (who is a historian herself). In the West, there is a strong link 
between school and the market, which Russia has been forced to participate in since 1991. Since 
history does not provide any great profits for the market, it instead allows Russia to re-engage 
with itself culturally, sparking the new obsession with history.  
 
An Old School With A New History  
 
Like many humanities subjects, history needed special care when reforming after the Soviet 
collapse. The previously approved Stalinist textbook (History of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union) was considered outdated and a new history started shaping before the post-Soviet 
system. A glaringly obvious problem facing the new system, was what history could be used for 
this new country? Moreover, how can one teach a history that does not exist and has not been 
written? Law had similar problems, because how could any student study laws that had not yet 
been created or established? This added to the shock therapy that Russia went through in the 
1990s as the country was starting from scratch. Not only the material, but also the teaching of 
history as a whole became an object of reform. It remains so due to the largely unsuccessful 
implementation of teaching reforms and new priorities of the Putin governments’.299  
Before a new history could be written, the past had to first be liberated from the Soviet ideology. 
The standard school textbook, which the Soviet government presented as ‘entirely correct’, 
ignored events, policies and people that did not fit the ideology. This one textbook used by fifty 
million children ignored the decline of production and the famine, enthused kulak elimination, 
but most controversially, mentions Stalin’s name only once. After Stalin’s death, all of his 
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successors agreed that he was too sensitive a topic and could divide the party. As a compromise, 
nothing was to be said about Stalin.300 The only problem with this, as Davies rightly highlights, 
is that Stalin had such a hold on the people even as his personality cult faded.301 In the new 
Russia, and has been discussed throughout, Stalin is still an issue which pits Russians against 
one another, and Putin’s partial rehabilitation of his image has crept into the general history 
education. Stalin, however, was not the sole cause of initial reforms to history; it was 
Gorbachev’s reforms. History became more objective due to relaxations on censorship, which 
in turn increased people’s interest for history. Historians began to praise pre-revolutionary 
aspects of Russian life particularly the peasantry. The Orthodox Church’s historical role was 
reconciled with and made a symbolic return to Russian life. The newfound interest in history 
meant pupils would turn up to class with additional knowledge not in the standard syllabus and 
often beyond the teachers own knowledge, which caused a lot of friction. Opinions began to 
differ between teachers and pupils so much, that in May 1988, the State Commission of 
Education cancelled final leaving exams for history of the Soviet period, replacing it with an 
ungraded interview of free conversation.302 Though unintended, freeing up history played on 
the notion that it creates a free human being and promotes good morals.  
Putin’s governments have tried to combine the freedom of expression allowed under glasnost 
and the importance placed on fundamental knowledge in the Soviet education system. 
Moreover, like the Soviet system, it attempts to reinforce a single valid worldview about what 
it means to be Russian in Russia , although this is still rather fragmented.303 This can also explain 
the rehabilitation of Tsarist (and Soviet) teaching practices. The rejection or ignoring of Western 
educational reforms previously mentioned, reflects the wish of Putin’s government to keep all 
aspects of life nationally orientated in order to achieve national unity. This further shows what 
the political function of history is, because to legitimise the state, it must also legitimise the 
national character. As such, the ‘return to Europe’ as mentioned by Klerides was not abandoned, 
but matched Putin’s pragmatic relationship with the West. Any return to Europe had to benefit 
Russia as a whole, and no one party could not define the terms. If one analyses a standard history 
textbook, something rather absent is the role of other republics and nationalities. As Nelli 
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Piattovea writes, Russia has a longstanding tradition of separating the nation from the state, so 
by mixing patriotism with human values as the substitute for an ideology not only satisfies the 
security threat of national disintegration, but also by stressing loyalty and cohesion in a child’s 
upbringing enables the concept of Russia and Russianness to flourish.304 In short, it creates the 
image of a wider homeland to be more inclusive. This is also, why the textbooks have the lyrics 
of the national anthem, and the flag is located at the centre of any school environment to help 
strengthen the link between state and citizen.  
Shortly after Putin told a conference of history teachers in 2007 that history contained 
problematic pages and that “[we] cannot let anyone impose guilt on us” the Kremlin backed a 
new twentieth century (1945-2006) history handbook for teachers written by Aleksandr 
Filippov. 305 While schools and teachers are free to choose their own materials, textbooks and 
curricula, the intention behind Filippov was to become the de facto ‘standard’ twentieth century 
history. It directly affirms the state’s stress of patriotism and its new or updated perspective. The 
facts, quite naturally, have not changed and certainly, Filippov’s teacher’s handbook is not 
lacking in information. While the textbook sheds light on Russia’s past and future perception, it 
does so with a slight reappraisal of Stalin, or as David Wedgewood Benn described it ‘glosses 
over his record’, and furthermore justifies Putin’s governing style.306 Benn further argues that 
its central purpose is to explain the collapse of the USSR from neither a Soviet nor western 
stance. Many textbooks published in the 1990s had conflicting narratives of this event. In 
addition, Filippov’s handbook puts post-Soviet Russia’s position into a global context in order 
to explain the current position of the country, thereby adding credibility to the Putin Agenda. 
Though he is cautious about the role of one man possessing too much power, the handbook was 
cleverly designed to be a product of its time and to link nicely with the laws on Patriotic 
Upbringing. It does promote a deep sense of understanding ones country, although is designed 
to be the ‘authoritive’ narrative on Russia after the Great Patriotic War. While within Russian 
society (and education), history is becoming somewhat mythicised, perspectives that do not fit 
the official line are increasingly attacked as ‘falsified’ and ‘distorted’ accounts of the past. As a 
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result, it is an indirect push for teachers to select different aspects, which are more ‘suitable’ for 
the majority and teach history the ‘correct’ way.  
 
This is particularly true of the period under focus. The role of the Orthodox Church has already 
been mentioned, but much romanticism has begun to surround Tsar Aleksandr III. Although he 
is outside of the period for Filippov’s book, the revival of history has been favourable to him, 
with documentaries such as Romanovy (a popular resource for history teachers) depicting him 
as a rough and tumble family man with simple tastes, yet a Tsar who controlled his country with 
true principles (autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality) and had the physical strength to match. 
His reign was also shown to be an economic success, with the ruble becoming a stable currency, 
technologically advancing and militarily competent.307 This resembles some aspirations of the 
Putin government, in the eventual hope of a democratic Russia emerging with responsible 
citizens. Finally, such narratives are not just pushing the view that the Russian Federation is the 
successor state to either the USSR or Russian Empire, but the history is more directly aimed to 
justify the path Russia is on. This is why history has become so important in the curriculum, 
however, the textbook debate and patriotic programme, which use history as a channel to 
promote loyalty to the state, are in many regards a mask for the lack of changes in education.  
 
The 2015 textbook series, analysed in the following chapter, attracted a great deal of attention, 
too. Firstly, their creation immediately suggests that Filippov’s textbook failed to emerge as the 
standard narrative for all schools. The nationalist and anti-Western rhetoric attracted great 
criticism in the wider public domain, and as explicitly highlighted in the next chapter, never 
caught on.308 Secondly, they are a product of the ‘Filippov backlash’, which was followed by a 
state sponsored movement to reassess the Soviet past. Putin’s call for a ‘unified textbook’ was 
coupled with the ‘historical cultural standard’ for writing history textbooks. This ‘unified’ 
version for teaching history, in Putin’s own words, for “our people feel they are citizens of a 
single country regardless of their ethnicity and religious beliefs”.309 This speech was delivered 
in the backdrop of the 2011-12 protests and concerns at local and state level of interethnic 
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308 Thomas Sherlock, ‘Russian Politics and the Soviet Past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism under Vladimir 
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discords and expressions of xenophobia. It was also symbolic, as it was delivered in the newly 
opened Jewish Museum and Tolerance Centre, Moscow, at the Council for Interethnic 
Relations. These new textbooks have little in common with Filippov. There is no anti-western 
language (as such), xenophobia or chauvinistism. As Sherlock writes, positive treatment of 
Stalin is infrequent and subdued.310 They do fail to provide a moral judgment of the Soviet era, 
the specifics of which are analysed in the next chapter. This is particularly significant because 
it suggests that a condemnation of the Soviet era would not just be unpopular, but is still 
impossible altogether. It could be self-defeating, harm its legitimacy (particularly as the Soviet 
state’s legal successor) and alienate more conservative groups.   
 
Conclusion 
 
History has been an especially complex aspect of the post-Soviet era. The education system is 
the ultimate reflection of the process of reconciliation and complexities of this process. The 
narrative of Putin’s Russia remains that the country is in transition from a period of weakness, 
poverty, corruption and crime to a brighter future. One Levada poll in 1996 revealed that pride 
in their country was at an all-time low, 36%. In December 2015, it hovered around 82%.311 
While keeping the humanistic and moral emphasis of history like Yeltsin and Gorbachev, 
Putin’s government also uses it to justify Russia’s current position and global status to help 
create loyal citizens. History’s purpose is to provide answers and promote the ‘correct’ ideals 
for the Russian people. Whereas in Soviet Times, ideals were focused around the party and class 
struggle, stressing unity around a patriotic past and connecting it to a child’s upbringing makes 
continuity appear visible at the early stages.  
The patriotic programmes have a special status because they are symbolic. In this regard, the 
poor funding and implementation is irrelevant to the state and teaching force. The money for 
patriotic projects often gets spent elsewhere, schools falsify reports and the guidelines provided 
from local authorities are often obsolete and not read by the teachers who in turn are expected 
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to ‘vote properly’.312 The state can claim to be proactive and schools passively participate. The 
programmes, however, do reflect the growing impact of the government on society and the 
nature of history in Russia today. Much of the narrative is repeated and repackaged for the same 
purpose, and done so by the initiative and direction of the state; centralisation is far from dead.   
Education shows that the political structure and state institutions are still developing and to a 
certain extent, remain largely unformed. Putin, as well as trying to correct the damage of the 
1990s, is trying to form a strong state and with it a belief in statehood so that Russia can move 
forward on its own path, liberated not burdened by its past. This is why many education reforms 
have combined history and patriotism. The task is a mixture of bold, unrealistic, optimistic and 
complex. The education model currently championed has a different angle to that of Yeltsin, yet 
still has to function within the political system he created and reforms initiated by Gorbachev. 
Putin’s reforms are limited in what they can achieve and it is far too early to assess their current 
impact. The patriotic education reforms, thus far, have been widely supported by the Russian 
public, although the Unified State Exam to a much lesser extent. Consensus favours a move 
towards a more ‘Russian’ approach, and history fits in with this nicely, since the country can 
now tell its own story in a more inclusive way. The new history in schools, however, does 
contain many paradoxes, which will be assessed in the next chapter. In this regard, it is no 
wonder why teachers encounter problems on a regular basis. Individual schools implement the 
reforms differently, and some with much greater state and financial support; others fall victim 
to demographic trends. Although many problems will not be solved immediately (or maybe at 
all), establishing the foundations is the most important thing at this stage. A country cannot exist 
without citizens. Getting schools and the past sorted out while the president is still hugely 
popular is essential and urgent.  
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Chapter Five 
Teaching History and Patriotism in Putin’s Russia 
 
Q: Do you agree that there should be a single narrative or one single textbook?  
 
Zhanna: That is a question about democracy in Russia…313 
 
 
 
Governments do not interfere with what is taught in history classrooms unless there is a 
perceived reason to do so.314 Since the mid-2000s, the Russian government’s use of history as a 
consensus builder has seen a more active involvement in the classroom. The main goal is to 
create a single unifying narrative of history, ideally through one textbook, which promotes 
patriotism and citizenship. Shaping a person’s civic and patriotic consciousness requires 
education and upbringing as a channel to bring Russian society together and strengthen the unity 
and friendship of peoples in the federative state.315 The aim of developing and consolidating a 
stable society also requires the maintenance of civic and economic stability. As stated in the 
previous chapter, education has to meet the needs of a country’s economy, yet economic stability 
alone cannot consolidate a society. This chapter will argue that the principal reason for teaching 
patriotism through history is that a patriotic citizen is a responsible one. Stressing traditional 
Russian values encompassed in a glorious past, patriotism is an easier way to establish a civil 
society and secure state legitimacy in the long term. Patriotism through the lens of history helps 
to close the gap between the generations inhabiting the Russian Federation, and emphasise 
historical continuity, as promoted in the Putin Agenda. This is why teachers have become key 
in establishing a civic identity, as citizens will receive their patriotic duties throughout schooling 
and upbringing. Teachers are an important contact point in a person’s life and help to shape the 
individual. This is why the focus on upbringing has become closely tied to issues of history as 
well as power.  
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Phillips (eds.), Issues in History Teaching, (London: Routledge, 2000), p.12 
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115 
 
 
This chapter draws upon interviews conducted in the Russian Federation October 2016- April 
2017 with secondary school history teachers and trainee teachers. The latter group are the future 
and a product of the Putin Agenda. Having grown up under Putin, they will have a different and 
unique perspective, thus offering genuine insight into the effectiveness of patriotic education. 
These qualitative in-depth interviews were aimed to get a sense of how (and what of) the 
‘preferred’ narrative is transferred to students in the classroom on the period under focus. These 
interviews were also designed to help analyse the extent of the state’s version of history and 
education reforms, their effect on the teaching force, and therefore the youth, with the aim of 
demonstrating how far the state can influence the population. The participants were encouraged 
to express their opinions and perceptions on the state of history in Russia today, particularly in 
the education system and the period under focus. The qualified teachers were based in Moscow, 
St. Petersburg and Volokolamsk whereas the trainees were fifth year students from Vladimir. 
School textbooks, curriculums, reading lists, assignments and YeGE materials are also analysed 
to obtain a clearer picture of history in Russian schools.  
 
While fostering a national spirit has long been a priority for the Russian education system, recent 
reappraisals of ‘traditional’ pedagogy reflect the concept of an ‘ideal’ teacher and need to create 
responsible citizens.316 Due to recent trends, V.L Matrosov suggests that patriotism is a 
substitute for real history; the present day strategy of training teachers must include an updated 
‘moral, ethical and spiritual’ component outlined in Russia’s ‘Professional Code of the 
Schoolteacher’.317 Furthermore, the emphasis on a ‘positive’ historical experience to combat 
any falsification serves to heighten a student’s sense of pride in the Motherland in the early 
stages; arguably with the intention of creating citizens to defend Russia, the Russian state and 
preserve national unity. While the state has taken clear steps in this direction, (such as 
introducing lessons on Crimean reunification; Appendix D) the interviews’ findings indicated 
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that patriotism should not be considered a substitute for history.318 Rather, it should stand 
alongside it where appropriate and be free of any political ideology. The lessons on Crimea and 
military history meanwhile are not, and instead are a pure reflection of the state’s narrative. 
 
What Teaching History Does 
 
The use of history as a vehicle for promoting good citizenship is not specific to Russia or 
Russian pedagogy. As Andrew Peterson writes, selecting historical material for schools comes 
down to what values a government wants shared and promoted. History can act as the enforcer 
of the correct manners and procedures of society, its ethical beliefs, democracy and so on.319 
The chosen material and selected topics for the classroom must therefore reflect and promote 
these moral values, and in Russia’s case, uphold the myth of the state. While the UK attempted 
something similar post 2010, in Russia it is much more centralised and openly promoted and 
supported. The ‘battle’ against ‘falsifications’ in Russian history and focus on upbringing and 
socialising the youth into the national culture demonstrate this. Chris Husbands supports this, 
writing that history is taught based upon the assumptions of the society we live in, and that by 
obtaining any historical fact, the student gets the ‘socially approved’ answer.320 In the post-
Soviet space, the ‘new’ histories created post-1991 had to be of self-identification, and were 
applied differently by each state. In Ukraine, history had to promote a national consciousness 
and loyalty to the Ukrainian state, which were both previously non-existent.321 Kyrgyzstan, 
which also lacked a history of statehood, adopted the Epic of Manas as a means of explaining 
its heritage and asserting a national culture. After the Soviet collapse, Russia felt compelled to 
re-assert itself as a great power because of its 1,000-year long past with established traditions 
and state culture. Yet, this is precisely where the contradiction lies, because it is difficult for the 
teachers to adapt to new narratives, especially when they continuously change. Those born in 
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the USSR who taught in Soviet schools were suddenly surrounded with new diverse textbooks 
and a new story to tell to students who were born in a different country yet were influenced by 
the memories of the prior generation. The narrative can be easily manipulated to suit the 
immediate needs of the state, which came through in the interviews. Under Putin and Medvedev, 
a more rigid narrative has taken shape, which while inconsistent, is a big change from the 1990s 
when narratives were either negative or absent.  
 
As history is closely tied to issues of power and cultural transmission, this further demonstrates 
why the Russian government feels the need to hoist up teachers as role models, instead of 
transmitters of ideology or information like during the Soviet period. The future professionals 
require the means to achieve the educational goals of the state. In this respect, there is no 
difference to the Soviet era, but no official doctrine exists behind the desire to create one 
narrative. As such, the cherry picked episodes or ‘sub plots’ of the narrative depicting a success 
story are over relied upon. One major consequence of this is that other episodes are downplayed 
and do not receive the attention necessary. If a topic is uncomfortable or undermining of the 
message, the state cannot use it to achieve its goals or create consensus.  
 
 
Historical Pedagogy 
Before analysing the situation in Russia, it is worth looking at pedagogy in Western countries, 
which, as stated in the previous chapter, is starting to have more of an effect on Russian 
education system. Since 2000, historical pedagogy in the West has shifted its focus towards the 
students as recipients of the information, and how to work with the ideals and material put 
forward. This requires a certain skill set from the teachers including, but not limited to, the 
correct language to define the history, whether they are ideas, actions or events. Labelling this 
pedagogical focus can vary, although Christine Counsell suggests ‘active linking’ or ‘finding 
shapes’.322 The purpose is to pass on skills to the students themselves, who in turn can try to 
understand the concept of the past and apply it to the wider framework, which in the case of 
Russia includes the modern day situation.  
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Teachers need to blend their pedagogic and content knowledge to successfully create a map of 
the past for students. Teachers must be intellectually capable and able to handle the history 
properly. The focus cannot solely be detail and the teacher is required to use analogies, 
illustrations and so on to engage and enthuse the students.323 If, as is often the case, the content 
is curriculum bound, the teacher may require additional knowledge on unfamiliar topics and 
with that, supplementary materials. However, the reverse is also true. Teachers can become very 
textbook bound and simply transmit or relay the information, which in practice means the 
minimum requirements for the exam or the institution’s standards. This is not the ambition of 
the Russian government because if a student lacks a historical map, they may not feel any 
connection to the past or patriotic. This will undermine any stress on historical continuity in the 
present day and hinder a citizen’s loyalty to the state. As Phillips states, the history chosen to 
teach and how it is taught, has a direct impact on how young people will view their own identity 
and, crucially, their country’s identity.324 
 
Historical pedagogy in Russia today is also student focused but tries to reinforce a more 
traditional ‘Russian’ emphasis. This is not unlike the cultural focus analysed in Chapter Two, 
where tradition is considered inherently better. Russia’s history-teaching standard suggest that 
students should be taught in the spirit of patriotism, citizenship education and interethnic 
tolerance.325 Furthermore, it suggests that patriotism is the outcome of history classes, 
celebrating significant military victories and heroism of the masses. Pedagogical aims usually 
include knowledge, values and competences. Still instating a strong and ‘correct’ line of 
thinking (and preferred narrative), unlike the Soviet era, this is not about indoctrination along 
strict ideological lines.326 Unlike the West, skills and analysis appear to be of secondary 
importance to facts from a textbook or teacher and are more of an accidental by product. This 
became very clear during the lessons observed for this thesis. With one exception, no other 
teachers went far beyond the information in the textbook. The teacher in question, from a 
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gymnasium school in Southern Moscow, made use of films, PowerPoints and regularly 
interacted with the students encouraging discussion. Another in Volokolamsk had the class fill 
out a table on the different components of Soviet culture in the 1930s and set a brief test at the 
beginning on the prior week’s topic. However, she did have the textbook on hand throughout 
the lesson. The other teachers observed generally lectured the students including the occasional 
personal story or references to the modern day to maintain interest. The differences in 
methodology and teaching standards between state, gymnasium and private schools seemed 
minimal, but this would require extensive research to ascertain. One certainty is that teachers 
receive a higher salary and this may affect classroom performance. The students did appear 
more attentive in the private school, however. It is worth stating that during the interviews, 
almost every teacher and trainee discussed what will be referred to as the ‘time vs quantity’ 
factor. That is to say, history’s allocation within the curriculum (two forty five minute lessons 
per week) combined with substantial amounts to teach. This places restrictions on what is 
attainable in the lessons and anything extra would require extensive amounts of planning. As 
one teacher from a gymnasium in central Moscow remarked  
 
 
We have to get all this information across to the kids and it takes a lot of effort. I 
have two lessons a week-it is not enough. The themes are difficult and get only one 
lesson each, some things like the Russo-Japanese war get barely fifteen minutes… 
History is now in an interesting phase and there are many experiments, but I have 
to keep up. The situation now is that we want everything at once. The kids have a 
lot to learn, which means they also need a lot [of resources]. Take YeGE for example. 
I cannot prepare them for every theme and the amount I can provide is limited.327 
   
 
Taking into consideration the ‘time vs quantity’ factor, history’s popularity, lack of economic 
wealth it generates and the 1990s, it is unsurprising that the Russian government has shifted its 
focus to patriotism. This is in line with the famous Russian polymath, M.V. Lomonosov who 
believed that education of the individual as a citizen and patriot should be the chief goal of the 
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pedagogical process.328 In other words, patriotism might be the best outcome the state can hope 
to achieve. If citizens develop additional skills and knowledge, this is merely an added benefit. 
Yet, the need for patriotism ties in with the official agenda, as it connects Russia to the 
romaticised nineteenth century and creates a feeling of continuity and uniqueness in education. 
This is also the case with the Soviet citizen education model as discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
Unpacking the role of a patriotic education in Russia further, the concepts of this can be traced 
back as far as Peter I, who maintained that it should create the kind of patriot who would lay 
down his life for the Motherland.329 This was developed further in the nineteenth century by 
several figures. A.N. Radishchev contended ‘a true man and son of the fatherland are one and 
the same’.330 V.G. Belinskiy’s pedagogical work that stressed ideas of a profound sense of 
kinship, whereas the Slavophile thinker N.I. Karamzin believed patriotism later arises and 
develops the upbringing and education of the individual.331 Not only are these prominent 
intellectual figures from the period under investigation, whose works are situated in the history 
section at any given book shop in Russia, but this is like tsarist times whereby good values were 
portrayed through notable individuals.332 In any case, the longevity of patriotic education as a 
‘tradition’ is enough justification for the state to use it; it adheres to continuity, tradition and 
appears as a cornerstone of Russia’s great power status. The argument would dictate that the 
population are patriotic because Russia is a great power, and Russia is only a great power 
because of its historic uniqueness and glories.  
 
Concerning its place in modern day pedagogy, however, it is often associated with K.D. 
Ushinskiy, who developed the principle of national spirit in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Ushinskiy believed the components of the Russian national spirit were humanness, 
industriousness and responsibility, and that a moral category of education was intertwined with 
Russian culture.333 Awareness of national worth and pride in the nation’s heroic past constitute 
the basis of a patriotic spirit, which educators have to push today. Analysis of the late Soviet era 
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by Klass-Goran Karlsson produced the model below, which depicts four methods of Russian 
historical pedagogy:  
 
1. Classical Method: Based on consensus and national and religious values.  
2. Liberal Objectivism: Based on scientific criteria and free perspective. Emphasis on 
cultural history.  
3. Radical/Critical Formalism: Urging students to work analytically.  
4. Categorical: Values and analysis. 334 
 
In today’s history lessons, method one seems to be the most auspicious, although the fourth is 
not completely out of place for a patriotic focused upbringing in Putin’s Russia. Both make 
students the receivers of the desired message, which emphasises tradition and the national 
culture. Urging students to work analytically could have the opposite effect. None of the lessons 
observed for this thesis followed methods two or three, either. Considering the teacher 
demographics, this is likely a hangover from the Soviet era where critical thinking was not the 
desired outcome of history lessons. During the interviews, the trainee teachers indirectly 
supported those two methods, particularly when reflecting on their own education. Most spoke 
of schoolteachers who transmitted dense information without much objective assessment or 
analysis. In their own words, it made for ‘boring’ lessons. The contents of pedagogical training 
and patriotic programmes seemingly support this, as well. However, the ‘analysis’ in method 
four deserves some scrutiny. N.A. Shaidenko draws attention to the fact that a characteristic of 
civil society in Russia is patriotism, however this further shows that objectivity can be lost in 
trying to create patriotic citizens.335 Actual ‘analyses’ may be limited in reality. An uncritical 
analysis of the nation means the preferred patriotism surrounding a cherry picked reconstructed 
past can be channeled through textbooks. Alas, objectivity falls victim to subjective trends. Olga 
Vasileva is a supporter of methods one and four, even suggesting that parents should receive 
punishment for not instilling their children with the correct spiritual and cultural values. 
Although such a law would be impractical and uninforcable, the threat of punishment would 
likely have a knock on effect where objectivity and analysis are concerned. This model does 
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however allude to how history continues to be mythologised, in the sense that a patriotic focus 
cannot ignore things like folk tales, songs and poetry of the native language. These things can 
be used to shape a student’s personality, train them as a member of the growing civil society, 
and a good citizen in a democracy (a loyal patriotic citizen).336 Using patriotism as the umbrella 
for moral values depicted through a glorious past is considered part of the good pedagogical 
practice and by definition, is already at loggerheads with methods two and three.  
 
All of the participants were asked ‘should history be patriotic’? in order to ascertain their stance 
on patriotism and how this links the Putin Agenda with historical education. The answers saw 
an overall split and no general support for the government’s stance on patriotism. Although the 
majority agreed that it should, they also believe, as four participants specifically remarked, that 
history also has to be tolerant, apolitical and inclusive of different opinions. Yet, most who said 
yes also believed that history is naturally patriotic. One teacher at a private school in Southwest 
Moscow said, “History cannot but be patriotic. Otherwise what is the point of even teaching 
it?”337 Of those who said no, their answers were equally explicit. One younger teacher in 
Volokolamsk said,  
 
 
Ukraine tried to do this-it is not a good idea. Being patriotic does not mean re-writing 
history. History should be written in an honest way, not on falsifications or 
exaggerations. We all made mistakes and we were also aggressors. We should not 
make history better in our own eyes; we need to use the truth.338  
  
 
Another in Moscow highlighted that patriotism is not a universally accepted term: ‘Why should 
history be patriotic? Patriotism is not terms that suit only one point of view. Every country’s 
history has many events and they should be taught properly’.339 Her colleague’s response was 
more cynical: ‘No. Why should it? And Maths?! Should Maths be patriotic as well? [Laughs] 
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Our school’s discipline is that we do not do this, because it is not right’.340  
 
Most who believed history should be patriotic were Moscow based, whereas the three from St. 
Petersburg showed more diversity. One said history should only be objective, whereas the other 
two disclosed yes, but one said that history naturally promotes patriotism, whereas the other 
discussed the necessity of tolerance and neutrality. The youngest two teachers were against the 
idea of a patriotic history whereas the oldest two were strongly in favour of it. As stated above, 
this is likely due to the teaching experience and a patriotic education from the Soviet era, 
compared to a ‘globalised new Russian’ living in a Soviet shadow. Regardless, it was clear from 
the responses that in Russia, patriotism is a very personal thing, which shows one obstacle for 
the Russian government in establishing a consensual patriotic history. On the other hand, and as 
came through in the discourse of the responses, it could possible be that teachers feel a more 
patriotic emphasis on history increases its appeal to young people. The interviews with the 
trainee teachers suggest this is highly likely, as 90% of this group believed that history should 
be patriotic. Their answers showed no uniform agreement on what patriotism means, but most 
believe that patriotism should not be ‘blind’ or political. Unlike the older and qualified teachers, 
they also referenced the current political situation in their responses. Three examples are 
displayed below:   
 
 
‘If history was not patriotic, then we [pause] our government [pause] I am afraid of 
anarchy. You accept some things, some unpopular reforms and laws because of 
patriotism’.341  
 
‘Yes, I suppose it should be patriotic but not extremely so. I do not like radical 
patriotism, like [that] surrounding the Great Patriotic War. Many patriotic projects 
that we have now are blind. Talking about things blindly is not just dishonest, it is 
dangerous’.342  
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‘I think I [pause] I am not patriotic. Not about the state. Of the country, yes, but now 
we have a strange political situation. Any modern minded person loves their history 
and their country. Yes, teach history patriotically, just do not get political’.343  
 
 
The one trainee teacher who did not explicitly say history should be patriotic remarked ‘For me, 
patriotism is the ability to accept and understand the good and bad sides of your past. To try to 
develop your country and make it better. If you accept and understand differing viewpoints, then 
you are a patriot. But this is not the government’s definition.’344  
Whilst these responses show patriotism as a very personal thing in Russia, it also suggests that 
like a single textbook, patriotism alone is not enough to build a broad consensus in the hope of 
consolidating civil society. It can be concluded that strong generational trends are apparent, and 
that patriotism does have the potential to be a useful teaching tool for generating interest among 
young people, if it is utilised creatively. Currently, it seems not to be the case.    
 
What does a Russian History Teacher Look Like? 
 
According to the All Russia Census 2010, history teachers made up 8.1% of the teaching force 
2009-2010, with a female majority.345 This figure should be treated with some caution and it 
does not account for those who may have entered ‘teacher’ or ‘secondary school teacher’ as 
their profession. The profession overall, has aged somewhat; 17.7% of teachers in 2009 were at 
the retirement age. The sample interviewed reflects this relatively accurately, as the average age 
was 45.45 years. A gap needs filling and younger teachers coming into the profession are a 
product of the new Russia and Putin era. This is also true of schoolchildren, all of whom in 2017 
were born after Putin became president. The profession has become increasingly female over 
last decade as well. Two thirds of teachers in training in 2009 were female. A more recent study 
in 2015 of two hundred teachers from four Russian cities showed that slightly over 80% were 
                                                          
343 Interview with Evgenya, fifth year history student, Vladimir, 18/02/2017.  
344 Interview with Ekaterina, fifth year history student, Vladimir, 18/02/2017.   
345 All Russia Census 2010, Volume 5, ‘Population by age group, gender and livelihood’, pp.6-15. Other figures 
relating to the teaching workforce in this paragraph can be found here, too.  
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female.346 The majority have ten-fifteen years of experience and this study replicated these 
figures.   
 
Compared with data from the Ministry of Education 1898, the gender split among teachers was 
56% men 44% women, whereas figures for the Soviet era are hard to come by.347 Women in the 
Russian Empire were less likely and able to obtain an education, particularly peasants, whereas 
in Russia today they have far more opportunities. Schools in the Russian empire often benefitted 
from female teachers as they could be paid less and were often more committed to the profession 
than males. As mentioned in the last chapter, the profession as a whole is becoming less 
attractive, despite the importance of teachers consistently talked up. Three factors can explain 
this: low salaries, the prestige of teachers and things Russians consider ‘important’. According 
to one Levada poll, among the most important things in life for Russian men were a career 
(52%), a place to live (46%), a car (30%) and to get married and have children (56% and 
40%).348 Education was the most important (65%) but most likely as a means to secure a good 
career, and with it, a decent standard of living. Teacher salaries vary depending on the region or 
city, yet can only be described as low. One trainee teacher interviewed claimed the teaching 
position she would enter the following academic year in Vladimir offered 11,000 RUR whilst a 
local call-centre paid 20,000-25,000 RUR. Another became the manager of a coffee shop in 
Vladimir, since the salary was more than double for a teacher in the entire region. Regarding 
prestige, teachers throughout Russian history have never been held in high regard.349 As Scott 
J. Seregny writes, in the Russian Empire, teachers were viewed as ‘civilised savages’ treated 
with pity and disdain who were neither peasants nor members of educated society.350 Christine 
Ruane supports this, stating that teachers were considered ‘boring pedants’.351 In other words, 
teaching cannot fulfil the average Russian male’s ambitions. Analysing what the same poll’s 
                                                          
346The study was conducted in Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ekaterinburg and Khabarovsk. See Joseph Zajda, 
‘Globalisation, Ideology and History School Textbooks: The Russian Federation’, in Joseph Zajda (ed.), Nation 
Building and History Education in a Global Culture, vol.13, p.40 
347 The data was reproduced in Scott J. Seregny, Russian Teachers and Peasant Revolution: the politics of 
education in 1905 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.14 
348 Daria Litvinova “Russians Consider Marrying, Giving Birth and Education the most important things”, The 
Moscow Times, August 27th 2015 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-consider-marrying-
giving-birth-and-education-most-important-things/528835.html  accessed 21/05/2016 
349Veteran journalist, Vladimir Pozner, speaking to a group of U.S diplomats in Moscow recalled that in Soviet 
times, people became teachers because they were either ‘born to be’ or simply failed in other professions.  
350 Scott J. Seregny, Russian Teachers and Peasant Revolution, p.13 
351 Christine Ruane, Gender, Class & the Professionalisation of Russian City Teachers, (London: University of 
Pittsburgh, 1994), p.21 
126 
 
findings for women, among the top things were getting married (77%), having children (75%), 
learning to cook (52%) and falling in love (32%).352 Careers and material possessions came 
further down the list. Based on these figures, women may be more inclined to take a lower paid 
job, especially if their husbands are better placed to provide economic security, thus not 
damaging their social standing. The interviews with trainee teachers supported this, with two 
examples below:  
 
 
 
Q: Do you intend to teach in your hometown/region after you graduate?  
 
Fyodor: I want to be a teacher but it is not easy. The salary is not enough for a young 
man to live on, but I want to do it anyway.353  
 
Evgeniya: I do not know, because I am getting married soon and my main goal in 
life is to have a good family.354  
 
 
The paradox here is that teachers are held in such low regard while education is considered of 
utmost importance within Russian society. The government is, as discussed, trying to increase 
teacher’s status, but it appears that schools are increasingly viewed like a service industry. 
History serves to create politically and socially responsible citizens, and other subjects like 
science and maths, a prosperous economy. History teachers, therefore, must be regarded by the 
state as ‘politically reliable’ and as models for society. One might question teachers’ ability to 
be patriotic considering their salary and social status. It may be another reason the government 
wants to increase their social standing.   
 
Tatiana Tsyrlina-Spady and Michael Lovorn suggest in their research that there is a pattern of 
                                                          
352Daria Litvinova “Russians Consider Marrying, Giving Birth and Education the most important things”, The 
Moscow Times, August 27th 2015 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-consider-marrying-
giving-birth-and-education-most-important-things/528835.html  accessed 21/05/2016 
353 Interview with Fyodor, fifth year history student, Vladimir, 18/02/2017.  
354 Interview with Evgenya, fifth year history student, Vladimir, 18/02/2017.  
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adherence among teachers towards the new unilateral patriotic narrative of Russian history in 
the classroom.355 At face value, one could argue this is a direct result of older teachers, trained 
in the Soviet era with one textbook, preferring this way while also having the means to use 
additional sources. Meanwhile, the younger generation coming into the profession, who have 
been more exposed to the Putin narrative, are more susceptible and adherent to current agenda, 
thus it will feature more increasingly in classrooms. However, the interviews with trainee 
teachers did not suggest this, and there was limited support among the qualified teachers as well 
for a single narrative, as analysed below.  
 
The Curriculum  
 
It is possible that the emphasis on patriotism, particularly surrounding certain events, comes 
because of history’s lack of classroom time. Therefore, the students must leave with the 
‘necessary knowledge’ in order to pass exams and gain a positive connection to their past. Most 
of the teachers interviewed agreed that the students should make up their own minds when 
drawing conclusions about certain events and leaders. The teacher’s views were quite noticeable 
whilst teaching, however. For instance, those who expressed a more balanced or positive view 
of Stalin’s leadership made it clear in the lessons his successes as a manager and his role in the 
Great Patriotic War.  
 
Asides from the ‘time vs quantity’ factor, the teachers also mentioned the bureaucratic pressures 
and ability to generate interest among students. As one teacher in Southwest Moscow stated 
“They are teenagers and ask ‘why should I do it?’ The problem is that these are old facts and 
they cannot connect with them easily”.356 This comment also falls in line with the overwhelming 
need for additional and more interesting materials. Another from St. Petersburg said she uses 
Stalin’s short course as a way of showing her students how society used to think and what their 
parents did at school – and may be helped by using the USSR citizen education model. The 
personalisation of history is more effective for students to gain a connection with the past and 
                                                          
355 Tatiana Tsyrlina-Spady and Michael Lovorn, ‘Patriotism, History Teaching and History Textbooks in Russia: what was 
old is new again’, in Joseph Zajda (ed.), Globalisation, Ideology and the Politics of Education Reform, vol.14 (Switzerland: 
Springer, 2015), p.47  
356 Interview with Irina, school history teacher, Moscow, 14/02/2017.  
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feel patriotic. Concerning the bureaucracy, most of this focused on YeGE, although the patriotic 
upbringing came up briefly, as did the nature of current textbooks. There was a common feeling 
that the patriotic programmes concept is well intended but ultimately flawed. Schools lack funds 
to take the students on excursions and are often unsure of what exactly encompasses a patriotic 
programme. One Moscow school director stated that the she and her staff simply had no idea 
what to do. Two from St. Petersburg also talked about history as ‘policy’:  
 
 
The most difficult thing is that history is often presented as a policy aimed at the 
past. Therefore, objective assessments often give way to opportunistic and 
subjective trends. Such fluctuations affect the place and role of history and 
knowledge in society. It means knowledge gives way to a prevalence of 
stereotypes.357  
 
The state is constantly changing the concepts of teaching. One law contradicts 
another. Today for example, I was asked what textbooks we need to buy for next 
year and I did not answer. Do you know why? Because I will say [which one], the 
school will buy it and then suddenly a new law will be issued meaning that we 
should not have!358  
 
 
The Moscow based teachers did acknowledge policy issues, but seemed less concerned with it 
compared to the large volume of information and YeGE. Regarding YeGE, most teachers 
preferred the old school exams but claimed it has not affected their teaching significantly. As 
implied in the previous chapter, most of the criticisms were about YeGE’s layout and suitability 
to history as a discipline. The consensus was that this exam does not teach skills, is too 
subjective and easy. Most want the multiple-choice section taken out for this reason. Some 
examples of the multiple-choice questions ask the students to match an event to the year it 
occurred, select the event that was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War in 1944 or even 
                                                          
357 Interview with Evgeniy, school history teacher, St. Petersburg, 31/01/2017.  
358 Interview with Kseniya, school history teacher, St. Petersburg, 01/02/2017.  
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complete a half filled out table of state leaders, their position and successors.359 Different periods 
that are not connected whatsoever often blend in the same question without much logic.  
 
The views of both groups concerning the textbooks’ quality and other available materials were 
mixed. Most strikingly, however, none of the qualified teachers were familiar with Filippov’s 
teacher handbook or textbook and it was not even listed on the trainee teachers’ recommended 
reading list. In fact, when specifically asked and informed about Filippov’s books, the 
participants in both groups appeared confused. This is significant because it reveals the 
government’s view is rejectable and despite all of the hysteria and uproar following its 
publication, Filippov appears to have had little impact in Russia’s two capitals and suburbs. 
Schools may not have the funds to purchase it and those who use Dannilov do so because it is 
the most recommended and has in essence, become the norm. Not every school visited used 
Dannilov’s textbook, and a selection of those that are will be explored below, however, all were 
familiar with it. None of the participants believed it is perfect but the quality of existing 
textbooks also did not guarantee their support for one single textbook or narrative to be used by 
all schools. On this subject, just two believed a single textbook or narrative would be a good 
thing and only to help with examinations. The rest thought it would be impossible, as did all 
most of the trainee teachers. The most common reason cited was that any hypothetical textbook 
would have to be so large and include all of the different opinions, historiographical trends and 
facts that it would be infeasible. Another factor to consider is that many of the trainees used 
Dannilov’s textbook at school in the recent past, and will go onto use it in their professional 
careers. Many described a negative history education with poor teaching in the interviews. 
Changes from below to the history classroom overall are highly likely. At least on the principles 
of history education, the interviews showed that there is a clear gap between the state and 
population. Therefore, history remains a negotiating space for democracy in Russia.  
 
                                                          
359 Question 11 in Variant 18 of a self-study book containing example papers for YeGE asks students to fill out 
the table with the answers below. This particular example has Trotsky as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR requiring his successor be completed, whereas the row below has Henrik IV, his position missing and 
Ludvik XIII as his successor. I.A. Artasov, O.N. Mel’nikova, Istoriya Gosudarstvenniya Itogovaya Attestatsiya 
YeGE-2017: 30 trenirovochnykh variantov ekzamenatsionnykh rabot dlya podgotovki k edinomu 
gosudarstvennomu ekzamenu, (Moskva: AST, 2017), p.179; See also Appendix H for another sample YeGE 
question/  
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Textbooks, Narratives and Teachers  
 
The following analysis will present a section on each textbook comparing the treatment of key 
issues and period. This will allow for a more systematic examination of the narrative and 
comparing different trends. Textbooks are often known by the authorship instead of the titles 
(these are usually the same). The textbooks analysed for this study will be referred to as 
Dannilov, Kiselev, Lyashenko and Volobuev. These four textbooks were used by the teachers 
interviewed in this study for the ninth, tenth and eleventh classes (ages fourteen-eighteen). The 
actual authors’ background seems of little consequence, as a glimpse through Prosveshchenie 
and Drofa’s websites provide no bibliographies. Whether they are professional historians or not 
was also not a concern for teachers in selecting the ideal textbook, either. Nevertheless, it ought 
to be taken into consideration that Dannilov was once in charge of the history department at 
MGU and has been criticised by some as a ‘neo-Stalinist’ for Stalinism’s portrayal in his ninth 
class textbook.360 O.V. Volobuev, meanwhile, is a historian of populism at Moscow State 
Pedagogical University (MGPU), so was perhaps viewed as a natural fit for writing school 
history textbooks. Dannilov was first published in the 1990s, is widely used and has been 
updated several times including 2012-13 along with Kiselev. This was a period of some internal 
unrest, meaning if handled properly, could go hand in hand with an anti-revolution message. 
Volobuev and Lyashenko, meanwhile, are part of the 2015 textbook series published during an 
economic downturn following Crimea’s annexation. Their statist slant is also complimentary to 
the rhetoric which customised the years leading up to Putin’s 2018 re-election.  
 
The layout does not differ drastically between textbooks, however, some are easier to follow. 
All textbooks include maps, photos, portraits, diagrams, timelines, documents and extra tasks 
for the students to complete. These usually require short answers, tables to fill out or are group 
projects. Most of the teachers interviewed set these for homework, as these are straight forward 
and do not require much from the students (Appendix G). There is also a short bibliography and 
the lyrics to the Russian national anthem at the end.  
 
Before examining the textbooks individually, it must be highlighted that each has a different 
                                                          
360 V. Lavrov & I. Kurlyandsky, ‘Teper budet komu zanyatsya falsifikatiey istorii’, Novaya Gazeta, available at 
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/12/13/280-teper-budet-komu-zanyatsya-falsifikatsiey-istorii accessed 
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slant. Kiselev’s book places a greater emphasis on economic factors throughout, whereas 
Dannilov focuses more on the political and social. Volobuev and Lyashenko (who wrote these 
textbooks on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for the same series) stand out due to a clearer 
layout and the fact they are in colour. However, Lyashenko’s textbook is also noticeably anti-
liberal and anti-revolutionary. This alone demonstrates that Russian children are learning history 
from a minimum of four different standpoints. The narratives differ on some key issues, with 
the two exceptions being both world wars. For this reason, the world wars will receive a separate 
section. The level of detail on any particular topic also varies and for no obvious reasons. The 
divisions of each period are more consistent and follow these lines: The reign of Aleksandr III, 
Russia at the turn of the century, the Revolutions, the 1920s and 1930s (not separated) and the 
Great Patriotic War. For this reason, the analysis of each textbook will also be divided up as 
such. Other events (or sub plots) fall under these chapters, also with differing subheadings. For 
example, culture and science are important and receive great focus for each period, with a 
subsection in each chapter in every textbook. Meanwhile, the Red Terror and Stalin’s purges 
are sections within a section. In Volobuev, for instance, Stalin’s purges are found under ‘internal 
politics’ and ‘Stalin’s revolution from above’ in Kiselev. In any case, the students will leave the 
classroom learning the importance of culture in Russian life and the purges as part of Stalinism. 
This is befitting to the preferred narrative, which also champions the superiority of Russian 
culture and downplays the terror and gulag.   
 
 
A.A. Dannilov’s Ninth Class Textbook for the Twentieth and Twenty First Centuries  
 
This textbook begins the period in a rather sentimental and nostalgic tone. Russia at this time 
was in a state-led but late moderisation and industrialisation process. Despite the social 
problems, people lived relatively harmoniously. Moreover, the modernisation was in line with 
the ‘special’ role of an imperial power361. This echoes the Putin Agenda, however it would be 
wrong to interpret this as imperialist ambitions of the government. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Russia’s desire to be accepted as a great power because of its imperial past is the 
                                                          
361 A.A. Dannilov, L.G. Kosulina and M.Y. Brandt, Istoriya Rossii XX nachalo XXI veka, (Moscow: 
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origin of the message. By contrast, most British school textbooks refer to Russia as a ‘backward’ 
nation instead of one that is modernising.  
 
The overall narrative is that this period was turbulent and could only be saved by a strong 
figurehead or centralisation of power. Despite being a good man, Nicholas offered neither 
according to the author(s). The Russo-Japanese War to this end is portrayed as initially well 
intended but a series of failures nevertheless. Whilst Kiselev places the blame on Nicholas for 
conceding too much, Dannilov states Russia was not prepared for war and refers to the soldiers 
who died as heroes who fought bravely for their motherland. The Dumas have no special section, 
but there is an agreement among all textbooks that post 1907 witnessed some progression with 
agrarian reforms and economic activity. This is a nice set up to portray the First World War and 
revolutions as an unwelcomed disruption.  
 
On the topic of the First World War, Dannilov is very patriotic and projects the besieged fortress 
mentality, stating that Germany were the best prepared for war and planned to ‘smash’ France 
and then Russia, expecting to walk into the Baltics and Poland. Moreover, it chooses ‘patriotic 
facts’ to focus on, such as how the initial declaration of war caused an explosion of patriotic 
feeling, pro-war demonstrations and a 96% increase in mobilisation on the first day.362 This tone 
continues as the war unfolds, writing that the allies cared more about the Western Front despite 
the fact most of the fighting was in the East and “not once was Russia saved by allied armies 
from defeat”. It takes this further by stating that Germany wanted Russia out of the war quickly. 
Blame for not having a victory is generally placed on other European countries opposed to the 
internal struggles. The internal struggles are connected to the revolution and treated as a separate 
matter altogether.  
 
All textbooks treat 1917 as process of two phases (February to October; October to the Civil 
War). In the chapter on the ‘Great Russian Revoltuion’, Dannilov writes that Nicholas ‘missed 
his last chance to transform the revolution which started from below into a less painful [one] for 
the country revolution from above’.363 Also that his politics ‘disappointed society’.364 This 
continues throughout the revolution and compliments the narrative of the Putin Agenda. The 
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revolutions’ causes are noted as the weakening of state power, where only a strong state could 
secure stability and unity for the country as a whole. The ‘Great Russian Revolution’ happened 
as the country’s situation was ‘explosively dangerous’ and the fall of the monarchy then became 
inevitable. The events of February are written like a timeline to then briefly mention Nicholas’ 
abdication and that the situation after was immensely difficult because the state failed to secure 
stability, security, uphold the citizens’ rights and control its borders.365 This does not stray too 
far from the Putin narrative. The arrival of the Bolsheviks is set out clearly and emphasises that 
their slogans won over the population who were tired of the unsolved power problems and ever-
critical situation. It then embarks down a very long list of each event leading up to the Civil 
War. No real narrative emerges until Lenin gains full control of the Soviets and the Civil War 
begins, which is depicted as a great tragedy that occurred because of the continual changes to 
Russian life, and where losses of life occurred and the minority party came to power with little 
support from the masses. The Red Terror, meanwhile, gets barely half a page. The stated reasons 
for the Bolshevik’s victory in the Civil War is their sense of a strong statehood and centralisation 
of management, which allowed for a more effective allocation of resources. Meanwhile, the 
Whites made a series of miscalculations, including the peasantry being ‘forced’ to put up with 
the military and economic program of the Bolsheviks, but makes clear that the peasantry did not 
wish to return to the old order.  
 
The Stalin era begins with his purge of the politburo, writing that Trotsky and his followers were 
accused of never believing in socialism. Stalin was able to ‘work the party apparatus’ and make 
socialism in one country look more attractive than a world revolution as it would see faster 
results.366 The period is generally covered in far more depth than Kiselev, however the narrative 
does not differ too drastically. Dannilov stresses the need of the USSR to industrialise and 
modernise, yet does make clear that the results came on the backs of the population. 
Collectivisation is painted as a disaster but for whom is questionable. For example, 
collectivisation is depicted as ‘hard on the regions and hungry populations of Ukraine and 
Central Asia’, but two pages later claims that ‘despite the difficult results, the peasants were 
largely indifferent to it all’.367 The criticism of this book largely surrouns the terror. It is covered 
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in two pages as ‘security for the state and cooperation of society’, whilst the gulag gets only one 
sentence. Kirov’s murder was said to ‘simplify the introduced procedures’ and accelerated the 
pace of it, and it is written that the terror masked any political and economic errors.  
 
 
A.F. Kiselev’s Eleventh Class Textbook for the Twentieth-Twenty First Centuries  
Kiselev gives the political process far less attention than the state of the economy and 
modernisation process. The Dumas are barely covered or even painted as significant. Kiselev 
also mentions much of the same issues on the First World War and in remarkably similar 
language. The main difference is the level of detail it goes into. Kiselev’s is unique in this regard, 
and is a consistent pattern throughout most of the textbook.  
 
Kiselev too argues that after 1915 and when Nicholas assumed control of the army, the economy 
was not able to cope and moral of the soldiers declined with the situation at home. Kiselev 
continues this economic focus into the revolutionary period. The causes are considered to be the 
long standing socio-economic problems. Post 1905, it focuses on specific features of the 
economy leading up to 1917. Piotr Stolypin’s reforms get two pages of praise for generating the 
highest production output in the world (at that time), and for his appearance and demeanour of 
a true Russian statesman.368 Kiselev also suggests the economic success came down to Russia’s 
unique geographic position: “[Russia] had to borrow from the west to create dynamic 
development… production exports went to four fifths of the globe thanks to Russia’s 
connections with the East”.369 To revisit Russia’s Foreign Policy Concepts around the time this 
textbook was published, shows how they go hand in hand with the government’s message. 
February begins with the abdication of Nicholas II and then proceeds with a day-by-day account 
of events. Everything happens rather quickly until the Provisional Government is established, 
and comments on how poorly the new power organs were functioning: ‘The situation was 
breaking down, no civil peace and the war was a huge burden’.370 The section on October is sub 
headed ‘The Bolsheviks become dictators’, and unsurprisingly goes onto to document how the 
USSR became a one party state under Lenin’s personal control of the party organs. This follows 
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the textbook’s claim that Lenin seized upon the people’s energy to force a new socialist coalition 
as ‘the country was heading for a catastrophe’.371 The authors’ reasons are that the Bolsheviks 
were preparing to assume full power and therefore saw no need for the Constituent Assembly. 
It also stresses that War Communism broke with Lenin’s doctrine and the party’s official 
ideology, but was deemed necessary to aid the transition from capitalism to socialism. Taking 
into consideration the time of its publication, following large popular protests, this is 
unsurprising.  
 
Stalin then suddenly comes to the forefront finding the party at his hands after Lenin’s briefly 
mentioned death. Kiselev writes that the USSR needed the ability to increase production and 
that Witte’s reforms combined with the effects of war showed the need to take Industrialisation 
further.372 With this, Stalin felt the terror was the most necessary element in securitising the 
industrialisation process: ‘Stalin wanted to increase production so much and develop the means 
of doing so… needed people on board’.373 The phrase ‘state safety’ is also used in the half a 
paragraph dedicated to the terror, and purging the politburo members gets one page. Kiselev 
also maintains that Stalin believed collectivisation would keep in line those million mass 
peasants below. Although Kiselev admits that whilst industrialisation helped the USSR to 
prepare for war, collectivisation did not solve the economic problems. In getting the population 
on board, Kiselev also highlights how the persecution of the church was necessary to ‘break 
down the concrete worldview in order to establish a new one and secure legitimacy’.374 It is also 
written that the Soviet government used education and a new school textbook to ‘connect to the 
people through epochs and false history’.375 Economic focus aside, this section makes it clear 
that state survival was crucial to the country’s existence at almost any cost.  
 
L.M. Lyashenko’s Tenth Class Textbook for the Nineteenth-Twentieth Centuries 
 
According to Lyashenko, pre-1900 was a golden age for Russian culture (post-1900 was silver). 
Aleksandr III is described as ‘between a liberal and conservative’, but just as ‘conservative’ in 
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the others. This is rather contradictory as Lyashenko then spends a great deal of time analysing 
the strengthening of state power and the crackdown on dissent. Lyashenko even states that the 
zemsky sobor’s purpose was to ‘combat liberal society’.376 Also as a Slavophile idea used by 
liberals to spread their ideas.377 There is a large usage of ‘autocracy’ throughout the text and 
even in subheadings, with strong connotations that the only way to secure the state and for it to 
function was through autocratic conservatism (at least during this period). Lyashenko’s 
depiction of Sergei Witte and his reforms demonstrates this: “In the interests of the monarchy, 
Witte used all the states might and administrative bodies to conduct industrialisation for the 
conditions of the monarchy”.378 Lyashenko is also quite effective in covering a range of different 
topics broken down into concise subheadings, particularly focusing on how ideologies 
developed around Russia’s socio-economic position. Each political group receives equal details 
and is in age appropriate language. Although Lenin is highlighted as an important figure, the 
information about him is quite basic until the October Revolution.  
 
Like Dannilov, the turn of the century begins by listing a number of statistics, particularly 
concerning demography in order to paint a harmonious picture of a unified Russian society. 
Despite an initial rosy tone, from 1900 onward it switches to one of social difficulties, 
particularly the rural question, leading to the events of 1905. Lyashenko states that societal 
progress had notably slowed down and that Witte’s reforms had unfortunately not touched every 
person.379 Although described as a patriotic uprising, 1905 lacks a narrative. A copy of Nicholas’ 
manifesto is provided but is hardly mentioned or analysed otherwise.  
 
Unlike Dannilov and Kiselev, Lyashenko covers each Duma in sufficient detail and is clear as 
to why each was successful or not. The first Duma known as the ‘wrath of the people’, was ‘full 
of liberal publicists’, the second marked the end of the first revolution with limited success 
whereas the third and fourth saw more co-operation between the parties, a stronger voice of the 
masses and far reaching reforms. This is where the lengthy praise of Stolypin comes in, who 
like Witte, is held up as an ideal Russian statesman; translation, ‘efficient manager’. Stolypin is 
portrayed as a good manager who implemented necessary reforms and whose successes were 
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not fully realised until after his death. Lyashenko poses the question to the reader ‘for what did 
the people overthrow the state in a difficult period and choose a different path for society to 
develop down?’ Its own answer is Nicholas’ wish to secure his own privileges and belief in 
autocracy and orthodoxy to protect the historic path of his ancestors, which also had an effect 
on the outcomes of the Russo-Japanese and First World War.380  
 
 
O.V. Volobuev’s Eleventh Class Textbook for the Twentieth Century 
 
Picking up where Lyashenko left off, Volobuev’s twentieth century textbook begins with the 
First World War in a chapter titled ‘Russia in the years of great turmoil’. In other words, despite 
1905, Russia was embarking down an auspicious path that was disrupted by the war. The war 
gets eight pages and unlike the other two, barely considers military history or pays much 
attention to the battles fought. Volobuev claims that the reforms after 1905 put Russia in a 
stronger position to fight and indirectly disputes claims in British textbooks that their army was 
poorly equipped for war.381 Moreover, it blames much of its failures, like those on the East-
Prussian Front, on the allies’ failings elsewhere. Volobuev is much better at connecting the 
events at home with those abroad, linking the war to the causes of the revolutions. 
 
The period is outlined clearly and broken down into concise issue based sections. The revolution 
arrives within twenty-three pages but just three cover February and another four the 
establishment of the Provisional Government.382 Volobuev states that the increasing social crisis 
and political polarisation was the government’s ultimate failures along with the unneeded 
distraction of war. As such, the Bolsheviks were preparing for an armed insurrection to seize 
the moment. Volobuev explores October and its aftermath in much greater depth than Kisilev 
and Dannilov. The Civil War and War Communism get eighteen pages. Volobuev also puts the 
Bolshevik’s popularity down to its slogans amidst the mounting social problems.383 Volobuev 
appears to stress that built up institutions are necessary for security and development. This is 
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382 O.V. Volobuev, S.P. Karpachev, P.N. Romanov, Istoriya Rossii nachalo XX-XXI veka, (Moscow: Drofa, 
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supported by asserting that the Bolsheviks were not the most popular political force of the day, 
and therefore needed a way of securing their own legitimacy. Volobuev writes ‘to protect the 
new powers from internal enemies, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissions (VChK) was 
created to prevent counter revolutionaries and sabotage’.384 It is not implied the Cheka was a 
good thing, rather necessary for the Bolshevik’s consolidation of power. Moreover, Volobuev 
states that dictatorship is all that came from the revolution: ‘the Soviet state was initially the 
most democratic in the world because it gave power to the masses… only to be taken away and 
placed in the hands of one political party’.385  
 
When outlining how the state apparatus formed in November, Volobuev makes clear that a part 
of this was identifying ‘enemies of the people’: “In this time it meant the Mensheviks and 
Socialist Revolutionaries (SR’s), closing down their newspapers and arrests and later extended 
to churches”.386 The relationship between the new Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox 
Church gets equal time in each textbook with a largely neutral tone. The first paragraph of the 
Civil War chapter ends calling it ‘one of the most tragic pages of Russian history’ yet, the causes 
are not really outlined and the Red’s victory occurs rather casually.387 Also like Dannilov, 
Volobuev attributes the Reds victory due to their better organisation and the White’s 
miscalculations. Volobuev also dedicates a lot of focus to the ideological differences of political 
groups, which allows the teacher to explore topical issues in greater depth and transmit more 
than a timeline of events Volobuev gives culture, science and the political situation equal 
attention. There is more linking and connecting of the main aspects of this period to one another, 
creating a stronger historical map. Volobuev is more concise in breaking down the period as a 
whole, but the tone is much the same as far as industrialisation is deemed a success, 
collectivisation a failure and the terror is just over a page long. There is a good use of graphs, 
tables and propaganda posters, which brings it to life far more than the others do, though. Yet, 
it also does not venture far from the Putin narrative, it merely seeks to present it another way.  
 
Teachers’ Opinions of the Period 1881-1945 and its Russian Leaders 
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In the interviews, there was a consensual and balanced attitude shown towards Nicholas and 
Aleksandr. Aleksandr was widely praised by all as someone who created stability, upheld 
Russian culture and maintained peace with other countries. His conservative nature was 
considered a positive thing and as precisely the component, which quelled revolutionary strife 
and anarchy in Russia. However, most referred to Nicholas II as weak, indecisive but a good 
family man nevertheless. Some of the participants even pointed out that his sainthood is 
questionable because of his record:  
 
 
 
‘Great leader, but the problem with him was that he could not make the state work; 
it was just a headquarters. He was not a professional tsar and he needed Stolypin. 
Any good decisions had to be made by other people. He was irrational and at that 
time, a rational politics was necessary. Read Solzhenitsyn’.388  
 
‘What wicked irony. In such a difficult and decisive moment of history, the head of 
the Russian Empire was a worthless king. An infantile, weak-willed and short-
sighted person. I have only contempt for this man. He killed himself, his family, 
millions of Russian citizens and a whole country that was created over centuries. 
Idiot!’389  
 
‘There is a wave of patriotism surrounding Nicholas II. He was a good man, but this 
patriotism dictates that nobody should criticise him. This is nonsense because he 
was just an ordinary person. Why is he even a saint? But you know, the government 
needs a leader from the empire to look up to and he is suitable because he was the 
last tsar, and as a saint is connected to the church’.390  
 
 
                                                          
388 Interview with Pavel, school director and history teacher, Moscow, 14/02/2017.   
389 Interview with Natalya, school history teacher, Moscow, 20/02/2017.  
390 Interview with Ekaterina, fifth year history student, Vladimir, 18/02/2017.  
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While his ‘martyr’ status, leadership style and personal qualities are accepted, declaring him a 
great leader is not welcomed by all sections of Russian society, neither is trashing his reputation. 
To follow on from the last interview above, there was an uproar from Russian Orthodox Church 
and many in the government over the film Matilda (2017), about a ballerina with whom Nicholas 
had a love affair. This will be explored more in the next chapter, but the overarching reason is 
that for all his mistakes, Nicholas is a saint and therefore untouchable. Like the revolution, any 
criticisms must come through the academic and education sphere, and the textbooks and 
interviews show this does occur. Also noticeable was how most focused on the gradual break 
down and the role of the leadership, opposed to specific events, which is complimentary to the 
‘preferred’ version of history.  
Each participant interviewed referred to the revolution as a tragedy followed by a difficult 
period, which should be taught with care and understood properly. A common phrase was 
‘because of what followed the revolution’. Memory of the revolution for most Russians’ centres 
on the violence of the Civil War. There is no distinction and there appeared a lack of desire to 
discuss the 1920s across the spectrum. There was little respect for Lenin and his leadership 
expressed by any of the participants because his big dreams of a new Russia ultimately failed 
and destroyed the country. The one teacher who did praise him referred to him as a ‘genius of 
the moment’ who led a great movement and seized the day.391 In St. Petersburg, one remarked 
that he “saw our country as some sort of guinea pig” and another after calling talented proceeded 
to call him ‘zubrila’ (a ‘muz’) for destroying the country. The trainee teachers all spoke 
negatively of the revolution as well, but their answers focussed more around how it changed 
Russia. As such, most used this to argue for teaching history in a non-ideological way so that 
students can understand Russia properly.  This is, unknowingly, supportive of the Council of 
Europe’s ‘new history’ pedagogy, where history can become a creative practice through inquiry 
methods and the use of sources and evidence.392 This is most auspicious when teaching a 
complex topic, like the 1917 revolutions, as it allows students to have empathy, learn defining 
concepts and how to form their own hypothesis.  
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392 Eleftherios Klerides, ‘Educational Transfer as a Strategy for Remaking Subjectivities: transnational and 
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The First World War hardly came up in the interviews. This is likely the result of no discussion 
in the Soviet era, but another reason could be its importance within the curriculum. The war is 
surrounded by so many other important events in this period. The self-study books for exam 
preparation are stacked with facts and information not in the textbooks, which the average 
student would find overwhelming to read and their teachers to fit into the lesson. This combined 
with the absence of a victory makes it fair to acknowledge the war either gets lost in history or 
is less worthy of attention, because where patriotism is concerned there is nothing to gain. 
Opinions of Stalin were divided, but not dismissive of opposing viewpoints. The teachers from 
St. Petersburg, whilst largely negative, also acknowledged his achievements and ruling style as 
typical for Russia. As one of them remarked “He is very contradictory. Yes, he was a tyrant and 
a murderer, but you cannot liberalise our country or our people ever! Although it was tragic, he 
did get some positive results”.393 This viewpoint was not uncommon, but what differed was 
whether they began with positive or negative factors. The teachers from Moscow were equally 
split on Stalin, whereas both teachers in Volokolamsk were more balanced in their assessments. 
Compared to previously mentioned data, the interviews more or less correlate, yet explaining 
the attitudes is more difficult. In his autobiography, Vladimir Pozner, in writing about 
Khrushchev’s rise and fall from power, noted that whilst intellectuals were his biggest 
supporters due to the secret speech and rehabilitation for millions of innocent people, ‘the 
people’ (non-intelligentsia) had a different view. Most Soviet citizens found it difficult to accept 
Stalin as a criminal not because the facts were disputable, but because it meant they had been 
mistaken. Agreeing with Khrushchev meant accepting the responsibility for Stalin, and most 
Soviets did not want to, nor did they like what Khrushchev said.394 In the modern day, Stalin is 
associated with authority, order and power. Admitting that Stalin’s regime was criminal is, in 
some respects, akin to denying the achievements and advancements of the period. For unity to 
be upheld and patriotism to flourish, this period and the victory in the Great Patriotic War cannot 
have been for nothing, and is most likely why Putin and Medvedev in their condemnations of 
the terror walk a careful line regarding the Stalin era. In the classroom and at home with their 
families, presumably, the participants also do not want to open up old wounds. Their opinions 
can be something more resembling an ambivalent acceptance. It may also be the reason that 
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Stalin’s character is largely glossed over in all of the textbooks.  
 
 
The First World War and Great Patriotic War  
 
The textbooks are consensual and in line with the official narrative. For this reason, this separate 
section will draw attention to the more contentious aspects of the Great Patriotic War and two 
popular trends concerning the First World War. These require a lot of intellectual manoeuvring, 
albeit for different reasons. Certain sub plots from the Great Patriotic War especially have the 
potential to tarnish the victory. By contrast, the First World War is still competing for a bigger 
shelf space in contemporary Russia. Simply put, something needs to stand out for consumption 
purposes. Two subtleties worth mentioning are the ‘airtime’ of General Brusilov and Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in all of the textbooks. These were significant turning points and important for 
twentieth century Russian history. One represents a great victory (at least by First World War 
standards) and national hero, and the other a crushing defeat for the Russian state. One 
symbolises flashes of greatness from the empire and its last hero basking in glory. The other sub 
plot is a final crumbling of the Imperial state before the storm that was the Civil War. This 
further alludes to ‘proof’ that Russia’s victory was stolen, by a combination of foreign powers 
and ideas (Marxism).  
 
In the Great Patriotic War sections, Kiselev justifies the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as Russia (not 
the USSR) protecting its spheres of influence without any mention of the Baltic States or 
Romania (modern day Moldova). Only Ukraine, Poland and Belarus are mentioned. Dannilov 
agrees, but also claims the USSR was ‘forced’ to join in because Europe would not 
accommodate the USSR in its collective security. Moreover, that Hitler divided the spheres of 
influence and treated the Baltic States as within the USSR’s. There was also no ‘invasion’ of 
the Baltics, rather the USSR ‘entered’ with a mutual understanding. Volobuev by contrast has 
coloured maps showing the students in detail who gained which territories. The pact is also 
portrayed as an unfavourable situation and the last available option to guarantee the country’s 
security, to which Hitler has quickly and decided the results. The textbooks also do not 
acknowledge or mention any atrocities committed by the Red Army during the war or even 
allude to any. The most negative aspects that arise are Stalin’s refusal to accept the severity of 
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the situation and a lack of preparedness for the Germany invasion. The USSR’s ultimate victory 
is most likely the reason for this omission. Success is undermined if the soldiers are anything 
less than courageous heroes. Both groups interviewed also agree with the official narrative of 
the government, although there was acknowledgement of the darker episodes of the war. This 
is encouraging to see as it does filter through into the lessons, yet teachers are silenced out in 
the media and public celebrations. Even if these episodes do sift through, they stay of minor 
importance, as those in power prefer.  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are many complexities, contestations and contradictions with 
history in Russian schools. The role of teachers is extremely important, yet the interviews 
showed the changes are often slow to manifest and rejected. Sometimes, this is the teacher’s 
initiative, other times it is due to external constraints. The interviews discovered subtleties and 
nuances within the wider process of learning, teaching and constructing history in Russia today 
which quantitative methodology would have missed. The teachers often hold opinions that are 
different to the state and ‘official’ narrative, the direction of history education and certain 
historical events and figures. As well as contestations of the official narrative, this chapter has 
also shown that teachers and schools are responsive where it suits either individuals or schools, 
meaning the gap between the state and schools can be closed, but requires further negotiation. 
The interviews with trainee teachers also showed the generational issues as well and the need 
for greater negotiation with the Russian teaching force and population as a whole. A younger, 
more dynamic, technologically minded and largely female workforce can be expected to emerge 
in the coming years. The interviews show it is also not a forgone conclusion that the next 
generation will legitimise the Putin narrative or fully embrace the current administration’s idea 
of a patriotic history. As such, the negotiation process continues and history education is far 
from a settled issue.  
 
This chapter has also shown that textbooks are used as a guide but are not necessarily the final 
word or basis of students’ opinions. For the most part, the textbooks are accurate and not 
damaging of the state’s image. The teacher can make up for any shortcomings, as well. The 
more difficult and uncomfortable topics will be the space to negotiate, however, a state 
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sponsored textbook is not intended to profit teachers and this should be acknowledged. The 
biggest concern is whether facts are compromised for the sake of knowledge, passing exams or 
creating patriotic citizens in the state’s image. This chapter demonstrates that this is both easily 
done and avoidable. For liberal groups, the lack of a moral stance on the Soviet era is concerning, 
but arguably favourable so as not to alienate conservative groups who can directly hold the elites 
to account.  
 
As will be developed further in the next chapter, the nature of history in Russian schools 
demonstrates just how limited history is as a resource. History is open and thus far, so is the 
Russian school curriculum. Although the state can intervene in schools to have its say by 
sanctioning new textbooks, these can be rejected. Moreover, no state can create a history that 
memory does not allow for or that has no academic justification. A socially (or politically) 
correct textbook content and reliable teacher are the extent to which any democratic state can 
intervene in history classrooms. In a democracy, it is never guaranteed that either will have any 
impact as rejection is a part of the democratic process, as well as derzhavnost’. Furthermore, as 
Russian civil society becomes more sophisticated and educated, the greater its demands will 
become. That means history’s effectiveness will decline. Thus, it is important to win this battle 
now while the population is still largely incapable of reconciliation and other political actors 
have little influence. The interviews also correspond with polling and surveys conducted in 
Russia in the sense the personalities are important.  Asides from a difficult period to grapple 
with, the state is using it to justify the present so that the emerging generations are loyal citizens 
who are prepared for the world and position Russia finds itself in.  
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Chapter Six 
 
The Uses of Anniversaries and Memorabilia in Putin’s Russia 
 
‘If we recall those events more often, then maybe some government officials will stop calling 
Stalin an ‘effective manager’…’395 – Kseniya Sobchak. 
 
As Andrew Glencross contends, history is an idea in the present, and the state and political 
climate form an essential part of reconstructed histories.396 Anniversaries and memorabilia are 
the most evident ways in which a country constructs its own image. Moscow has countless 
statues of Pushkin, a handful of Stalin busts and monuments of the Tsars dispersed. There are 
streets and metro stations bearing the names of prominent Soviet generals, but also notable 
cultural figures of the Russian Empire like Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy. These were not chosen by 
coincidence, nor have those from the Soviet era remained accidentally. Representing oneself 
through historical figures and events due to the lasting significance these had for that particular 
country means the images must fulfil a social function.397 Building an all-inclusive new 
narrative that justifies Russia’s current position must include and exclude Stalin, who for better 
or worse, had a profound impact on the country as a whole. The collective memories of Russia’s 
past must be rehabilitated in order to legitimise the narrative; this explains the nature of both the 
imperial and Soviet presence in contemporary history. The generic yet inconsistent narrative 
must suit the majority to create a social harmony, but as already demonstrated the problem lies 
with the diverse nature of Russia’s history.  
To an outside observer, placing busts of Lenin and Stalin next to Aleksandr and Nicholas on the 
Alley of Leaders might seem strange. The past requires greater knowledge and sensitivity when 
it comes to public remembrance, and the battle for public taste shows the difficulty Russia has 
coming to terms with its past, and furthermore the fight for exclusivity. Putin’s governments 
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have had to cater to and pick up the pieces of nostalgia after the Yeltsin years, and re-emphasise 
patriotism through traditional values and a great power status to build on an existing pride. 
Channeling this narrative through anniversaries and memorabilia (old and new) is tricky, 
because no nation can be optimistic for the future without some level of admiration for the past. 
Monuments, celebrations, exhibitions and the like help to create this admiration, and act out the 
relationship with the past from a particular point in the present.398 It is a matter of preserving 
the memory so that stories do not become obsolete. Moreover, in order to generate hope for a 
brighter future, reconciliation must occur; nostalgia is not enough on its own. This includes sub 
plots, which were blocked out of public memory, such as the First World War and Civil War). 
In this respect, there is no difference between certain events and figures, since what matters is 
that modernisation is not disrupted. This continues to cause controversy both in Russia and the 
West, particularly anything relating to Stalin. In recent years, many museums and cultural 
centers have been opened which either are dedicated to him or ‘airbrush his legacy’.399  
Reconciliation and remembering, while inevitable and necessary, can bring unwanted 
distractions. The centenary of the 1917 revolutions proved to be a real headache for the Russian 
state in this regard, as it had the potential to destablise the fragile social harmony. Unlike school 
textbooks, a monument or anniversary is something that can permanently reinforce the past and 
its ‘officialness’, because they are usually everlasting. They are also constantly evolving in 
reaction to new technologies for recording information and other mediums available, which can 
be used as ‘sense making’.400 It is important to consider here the concept of ‘remediation’, to 
avoid comparing apples with oranges. Mediation is pertinent to cultural memory but there is no 
mediation without remediation, as Erll and Rigney assert. All representations of the past draw 
on the available media technologies, existent media products and are unthinkable without earlier 
acts of mediation.401 The goal is to provide some form of window to the past and make us forget 
the medium in which it is viewed. This is also a visible form of recycling the past, as previously 
discussed. Exhibitions may include letters, photos and films, thus combining many different 
media to provide access to the past. The same is true of a monument; the symbols, figures and 
                                                          
398 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics’, in Astrid Erll and Ann 
Rigney (eds.), Mediation, Remediation and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), p.2  
399 Katherine Jacobsen, ‘New Museums in Russia are airbrushing Stalin’s legacy’, The Business Insider 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mew-museums-in-russia-are-airbrushing-stalins-legacy-2015-12  Accessed 
December 18th, 2015.  
400 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics’, p.3  
401 Ibid. p.4  
147 
 
designs are recycled so that the commemoration is familial and, therefore, accessible. 
Considering mediation and remediation, anniversaries and their commemoration events are 
widely participated in (most are public holidays) whereas a school textbook needs constant 
maintenance, updating and fades away with time. Memorabilia is more accessible to the public 
and intended for mass consumption. Textbooks meanwhile have both a more specific audience 
and purpose (to educate). Anniversaries and memorabilia are transitory and pass on the story of 
Russia’s collective memory, purposely designed to prevent anyone forgetting.402 Thus, a 
multimedia exhibition, art show or monument share the same purpose.  
Although in the West anniversaries, in particular memorials, are often linked to painful issues 
(such as the Battle of the Somme), Russia commonly reflects upon triumphalism to unify the 
population. The Great Patriotic War and Victory Day remains the biggest and most important 
holiday, and is a lavish celebration of an immense victory against foreign aggression. Speeches 
by government officials are reflective of this, and it is also unsurprising, therefore, that the 
Victory Park and its museum to the Great Patriotic War is situated on the westward highway at 
Poklonnaya Gora. This was the sight of many fateful moments, western assaults and the place 
where those on pilgrimage would turn and bow down in reverence to Holy Moscow and its 
saints.403 Victory Park (Park Pobedy) shows the new narrative is used to connect distinct, unique 
and positive parts of Russian history, which long made up parts of the national pride and 
historical nostalgia. Above all else, these are omnipresent in the collective memory making them 
easier to exploit. As a result, the idea of a unique kinship can shine through. The heroism, 
triumphs or even catastrophes, which receive a special place in Russia’s historical 
commemorations are largely state sponsored. Yet, it is the moral authority and meanings behind 
the spectacle adding to the collective consciousness that do justice to the labelled ‘positive’ past.  
This final chapter will explore the public crystalisation of a ‘positive’ history and public 
handling of the uncomfortable past in Putin’s Russia. A key issue to highlight is that the 
mythologising of Russia’s history would never be successful if the public deemed it 
‘unrealistic’. As Elizabeth Anderson et al highlight, any historical representation, be it a 
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museum or otherwise, must be recognisable.404 If certain facts are left out or not fully 
considered, it is compensated by satisfying other pre-existing assumptions held by the 
population. This chapter will also consider how the chosen past reflects the country Russia is 
trying to become and links in with the other themes discussed in this thesis. Finally, it also 
examines how the Russian Federation is now retelling the stories of pre-revolutionary Russia 
after it was almost obliterated from public memory as it conflicted with the Soviet ideology.  
 
Issues Commemorating the Past  
Culture is central to the Russian identity, as is the state’s role in shaping it. Many of the 
anniversaries and memorabilia concerning the past are commissioned or financially supported 
by the Russian state who are often the sole author. National triumphalism is by default an 
achievement of the state, since it can claim to be the instigator of national unity and orchestrator 
of the victories, supported by loyal citizens. Since the reality of the past is gone and beyond our 
ability to recreate, the best an anniversary or memorabilia can do is provide us with a practical 
understanding of the past. A state constructed narrative via this medium is a work of its 
imagination to preserve a historical dimension. Gunn also draws attention to the key purpose of 
any anniversary or memorabilia. Any story, fact or fiction, consists of a series of events. These 
can be long-term developments such as the Industrial Revolution or a very sudden event like an 
assassination. ‘Sub-plots’ are not just a link to the narrative. They often form a huge part of our 
historical map and understanding.405 The Stalin period cannot be understood without any 
knowledge of the terror or Great Patriotic War. The same is true for Aleksandr III and his 
attempts to restore Grand Muscovy and Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality into Russian 
political life. For this reason., it is the sub (or quasi) plot, which works on the limits of our 
understanding and potential to grasp the past. All too often, these receive the majority of 
attention and focus, and this can undermine a practical understanding of the bigger picture. This 
is why Stalin and the USSR as a whole are overshadowed by the terror and purges, and the Putin 
Agenda must combat this. When a sub plot, however big or small, comes into contact with the 
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memories of a society (as a whole or an individual level) it starts to reveal more about the 
identity of a group. Thence, constituencies are created, divided and allow the historian to judge.  
Though any state relies on popular sovereignty, Russian states in particular have always 
fabricated the idea of ‘the nation’ co-existing with territory, ethnicity and culturally homogenous 
peoples.406 In one period of Russian history, the idea of a ‘Third Rome’ and narodboganosets 
was the dominant narrative, and in another it was the ‘Stakhanovites’ or ‘new Soviet man’. The 
monuments and festivities during these periods were the ultimate depiction of this, and 
eventually found their way into the mentality. By contrast, the Russian Federation uses the Day 
of National Unity in an attempt to paint the picture of a wider Russian homeland defined by 
historic peculiarities. Putin’s speech in 2017 for instance spoke of how there is no other multi-
cultural nation on earth quite like Russia, and that this day “rooted in the past” has many 
examples of invincible unity.407  He said this while completely ignoring the October revolution’s 
centenary, as it would have undermined the message (more on this below). Monuments and 
anniversaries merely compliment or reinforce who ‘we’ are and affirm the boundaries and 
features of kinship. As Ludmilla Jordanova contests, however, a further problem lies in the 
nature of how these are carried out. These displays of public history are to educate as much as 
to remind, since they define the terms of the past to the public.408 The fact that the state lies at 
the heart of public history means the representations indicate alliances and affiliations, and 
cannot therefore be neutral. The celebration or commemoration would not be legitimate 
otherwise, so ‘dressing it up’ strengthens the moral authority of one’s past.  
Selection is an essential historical skill, meaning producing a dominant evaluation, especially 
of more painful topics, is extremely difficult. The historian, in this case the Russian state, must 
carefully choose how to present the past to legitimise itself and represent the country as a whole. 
This is precisely why a state led effort to ‘fill in the blank pages’ is a central theme to the Putin 
Agenda. By dealing with painful topics and taking into certain sub plots into consideration, the 
state can develop an inclusive public history which reduces the risk of internal conflicts. This 
supports the justification of erecting a memorial to the victims of the Stalinist terror in 2017, 
while a year earlier a statue of Grand Prince Vladimir was unveiled outside of the Moscow 
Kremlin and the year prior to this, Europe’s largest mosque was opened. This selection fits 
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Kremlin’s belief that non-Slavic or non-Orthodox Russians make up the wider Russian 
identity.409 It is also a political statement to satisfy the view that Russia does not condone 
intolerance and discrimination, nor the darker episodes of its past. While the memory is 
important, dwelling on this is not; it undermines progression and the nation’s ability to move 
forward. A certain measure of sympathy is necessary to allow the population to deal with their 
public grievances, as well as embrace (not necessarily accept) an ethnically diverse nation. This 
supports Jay Winter’s assertion that public history represents the space between state and 
society; these memorials enable the population to join in the wider collective notion of ‘the 
nation’.410 This can serve as a political statement, and when analysing Putin’s speeches at such 
events, many commentators hold the view that he tries to assert Russian power and authority. 
For instance, when unveiling a monument to the Russian soldiers who gave their lives in the 
First World War, the main purpose, as he explicitly remarked, was to explain why Russia had 
no victory. In so doing, Putin made references to Russia’s military glory and heroic values, 
which defended Russia’s independence and dignity.411 In other words, it was not Russia’s loss, 
the victory was stolen from them. As the military makes up a key component of Russian 
patriotism, the grand victories such as the Great Patriotic Wars receive more attention to foster 
the much sought after unity in the modern day. 412  
History and patriotism in the public space are completely inseparable in the Putin Agenda. This 
also highlights another key function of public history. The size of a monument or building alone 
reveals the intentions and message behind it; a reflection of power and status, and the two 
Russian capitals have numerous examples.   
 
Places, Spaces, Statues, Monuments and Anniversaries 
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This section will consider different segments, figures and events of the period 1881-1945 and 
the nature of their commemoration in contemporary Russia. Agata Pyzik states that Soviet era 
monuments fixate on four particular things: the past informing our present, outright political 
statements, power and sacrifice.413 However, Pyzik admits that while such monuments can 
explain part of the current situation, many other [unspecified] things do as well. Nevertheless, a 
monument can help either justify the current situation or serve as a source of nostalgia for ‘better 
days’. This conflict does justice to the Putin Agenda as it sheds light on the need to still assess 
the problems of today through the lens of the past. The next problem comes with nostalgia being 
imbedded within a political statement. Though a monument reflects a common heritage, there 
has to be some consensus on what a group or nation is nostalgic about. The ‘better days’ in 
public memory might differ to the state as priorities vary.  
The vast majority of contemporary monuments across Russia reveal that it is a country fixated 
on remembering three things. First is immense sacrifice, regardless of whether it is the Red 
Army or Nicholas II’s abdication, simply because Russia has seen great trauma and drama 
throughout its existence. Symbols of the strength of the people who overcame great hardships 
and struggles are used in commemoration. It is both fitting and timely that the patriotic education 
programmes continued through the recession that followed Maidan. Second, it is about status, 
and Russia as a de facto great power. This often goes hand in hand with the military, although 
it is not limited to this sphere. Technological achievements like the space race continue to 
receive special commemorations. Religion also draws an equal share of attention. The 
controversial statue of Grand Prince Vladimir serves no other purpose than to display Russia’s 
continued adherence and reverence of Byzantine Christianity country. It was funded by the 
Ministry of Culture, Russian Orthodox Church and a Putin acquaintance, Vladimir Yakunin.414 
Its location and date of unveiling, (Aleksandr Gardens on National Unity Day) was also 
carefully thought out. Third, and as already stated, they serve as a reminder about the journey 
from its founding roots to the modern day (continuity). The trouble is that simply by looking at 
all the monuments, exhibitions and so on, it is impossible to guess what the ‘glory days’ of 
Russia were, as historical commemoration is so diverse and Russian history is so rich. Soviet 
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monuments are counterbalanced by nostalgia for the nineteenth century, yet, they all share a 
purpose, whether it is a monuments, exhibitions or museums, of bridging the divide of opinion 
in Russian society. Since the chosen past is for the public and to secure national unity, everyone 
must feel able to access it, and any ‘falsifications’ would be widely rejected.  
 
a. Pre-Revolutionary Russia 
 
Positive commemoration to the Romanovs is commonplace in contemporary Russia. The 
Aleksandr Gardens holds a reconstruction of the Romanov Obelisk, which initially stood at the 
garden’s entrance after construction in 1914. During Soviet times, it was remade as a monument 
to Soviet thinkers.415 Almost a hundred years later, the same monument was dismantled, 
rebranded and reopened in 2013 on National unity Day ‘in honour of the three hundredth 
anniversary’. The Ministry of Culture called its restoration ‘necessary’, and the links to state 
continuation are apparant.416 A golden leaf Romanov coat of arms sits on top, with the names 
of every Tsar, emperor and empress descending the monument in chronological order. The cubic 
base depicts St. George and smaller coats of arms of all the regions and oblasts of Russia on 
either side. Pictures from 1914 reveal the monument to be identical, not unlike other 
reconstructions of historical and or cultural buildings, such as Christ the Saviour Cathedral and 
Tsaritsyno Palace, which was completely rebuilt in 2007. Reconstructing exact replicas adds to 
this idea of continuity of state power and the past informing our present. After seven decades of 
omitting the Romanovs from public memory and denying their role in shaping the Russian state 
and national culture, the marble obelisk honours the former ‘fathers of the people’. In the case 
of Aleksandr III and Nicholas II, it can inadvertently remind Russians of the moral values they 
embodied and sacrifices of Nicholas and his family.  
This perspective is reinstated at a permanent exhibition at VDNKh’s Friendship Park (VVTs) in 
Moscow, Moya Istoriya (Appendix I). The history park’s success in Moscow has seen others 
opened in sixteen Russian cities.417 Located at Pavillion 57, it hosts two exhibitions; one to the 
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Rurikovichy and another to the Romanov dynasty which ends with a film about the Russian 
army during the First World War. Walking around with an audio guide, the narrator informs the 
visitor that ‘all [of the] Romanovs governed our country well through their own abilities and 
turned our country into a great one’.418 Regarding Aleksandr III, the visitor is informed that 
stability was his first priority in safeguarding Russia’s wellbeing. This justified his toughened 
conservative methods, which ‘many around him thought would fail but produced positive 
results’. The ‘Tsar peacemaker’ is portrayed as a firm defender of Russia’s interests. His 
infamous quote that ‘Russia has two reliable allies; the army and the navy’ is visible across the 
exhibition and ties in nicely with Putin’s rebuilding of the Russian military in recent years and 
the solid link between Russian patriotism and the army. It continues that Russia began to 
modernise tremendously; the economy improved, sport took off, Russia witnessed rapid 
progress in the sciences, particularly with the railway, described as the backbone of Russia. 
With regards to his son, Nicholas is very much the victim of circumstance, which is in fact the 
first sentence on the interactive touch screen information and audio guide; ‘This period saw the 
most rapid advancement in all sectors, however fell victim to itself’. Statistics are presented to 
support this, and the beginning of Nicholas’ section is depicted as entirely positive. A budget 
revenue of four million rubles without new taxes, the largest oil production in the world, literacy 
grew by 70% as well as the blossoming arts and culture. According to the exhibition, Nicholas 
fell victim to the social tensions (which caused the events of 1905) and also to Europe. Terror 
had now become an official form of political opposition in Russia and by the time Nicholas 
assumed the throne, he would always be in the face of public opinion. Figures given here suggest 
eighteen people a day were dying due to political and social unrest. The line concerning the First 
World War and later the revolution is that a ‘peacefully minded’ Russia was drawn in by Europe 
and that the war completely exhausted the country as a whole. In addition, that the Tsar, not 
feeling the support from his contemporaries, was betrayed by the ‘traitorous elite’ and army at 
home. Also worth noting at this point is that the exhibition referred to Nicholas’ brother, Grand 
Duke Mikhail as the last Tsar of Russia, despite his refusal and this never being confirmed. The 
exhibition can fairly claim to ‘fill in the blank pages’ in the sense that it finally provides a say 
on pre-revolutionary Russia. It appears that Putin while publically acknowledging the greater 
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parts of the period, is keen not to make the mistakes of such a nostalgic period. Upon unveiling 
a monument to the Russian soldiers who fought and died in the First World War, Putin stated:  
 
 
This was a generation that was fated to go through not just the difficult trials of the 
first global world war, but also the revolutionary upheaval and fratricidal civil war 
that split our country and changed its destiny. But their feats and sacrifices in 
Russia’s name were forgotten for long years.419  
 
Asides from this victory being ‘stolen from our country’, Putin also made a jab at the 
revolutionaries, saying that those who sewed divisions betrayed the nation’s interests. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, this anti revoltion message serves a political purposes as negative 
links can be made to opposition figures. The lesson for today being that such actions from selfish 
individuals bring chaos and instability. The monument to the soldiers who fought in the First 
World War also salutes the idea of ‘filling in the blank pages’. As Winter writes, the men of the 
Eastern Front are the most unknown in the entire war and on top of this, it was practically deleted 
from history during Soviet times.420 In the same speech, Putin further supported the need to 
restore the links in time, serious archival research to help us learn more about the causes of the 
war and give the heroes the proper place they deserve now that justice is finally triumphing in 
books, textbooks and on cinema screens.421 By immortalising and canonising these soldiers in 
the context of learning more, it enables Putin’s government to finally create an official Russian 
history of its First World War via a nostalgic record of the previously erased truth. The two 
revolutions were deemed as more important, and as a result, the war become something of a 
non-event.422  
Something that made international headlines in 2017 was the release of the controversial film 
Matilda. The plot focuses on the affair Nicholas had with Polish ballet dancer, Matilda 
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Kschesinskaya. In particular, it upset the group Christian State-Holy Russia, as well as Crimean 
MP, Natalia Poklonskaya, who started a campaign to ban the film. Their reasoning, in line with 
the Russian Orthodox Church, is that as a saint, Nicholas is untouchable. There is a link to the 
newly forming narrative here, as many in power would prefer he be remembered as a martyr 
and good family man. This film had the potential to tarnish his image. The director Aleksei 
Uchitel’s car was set on fire outside of his office. Meanwhile several arrests were made at the 
film’s premier in Moscow. Russia’s leadership took a different route. The Minister for Culture, 
Vladimir Medinskiy and Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov both publically stated that any 
attempts to exert pressure on cinemas over the screenings of Matilda would amount to 
censorship and lawlessness. Medinsky explained that the Ministry of Culture allows the 
screenings at cinemas in line with legal procedures; "The law strictly lays out the grounds for 
any refusal. There are none of them in case with Matilda. We are guided by the law, not personal 
preferences."423 Concerning the film itself, there were many historical inaccuracies, fabrications 
of the affair and a few soft sex scenes, which likely upset hardline Christians. Two common 
themes were his parents’ dislike of Alexandra and Nicholas’ journey to the throne, something 
he was not ready for nor wanted.424 On the opening weekend, Matilda made $3.9 million at the 
box office, showing that the Russian public were enthusiastic to see the film and perhaps are 
mature enough to handle ‘difficult’ material. The Death of Stalin (2017) was banned later that 
year for a disrespectful portrayal of Zhukov, showing where the line is drawn. Although Putin 
has explicitly said that no film or publication should be banned unless it is criminal.425  
 
b. The 1917 Revolutions and Civil War  
Unlike in Soviet times, the revolution receives no specific annual commemoration or promotion. 
Although, during Putin’s first presidency, he created the ‘Day of National Unity’ (November 4) 
to replace the Soviet holiday marked for the revolution on November 7. In pre-revolutionary 
Russia, November 7 celebrated a day of liberation from Polish invaders. Today, its significance 
has re-appeared, particularly as this narrative fits the concept of being surrounded by hostile 
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others. Its messaging is overall confused, but the change of label was not accidental. The move 
upset communists, but it shows the priorities of the new Russian state and is an attempt to 
establish unity through reconciliation of its past.  
 
It is also worth stressing that public celebrations are not designed to educate, but to remind. 
Whilst the textbooks analysed in the previous chapter were fact heavy and mostly all-inclusive 
of the revolution’s events, the minimum requirement for any public commemoration is a meagre 
acknowledgement – not a proper understanding. That is why 2017 had barely any 
commemoration; the Russian government could not afford to ignore 2017, yet too hard a line in 
either direction might have received a backlash. Early predictions assumed that any events 
would be aimed at reconciliation. Naturally, discussions of a proper reburial for Lenin re-
emerged, as did calls for one of the Russian emperor’s children.426 Handing over St. Isaac’s 
Cathedral in St. Petersburg back to the Russian Orthodox Church in 2017 had a sense of 
reconciliation at its core, yet the protests that it ignited showed that while no obvious 
antagonisms existed, they could easily be exposed. Even though the public’s sympathies were 
no longer with the Bolsheviks, this did not necessarily place it with the other side. Commentators 
waited eagerly to see what kinds of intellectual somersaults Putin would perform to square with 
the revolution.427 The year prior to the centenary, Putin had already made some of his feelings 
clear, claiming that Lenin’s nationalities policy had placed a ‘time bomb’ under the USSR.428 
As an act of reconciliation, he attended the burial of White Army General A.I. Denikin in 2005, 
and granted his daughter in France a Russian citizenship.429 In February 2017, it became clear 
that the Russian government would leave revisions and analysis of the revolutions’ outcomes to 
the academic community. Indeed, Putin’s 2016 address to the Federal Assembly did stress the 
need for scholars to take part in this discussion, so there is some unintended consistency here. 
Overall, it appears that the Russian government simply did not know how exactly to remember 
the February Revolution, let alone possess the appropriate choice of words or actions to satisfy 
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the population. For instance, a reburial of Lenin lowers his status and importance, but this 
elevated Nicholas II and his family to sainthood.    
In February 2017, Kommersant’ reported that the Russian foundation for basic research, History 
of the Fatherland and the Knowledge Society would provide funds of fifty million rubles for 
projects across Russia.430 A cycle of online lectures called ‘On the Events of 1917’ began, and 
were prepared for by the Historical Perspective Foundation, which is headed by Duma Deputy 
Natalia Narochnitskaya. Some of the profits would go to organising other activities related to 
the anniversary of the revolution. More interestingly, Elena Ruda, the newspaper’s head of 
educational and cultural programs, stated that participants would be able to ‘figure out’ that 
1917 was the year Russian statehood collapsed.431 This matches the over-arching narrative of 
the government whilst simultaneously detaching itself from it. It also suggests that the 
revolution was not about the Russian people, but the state. Guiding the population to this 
conclusion is in the spirit of ‘managed democracy’, and shows the inclusion of the past as a 
necessary consolidation tool. It shows an underlying fear of letting the population dictate the 
narrative and the unforeseen consequences this might bring.  
 
One large exhibition that did receive official backing from the state and Russian State Archive 
of Social and Political History (RGASPI) was Kod Revolyutsii (Code of the 
Revolution). Attended by Medinsky, it was the first full-scale project, timed to the centenary 
revolution. Personal belongings of those who participated, the notes of the Lenin, the porthole 
from the legendary cruiser Aurora, the telephone apparatus from the headquarters of 
revolutionaries, weapons from the Ipatiev House where the royal family were executed as well 
as works of art were on display - some of which for the first time.432 It gave a timeline-like 
narrative of Russia from the beginning of the twentieth century until January 1918, when the 
Bolsheviks seized power. The idea of a tragedy was present, but not explicit. Likely, the hope 
was for the visitor to be guided to this conclusion in awe of the history. The chosen artefacts 
and interactive nature of them brought it to life somewhat, especially since no other exhibition 
on the revolution like this had ever taken place. 
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Yet, one of the first exhibitions that took place (also with state backing) was far more telling. 
‘Constructivism for Children’, held at a discreet museum in an Avant-garde residential area of 
Moscow (Appendix L). Visitors could view a selection of children’s books designed to show 
how children were socialised into the new Soviet regime. The museum’s contents were taken 
from the Russian State Children’s Library and private collections. Many of the books from this 
era were to get Russian children used to city life, to know about the necessities of constructing 
socialism and its important figures. There were books on the new kitchen, flats and how to cross 
a busy street. Whereas pre-revolutionary children’s books focused on romantic fairy tales, the 
1920s brought in a new era of explainer books. The subjects became more complicated: stories 
about factories, gold mines and oil refineries. For the first time, children were treated as “little 
human beings” who, if taught properly, could be able to make anything.433 The exhibition also 
held a series of talks and special master classes adding to its intellectual credentials. Apart from 
its small size (three rooms), the exhibition gave no narrative of the revolution, nor did it focus 
much on the books’ authorship. Instead, it showed how the new society began to shape after 
revolution, and what the winners did in power. It attempted to play on the visitor’s nostalgia 
with colourful images of childhood and avoiding a discussion of the darker sides of the 
revolution and 1920s. This worked especially well because the language in the books is funny 
and poetic, yet, its appeal was primarily to students and academics, meaning its outreach, 
perhaps intentionally, was limited.    
Project 1917 attracted a lot of international attention.434 Created by a team of experts, 
journalists, designers, animators and illustrators, the website enabled viewers to access a day-
by-day account of the revolution from those who lived it. The site consists entirely of primary 
sources, including speeches, diaries, weather reports, newspapers and government 
memorandums. Each entry had a link to the original document, making it invaluable for 
researchers, students and academics. A particularly clever aspect was the viewer’s inability to 
‘fast forward’. It ‘reported’ the revolution in real-time. By the websites own admission, ‘not a 
trace of intervention’ is included.435 There is no assessment of the events and the reader must 
reach their own conclusions based on the archives, meaning the concept of ‘tragedy’ is missing. 
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It was mostly aimed at a younger audience for entertainment purposes, as well. While Project 
1917 was essentially a wonderful archive, it was not an initiative of the Russian government, 
although RT did create its own version, 1917 Live - essentially the same chronicle in a different 
format also without an assessment.436 The lack of narrative from non-state actors, many of whom 
at Project 1917 are openly critical of Putin’s government, is equally telling. It seemed few 
possessed meaningful words to properly assess the legacy of the revolution. In addition, the 
Yekaterinburg diocese of the Orthodox Church created a similar portal, Tsarskaya Sem’ya (The 
Tsarist Family).437 This documented the royal family’s exile in Tobolsk and Yekaterinburg up 
until their deaths. The website published excerpts from their diaries, letters and photographs, 
also without providing judgment. It was easier not to provide a narrative and allow public 
discussions to form their own conclusions. This creates the appearance of more honesty in order 
to discourage unnecessary discords. The interest in Russian history that these sparked can only 
be a positive thing, too.  
The monuments erected received little public or international attention. One in Novocherkassk 
did reflect the idea of unity and reconciliation, and was named to reflect this (Monument to 
Reconciliation and Consent). It is covered with symbolism, including an Orthodox crucifix that 
towers over a humble woman with hand on heart, a soldier and the headgear of both armies.438 
It was also decided at the fifth Congress of Compatriots, which Medinsky is a member of, to 
erect a Monument to Reconciliation in Crimea by 2017. Although controversial, this move was 
also to combine reconciliation with patriotism surrounding the peninsula, which was burning 
out in 2017. It also sent a message in the backdrop of Maidan and the Orange Revolution, which 
implies revolution and ‘coups’ are terrible things. This is a full projection of the state’s narrative 
and its attempts to create a broad coalition of support. By the time November arrived, the 
government had either delayed or abandoned the idea alltogether.  
Besides the monument in Crimea, no ‘official’ plans for October’s commemoration manifested, 
nor was any official statement given by a government official. Its commemoration was even 
more low key, not attached to the state and under promoted. Examples would be a scarlet fashion 
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show (‘In Red Tones’) at the Peter and Paul Fortress, St. Petersburg, the exhibition ‘History was 
made here: The Hermitage and Winter Palace 1917’ and in Moscow a gunpowder painting 
exhibition of Cai Go Qiang.439 The KPRF were unsurprisingly the only group to announce 
anything early. With 150 other left wing groups including ‘loyal delegations’ from Donbas and 
Crimea, the KPRF planned two three daylong celebrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg 
situated at different landmarks connected to the revolution. This included a gala meeting at the 
Oktyabrsky Concert Hall, St. Petersburg.440 As mentioned, however, this was for a specific 
audience.  Although the anniversary year was not absent of commemoration, it was controlled, 
managed and essentially a private discussion in the public sphere. ‘Success’ as key to public 
celebrations securing a broad coalition of consensus, and the revolution’s lack of this is reflected 
in the state’s low-key approach.  
 
c. Stalin and the Great Terror 
There has been a rise of physical and metaphysical memorabilia to Stalin since Putin became 
president. Greater reflection on the period, its successes and the idea of Stalin as a historical 
necessity has become a popular trend in recent years. The reappearance of Stalinist symbols is, 
as it was in 2001, to restore a sense of lost pride after the Soviet collapse and a different way of 
filling in the ‘blank pages’. Yet, any positive assessment of Stalin and his rule are considered to 
be objective. From Perestoika and the release of more documents and archives, new stories 
could be told and a new process of historical memory could take place. The purges, which hang 
over Stalin’s legacy, took centre stage. Most interpretations were naturally negative. The new 
trend is refocusing on Stalin’s rule and its achievements. Building on the argument of Stalin as 
a historical necessity, he may also be considered a ‘unity’ necessity. To completely erase him 
from the public memory could be viewed as potentially dangerous, and this certainly did not 
end his cult during the USSR. To keep his achievements alive in physical form is another agent 
of pride and patriotic reinforcement of Russia’s great powerness. Didier Maleuvre supports this 
claim, stating that any museum has to display a long lost life and show the desires for this; if it 
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is weak, then the museum is a failure.441 In order to remain objective about Stalin, the museums 
and statues of him must reinforce a previous nostalgia and admiration for the leader to be 
authentic. Since his personality cult did not end with the USSR, Stalin will continue to undergo 
historical revisions reassessments for many generations to come.  
The terror is not ignored and in Moscow alone, there are numerous sites to commemorate its 
victims. However, most are ‘off the trail’, even those in the city centre. Moscow hosts a Gulag 
museum just outside of the city centre, which was redesigned as recently as 2015. This museum 
is located on a back street in a particularly quiet and non-touristic part of the city centre. The 
museum’s rich range of historical records documents decades of Soviet repression in meticulous 
detail. It is interactive, including touch screens and video clips that precede historical archives 
and artefacts. Also worth mentioning are Moscow’s field of mass graves in Butovo and the 
House on the Embankment opposite the Kremlin which used to house members of the NKVD. 
Both are tucked away and tell a story of horror, although fail to capture the extent of cruelty 
faced by the prisoners. The same is true of Camp 36 in the city of Perm, which only closed its 
doors in 1988. While Camp 36 is the only former site open in the form of a museum 
commemorating the terror, it fails to create an atmosphere that enables the visitor to empathise 
with the harsh conditions faced by the terror’s victims. Its purpose is simply to symbolise the 
terror in an almost commercial manner, painting just enough of an inhumane image that is not 
damaging.    
On the eightieth anniversary of the order to initiate the Great Purges, the Russian president spoke 
at a lavish celebration for Naval Day. Putin stood at a podium in St. Petersburg and spoke of the 
high morals and professional qualities of Russia’s navy, its great victories in battle and 
importance the motherland. Meanwhile, #помнимбольшойтеррор (pomnim bolshoi 
terror/we remember the great terror) circulated social media.442 Relatives of the Great Terror’s 
victims told of their ancestors’ decrimination in sufficient detail, often publishing photos and 
archives which had been personally obtained. This is arguably the clearest instance of the state 
acting on its version of a usable and unifying past. The government ignored this anniversary to 
focus on the unifying force of Russia’s military during a time of frosty relations with the West. 
However, President Putin’s 2015 decree of creating a monument to the gulag’s victim still had 
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to be fulfilled. On October 30 2017, a few days before the revolution’s centenary, the monument 
was unveiled in Moscow. One hundred and seventy natural stones from fifty-eight regions 
connected with the Soviet era repressions were handed over to sculptor and author of the ‘Wall 
of Sorrows’, Georgy Frongulyan, for its construction. Most of the population, however, were 
quite unaware of it. As president Putin spoke of how this monument appeals to our sentiments, 
dealt a harsh blow to our people’s roots and was completely indefensible, Muscovites carried 
on with their daily routine, perhaps seeing a clip on the evening news. There was also a subtle 
hint to the October Revolution and political opposition in Putin’s speech as he ended ‘we 
remember, but this does not mean settling scores. We cannot push society to a dangerous conflict 
yet again’.443  
The recent refurbishment of VVTs is also worth considering. Still a popular leisure destination 
and tourist attraction, the restoration keeps alive the image of the Stalinist dream it was intended 
to represent. Although Russian citizens no longer view the way it was intended. A grand and 
impressive area, VVTs was designed to show the Soviet state’s ambitions, astonish the world 
and be a representation of the Soviet (socialist) future. This was to demonstrate the reward for 
working hard and that a paradise on earth was possible.444 Historians’ interviewed by RT  spoke 
of how this is a commemoration of a unique state and social experiment, and that today, one 
must appreciate it as something the Soviet people paid a high price for, without the evil of 
Stalinism. It is, after all, a monument to them as well as Stalinism. The Hellenistic style like 
buildings remind the visitor these were to show the power of the state. Only now, however, 
when looking at the friendship fountain, the Russian sees a marvelous work of architecture, not 
a symbol of worker solidarity or friendship of peoples. It freezes in time a mindset and life many 
still have nostalgia for and, more importantly, one that can never return. This is partly why many 
still find it so attractive, yet the renovation became so important, as it remains a popular public 
space for events and leisure activities. It also made instant headlines when a ten metre high 
bronze monument in the main hall was rediscovered depicting a triumphant Soviet people 
parading. Moscow Mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, stated, ‘It is a unique monument, showing the main 
objective of VVTs, if the park is not worth restoring, nothing is’.445 The fact is, if Russians still 
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viewed Stalin and Stalinism in such an abhorrent way, their relationship to VVTs would not be 
so positive and sentimental.  
To mark the seventieth anniversary of the meeting, a monument was erected in Yalta of Stalin, 
Roosevelt and Churchill, resembling the famous photograph of the three.446 This was 
controversial not only due to the annexation of the peninsular but also because of Stalin’s forced 
deportation of the Crimean Tartars who protested the monument opened by Duma chairman, 
Sergei Naryshkin. It is another commemoration of the war with the intention of reflecting power 
and influence. Stalin towering over Roosevelt and Churchill and going head to head with the 
west can be used to foster patriotic notions left behind. In comparison, one museum and Stalin 
bust in Khoroshevo is a part of the path to victory tour, including various other monuments, but 
this particular also chooses to focus on Stalin’s economic and military achievements. While it 
is now a crime to talk ill of the Great Patriotic War, the museum curator stresses that Stalin 
looked after the safety of Soviet citizens. There have also been protests to the increase of 
memorabilia to Stalin personally. A recent case would be in the Siberian city of Surgut, where 
a new bust of Stalin was drenched in red paint to show he had ‘blood on his hands’. A few 
metres away from it is a memorial to victims of the terror. More paradoxically, the Stalin bust 
was funded by donations from the local community collected by the group Russkiy Dukh 
(Russian Spirit); 60% of Surgut are believed to support honouring Stalin.447  
 
d. The Great Patriotic War 
Before conducting a full biopsy of this, it is worth stressing that the emphasis on the Great 
Patriotic War is the result of Soviet politics forging an identity. This event became the first 
unifying force and painful memory in the USSR because it involved a mass mobilisation of the 
population to defeat another foreign invader. This sentiment remains and is relayed by 
government officials. As one Russian diplomat wrote ‘the Red Army saw what the Germans 
had done on their soil… almost every soldier had personal accounts to settle’.448 The 
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government recognises that this event still has a hold over the population and reflects a common 
trait in Russia’s historical identity with a moral message of perseverance. That in one of Russia’s 
darkest periods, they overcame the greatest challenge and liberated themselves. The Great 
Patriotic War reflects Putin’s belief in Russia being a sovereign independent country who is a 
leader on the world stage and whose traditional values are key in securing this. The same 
diplomat, Aleksandr Kramarenko, used similar language a year earlier when laying a wreath at 
the Soviet war memorial in London. Kramarenko stated that  
 
the enormity of that sacrifice, suffering and war effort made World War II a defining 
event in forging our national identity, a victory of the highest moral value order, 
which explains our positions on many issues of today…449  
 
Although numerous and large memorials exist throughout Russia, Moscow’s Park Pobedy has 
an interesting back-story that shows the complexity of handling Russian history in the post-
communist world. Though no public events took place commemorating the Great Patriotic War 
until 1965, the Soviet government decided on creating a memorial in 1947 at Poklonnaya Gora 
because it had the same juxtaposition for the Patriotic War of 1812 - a foreign aggressor 
attacking a peaceful minded Russia. Furthermore, the suddenness caused the population to 
become instantly mobilised and adds to the idea of a universal historic victory for the Soviet 
people.450 Nurit Schleifman compiled a detailed account surrounding the significance of the 
park and museum. There are two points to dissect in this regard. Before any such memorial or 
monuments could be erected, the Soviet population had to be educated of this glorious victory 
(as do the new Russians). As Schleifman notes, there was an instant struggle for interpretation 
of possession of memory.451 The involvement of the public and memory embedded in the Great 
Patriotic War meant the concept of ‘universal’ had to be just that. There is, therefore, a section 
at the museum on the second floor dedicated to the non-Russian nationalities. The USSR was 
not a wholly monolithic state so great care had to be taken in interpreting the contribution of the 
nationalities as equal. The same is also true of the allies and Stalin, both with their own sections. 
                                                          
449 Speech by Aleksandr Kramarenko, Russia’s Charge d’Affaires, a.i. at a wreath laying ceremony at the Soviet 
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This makes Park Pobedy a comprehensive monument to the war as a whole, opposed to 
individual battles, although, this comes with certain contractions, which will be discussed 
shortly. Secondly, and somewhat ironically, the monument was not completed until 1995, 
meaning the Soviet Union never told its own story of the Great Patriotic War; it would be told 
in a new language by a new country suffering from an identity crisis and culture shock.452 It 
should also be noted is that the architects and designs changed on a number of occasions, 
meaning so too did the interpretations of the war.453 Stalin’s title of ‘Brilliant Marshall’ also had 
to be changed to fit the times. Although the park is largely based on the 1978 designs, a 
Synagogue and Mosque were later added ‘democratically’ to fit this universal idea. With that 
being said, these are not in plain sight and the visitor has search for them beyond the museum 
deep into the park. The Orthodox Church, meanwhile, is off to the left at the forefront of the 
park, stressing the idea that whilst other groups make up a wider part of the Russian identity, to 
ignore its ancient symbol and identity enforcer is foolish.  
Although the Park was largely constructed outside the Putin era and cannot be considered as 
‘Putinist history’, it is certainly a useful marketing tool for the new narrative. At the end of ‘the 
hall of sorrow’ is a statue of a mourning woman on her knees with her dead son. The woman 
represents Mother Russia in a concrete personification with her son to serve as a representation 
of a soldier. Such a powerful image acts as a symbol of Russia’s great past and arguably, the 
Great Patriotic War is the greatest moment in recent history that embodies this. As Kramarenko 
stated, ‘as long as Russia exists, [we’ll] stand by that memory and the ideals our fathers and 
grandfathers fought for’.454  
In recent years, different forms of memorabilia have come out at incredible pace. Worthy of 
mention are the statue of Kalashnikov and the films White Tiger (2012), Panfilov’s 28 Men 
(2015) and Rubyozh (2018). The rifle named after its creator was labelled by Medinsky a 
‘cultural brand of Russia’ and embodiment of the best features of the Russian people.455 It is 
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also a symbol of the victory in the war and proof of the results of patriotic modernisation, which 
saved Russia from foreign threats. It also contributes to the mythological heroism surrounding 
the war. This is despite the fact Kalashnikov himself felt nothing but guilt for the deaths caused 
by his invention, as outlined in a letter to Patriarch Kirill.456 The films meanwhile are nothing 
but pure mythologising and fantasy. Asides from a scene of Hitler talking to Satan, the main 
character in White Tiger, an injured tank commander Naydyonov, has the power to communicate 
with tanks as if they are human. Panfilov’s 28 Men, on the other hand is based purely on a Soviet 
myth of guardsmen from the 316th rifle division (mostly Kazakh and Kyrgyz), killed by the 
Germans who outnumbered them after a valiant defense. Although pure myth, it shows 
solidarity and unity of Russian and Kazakh soldiers fighting together, with Medinsky calling 
those who interfere ‘filthy scum’.457 In other words, pointing out the inaccuracies, 
inconsistencies or the fact it is pure myth makes one unpatriotic and irresponsible. Rubyozh also 
follows similar lines; a young cynical businessman hindered by evacuation on Nevksy 
Pyatachok, ends up going back in time and finding himself in the middle of combat where he 
meets his grandfather. The fantasy element aside, the moral of this film is about loyalty to ones’ 
ancestors. All of these films, however, show a lack of real creativity as the message must be 
adhered to be considered successful.  
The last word has yet to be said on the Great Patriotic War in Russia, yet Park Pobedy continues 
to be used as the defining symbol of the narrative. It shows the sacredness and attempts to be all 
inclusive. It is not just a demonstration of the Soviet military and its power. The panoramas, 
artefacts and recreations of battles and Berlin after the Soviet offensive seeks to make the visitor 
feel a sense of triumph after misery and complete destruction of their motherland. Putin as 
Russia’s long serving leader is now what Anthony D. Smith refers to as the ‘bearer of myths’. 
Myths of a nation and its descendants can divide or unite a community whose identity and 
consciousness have different modes of myth making.458 Putin appears to be in pursuit of a mode 
of cultural nationalism which demands a special identity, and in Russia’s case, one of social 
solidarity and its links to the state. The Great Patriotic War therefore gives him legitimacy in an 
apparent quest to kindle what Smith calls the myth of regeneration (restoring the golden age).459 
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This is in line with Kalinin’s argument of ‘reinventing the wheel’ or ‘nostalgic modernisation’. 
Park Pobedy opened during the Yeltsin era and is linked to the ‘myth of decline’; a glorious past 
faded, its heroes oppressed and old virtues forgotten whereas nowadays, this glory is being 
restored through older, arguably, more effective means.  
 
Anniversaries as National Holidays 
 
As the subheading implies, many national holidays are linked to historical or artificially 
constructed ‘patriotic’ events. Though anniversaries go hand in hand with the historical 
narrative, most have become rather commercialised. A closer look at November 4 shows this. 
National Unity Day initially commemorated 1613 when the Romanov Monarchy came to power 
and overthrew the Polish ‘occupation’ of Russia. Today, the openness to history makes this is 
impossible to ignore, and the monument outside St. Basil’s Cathedral often makes it onto the 
official posters. Yet, the monarchy no longer rules Russia so it cannot be main purpose for 
celebration. It also marked the October revolution’s anniversary, and must be carefully tailored 
to towards the modern situation. Constructing this narrative is much harder; it has to be all 
inclusive and posters for this holiday are confused and generic. Some simply use the phrase, ‘s 
dnyom narodnogo edinstvo’ (with the Day of National Unity) and the tricolour flag. Others have 
females in the many national dresses of all the Russian peoples. According to a Levada poll in 
2015, 55% planned to celebrate neither National Unity Day nor the October Revolution 
anniversary. National Unity Day’s popularity rose from 12% in 2006 to 22% in 2015, suggesting 
patriotic fervour had risen.460 However, it cannot be claimed that historical patriotism was a 
factor. A combination of historical events under one holiday can create the appearance of 
continuation opposed to highlighting the disruptions, which occurred. This came up in Putin’s 
2014 speech at victory day: “The unbroken link between our generations is our immense 
national treasure and it is here that Russia’s strength and dignity lies.”461 There is a great deal 
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of consistency in this, too. When speaking at the National Unity Day itself, Putin in 2015 implied 
Russia is an omnipresent or spiritual being:  
 
Russia is our homeland. She is in our hearts, our acts and deeds. Our parents and 
children, our hopes our dreams… We are inseparable from our homeland and its 
ancient old spiritual roots… Our multi-ethnic nation has never been stopped by 
difficulties ahead… Based on our past experience, we can map our future horizons 
more clearly.462  
 
Despite this attempt, the fact that ordinary Russians do not consider this holiday of any real 
importance suggests the messaging behind it is hollow.  
The New Year’s Eve holiday, which was reinstated by Stalin in 1935, tends to play on the 
national culture and its ‘modern’ aspects. It is very common for the TV channels to invite 
Cossack choirs to perform or even have celebrities singing traditional folk songs.463 The show 
itself often gets political, such as in 2014 when three Russian celebrities sanctioned by the EU 
performed ‘song of the sanctions’.464 These types of performances reflect the attitude of a desire 
to see a strong Russia returned, one who can stand up in the world for its own interests, as 
championed in the Putin narrative. Naturally, the motives can be bought into question when 
celebrities perform or express such opinions on state owned channels watched by the majority 
of Russians.465 Not only is viewership high, polls show the majority of Russians tend to stay at 
home relaxing during the New Year period relaxing since 2005.466 Thus, the television channels 
have a huge opportunity to be ‘entertaining’ in their politicisation of the holidays.  
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Russia’s most important holiday after New Year’s Eve remains Victory Day (or May 9), further 
showing how over relied upon it is. The fact this is a state holiday (and not a public one) shows 
that this government is the heir to the victory. The irony is that this day is also associated with 
one of Russia’s most brutal leaders. Volgograd is renamed Stalingrad in six official 
celebrations467, but Stalin’s picture was banned from public celebrations in 2010 by Medvedev, 
who also confirmed Russian guilt over Katyn the same year. Analysing Putin’s speeches on 
Victory Day, no mention of Stalin is ever made. It would simply be too polarising and get 
unwanted attention from the Western media. It is also unsurprising that the two most important 
holidays are also the better orchestrated and planned as well as the most nationally solidifying. 
These are the two occasions where the president and Russian state has access to its possible 
widest audience. The year 2015 saw Putin’s speeches at the Victory Day Parade and New Year’s 
Eve stress the idea of tradition, security and benefitting the Motherland. In his speech on New 
Year’s Eve, Putin made remarks concerning the armed and labour forces whom the country 
depend upon and stressed that unity through times of trouble, like the Great Patriotic War, help 
the nation to meet such challenges and will always serve as examples.468 New Year’s Eve is less 
interfered with by the state, but the president’s speech is symbolic, as it become a tradition in 
the USSR – it is a part of this continuity factor. Victory Day gets equal international and 
domestic attention, and therefore serves as the ultimate showdown of historical patriotism, 
which can promote unity and security. The Soviet symbols, lavish military parades and Putin’s 
patriotic speeches are the tip of this iceberg.  
Non-official anniversaries are also important, but usually very small scale and essentially 
private. The deaths of Lenin and Stalin are participated in annually by communists, and happens 
right at the heart of the Russian capital. Wreaths and flowers (usually red carnations) are laid at 
the mausoleum and on Stalin’s grave (see below).  
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                                                                Figure 2: Anniversary of Stalin's death, Moscow 2013 
 
These are only reported on due to some international interest. The local population are usually 
at work oblivious to it all. Likewise, a festive liturgy on Peter and Paul’s day is a tradition, where 
the Patriarch leads a liturgy in the familial burial vault of the Romanov dynasty in St. Peter and 
Paul’s cathedral, St. Petersburg.469 As if by fate, this day also coincides with ‘Russia Day’ (June 
12), the national holiday for the Russian Federation commemorating the day the modern state 
was established. As polling shows, however, most Russians are indifferent towards Russia Day, 
with even fewer Russians taking the day off work.470 Russia was the only former Soviet republic 
to not gain independence from the USSR, as it is the successor state. It, therefore, lacks any real 
meaning to most people. Lawmakers, including Putin, have also pondered protection for 
‘unofficial symbols of Russia’, ordering fines for any insulting or defacing.471 This could be 
extended to monuments of leaders, as well as emblems, replicas and so on. The enforcement of 
such a law, however impractical, would indicate that history is completely untouchable. In other 
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words, while there could be more public celebrations and national holidays of a historical nature, 
civil society are likely to reject them, and organising this would take an immense effort.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In response to Sobchak’s statement at the beginning of this chapter, the Russian government 
believes it still needs ‘effective managers’ to legitimise the young state with a thousand year 
history. Recalling the terror too much undermines this. This chapter has shown that 
anniversaries and memorabilia come with a great deal of constraints, are focused around unity, 
sovereignty, security, patriotism, and play on nostalgia for an unexperienced glorious past. 
These are the ultimate reinforcement of the narrative and rarely fail to stray far from it, despite 
the complexities that arise in their construction and existence. While it may be too early to call 
such attempts as ‘successful’, in creating a new sense of pride among the population, the impact 
is undeniable and noticeable. Protests to remove controversial memorabilia are rare; in fact, 
Muscovites are more upset with the giant statue of Peter the Great on the Moscow River because 
it looks ‘ugly’. Festivals say a lot about a nation’s identity, but the nature in which they unfold 
is far more telling. For instance, no referendum on statues of Stalin’s were issued and there is 
little public say over the timing or features during anniversaries. They are laid on or established 
by the government, and civil society’s participation or lack thereof, is also evident. While parts 
of the narrative are accepted, many have still not trickled through and are sometimes viewed as 
mediocre. The mythologising is on occasion troubling, yet there is little to suggest that a 
majority of the population are confusing this for historical fact. There is evidence to show the 
state is willing to engage with the difficult sub plots of history in a lukewarm fashion, however.  
The anniversaries are used as a way of promoting the state’s narrative to form a new kind of 
identity, which the president hopes will create a secure, independent and sovereign nation full 
of loyal citizens. Civil society does participate in the funding and construction of monuments, 
and simultaneously, these come with equal criticism and indifference. While neither Putin nor 
any member of the cabinet take part in non-official events, these are not prohibited either. The 
conclusion that can be drawn here is that the state and society recognise these are important 
figures who cannot be written out of history. Then again, civil society shows the writing process 
is still on going. The imperial and Soviet past has been reignited in the public space to also 
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justify the present. Its leaders and controversial episodes are therefore presented as a historical 
necessity for Russia, and one which must still be come to terms with. It can also explain why 
the creative process involves reproducing and repackaging instead of originality.   
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Conclusion 
 Wet Cement in a New Wine Bottle 
 
Observing the bigger picture of history in Russia today, this thesis has shown that the glory days 
of Russian history can come from both the Imperial and Soviet period so long as they speak to 
the message of continuity, a strong state and the flourishing of Russian culture. Usually, this 
series of achievements assumes the form of state and military leaders, although it is not a 
requirement. The period under investigation has usable examples, which are exploited routinely 
and cautiously. A concrete narrative is beginning to form, but for now, it remains wet cement. 
The most usable periods are the end of the nineteenth century and Great Patriotic War, where 
most of the population can reach an agreement with the state. Unlike the Soviet era, whatever is 
conveyed in the public sphere, whether it is in the form of a textbook or monument, does not 
become the sole authority or unquestioned truth. Two things are apparent, however; history is a 
ready source for patriotism and the attitudes and narratives surrounding the period are 
inconsistent. The population are also aware of this. The country as a whole wants to feel good 
about itself after the fall of the USSR and the disappointments of democracy. Pride in a history 
that champions positive stories of strong leaders, a unique way of life, progression and military 
victories is a good starting point and reliable fallback. At least it can be when objectivity is not 
required to retell the story. The interviews conducted for this thesis found that teachers are prone 
to rejecting the message, particularly the younger generations who did not experience the Soviet 
system. While they are more malleable in the sense that all they know is the Russian Federation 
led by Vladimir Putin, this in itself is why rejection is possible. Unlike the Soviet era, the 
message is not strictly controlled or forced onto the population and contesting it is possible. The 
past has become extremely symbolic and led to the problem of over-mythologising. When 
nuance and inferred meanings become more important than historical fact, this could later be its 
own death sentence. Russia today is, after all, an open society with active social media users.  
Another paradox of the past in contemporary Russia is the lack of creativity in the creative 
process. There are plenty of new exhibitions, monuments, films, museums and restorations of 
old buildings that all utilise up to date technology and resources. In most cases, these represent 
a repackaged and recycled past rather than something brand new. Keeping the past familial 
credits the idea of continuity. The narrative is new in the sense that the Russian Federation now 
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has one, however, it is not original; pieces of the puzzle are collected and placed onto a canvas 
in a way the suits the government’s message. The phrase old wine in a new bottle does not 
exactly fit this scenario. The bottle is new, but the recipe has been adapted. The title of ‘Great 
Patriotic War’, for instance, portrayed Soviet exceptionalism during the victory effort. It is not 
the same as the Second World War, which began in 1939. Today, the continued sacralisation 
has the same goal but is Russia-centered. Also similar to the Soviet period, history is serving 
the state’s immediate needs.472 In only seeking to achieve national unity and a stable path to 
modernisation, the uncertain past makes the future seem even less so. ‘Sovereign democracy’ 
which is the ‘unique’ modern path, is fragile, imprecisely defined but is based on a particular 
formula.473 This formula, it is argued, is to reinterpret modernity from perspectives of the past. 
The often non-specificity surrounding it also provides some flexibility.  
This thesis has shown that the past is the most desirable resource to play on the identity of 
modern Russian citizens. The very idea of Russianness is strengthening ties to the myths that 
make up ‘Russia’ and support the past glories. Reasserting the founding myths and historic 
traditions that have continued and even flourished in a period of troubles in the twenty first 
century is utilised as proof of Russia’s greatness and unique place in the world. When Putin 
spoke of how Russia can have no other national idea but patriotism, he may as well have said 
that Russia cannot conceive of another. This is why rebranding and restoring cultural traditions 
has become the norm, and nostalgia is so important. To understand how Russia operates today, 
it is essential to understand it as a historic entity, who besides a former authoritarian communist 
state was once the ‘Third Rome’ and straddles Europe, Asia and the Middle East. That the many 
peoples of Russia have endured tremendous hardship and now live in a world where it has yet 
to find its place as it attempts to re-emerge as a great power. As the West becomes an 
increasingly less attractive alternative with the disillusionment of the EU and presidency of 
Donald Trump, history serves as a reminder of two things. First, that the two sides have never 
found a settlement, and second, it sells the idea to Russians that its place in the world is 
exceptional and incompatible with other systems.  
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To follow on from this, a recurrent question of this research is whether Russia is exceptional in 
its use of history for legitimisation purposes, nation building or consolidation. To claim this 
would be absurd, but more importantly, it misses the point. While Russia and Putin personally 
are not exceptional in this, the emphasis on historical continuity is to show the country’s 
exceptionality and uniqueness. This is, furthermore, in spite of its history being marred by 
discontinuities. The fact that this narrative remains wet cement shows Russia is still a nation in 
transition. Something else that set Russia apart from the West in reinterpreting its past is the 
question of morality. Whilst in Britain, for example, the imperial past is viewed from a moral 
position, in Russia it is not. Neither is the Soviet period. Looking at the past from a moral 
perspective further opens uncomfortable questions that could cause harm. Individuals or groups 
who drift from the ‘consensus’ are often labelled ‘unpatriotic’ or treacherous’.474 Selecting a 
historical period to draw moral lessons from is to hold it in higher regards than others. Whilst 
the heroism, sacrifice and immense bravery of the Great Patriotic War fits this, little else specific 
does. As such, ‘tradition’ as a blanket term is the basis for morality. The philosopher and Soviet 
critic, Aleksandr Zinoviev, whilst in exile 1978 perhaps best wrote about viewing the past 
through a moral lens:  
 
 
I became an anti-Stalinist when I was sixteen. Now, of course, everyone is an anti-
Stalinist. But, I, adhering to the rule that the dead cannot be my enemies, changed 
the orientation of my critique of reality. I began to study the Stalinist period as a 
scientist. And came to the conclusion that no matter what, it was a great period. It 
was horrible, tragic. Countless crimes were committed at that time. But the period 
as a whole was not criminal. If one judges history from the criterium of morality 
and law, then it must all be conceived as a crime. I do not justify the horrors of the 
Stalin period, I only defend its objective assessment. And I despise those today who 
make their fortunes criticizing a past that that neither threatens them, nor can defend 
itself. As they say, even a donkey can kick a dead lion.475  
 
                                                          
474 James Ryan, The Politics of National History; Russia’s Ruling Elite and the Centenary of 1917, Revolutionary 
Russia, June 2018, p.15  
475 A. Zinoviev quoted in Vladimir Pozner, Parting With Illusions, p.308 
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Viewing the past through morality opens up too many inconsistencies to bear. Zinoviev’s 
mother and her six sons, who lived and worked on the kolkhoz, would almost certainly have 
had a better life if not for Stalin. Instead, this illiterate woman’s sons became a colonel in the 
army, another the director of an industrial factory and three engineers. Morality is often 
irrelevant when the very existence of so many people was transformed. In the West, this 
statement would be hard for most to accept because our historical experience of struggling for 
greater freedoms is simply different to what most of the Russian population has endured.  
The education system’s priorities reveal that history is more symbolic than anything else, and 
says a lot about the stage of Russia’s political development. The system has merely been 
rebranded, and continues to stress patriotism. Likewise, the stress on patriotism as well as 
Putin’s presidencies began during a period of crisis. It has a way of hinting that the path to 
modernity and normalcy is not complete. The Soviet model of education is still viewed in a 
positive light and its practices continue to this day. This is in part, down to where education 
comes on the government’s list of priorities, but also nostalgia. The Soviet education system 
was one of the best in the world, with the exception that it did not allow the teaching of 
freethinking. Yet, this shows the priorities of education in Russia; freethinking is not 
discouraged, but neither is it the main goal, in the same way that objectivity is not the purpose 
of history; instead, it is cultivating love and respect to past glories of a great and unique country. 
Thus, the teachers are trained in this way. Rebranding the Soviet model also keeps a Russian 
character of education, and further attests to the patriotic programmes being purely symbolic. 
The population is supportive of the patriotic emphasis, as viewed with the growing importance 
of national holidays like May 9. Yet, schools and teachers seem largely unsure of what a patriotic 
project entails. The need for greater clarity adds to the notion of a past that is wet cement and 
the projects themselves are a recycled wine bottle.  
Teachers show that there will likely be another great transformation of Russian history, as those 
who lived in the USSR become fewer. The priorities of Russian society are changing, and the 
willingness to have a more open discussion about the past is growing. It will then be up to the 
state to either join the discussion or guide it in a more auspicious direction where it continues to 
maintain the upper hand. The interviews conducted and analysis of textbooks, exams and 
homework show that many complications still exist in relaying the past. While the aim is for 
textbooks to eventually become the ‘final say’ of the government, they tend to be used as a 
guideline and are not considered the sole authority – nor should they. The issue of textbooks 
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persists in political discussions showing that the battle is not yet over. These can still play a role 
in shaping the population’s historical consciousness. In some respects, shifting the focus from 
facts to historical patriotism changes the aim of history education to citizen building. The black 
and white binary of the past is unhelpful in this regard, as well, since ‘wrong’ or ‘falsified’ 
accounts of the past are unpatriotic. This is regardless of how historically accurate they are, or 
even if like the film My Good Hans (2015), they merely touch upon uncomfortable facts in an 
attempt to deal with them.476 This is also why teachers will continue to be trained to instill moral 
and ethical codes in the students. This is not unlike history in other nations, but as previously 
stated, the clear distinctions of wrong and right, true and false are designed to make Russia stand 
out from other European countries.  
There are clear splits in society which can undermine not only the historical narrative, but also 
the myth of a stable state in contemporary times. The state and population have still not fully 
reconciled with the more complex and darker sides of Russian history. Despite a government 
ordered monument to the victims of the terror finally being installed, as long as busts of Stalin 
continue to surface at the demand of civil society, the reconciliation process will never be 
complete. As this thesis was submitted, it was reported that gulag prisoner documents had been 
destroyed at the state’s order (something it denied).477 This aside, loyalty to the state (loyalty 
according to its own definition) will not come through negative depictions of the Soviet era, and 
the 1990s are repeatedly held up as proof of this. The growing nostalgia towards the USSR may 
prove another obstacle here.478 As previously outlined, repackaging the troublesome past in a 
less negative light is limiting Russians’ ability to identify with a democratic state, and stagnates 
the democratisation process. However, the elite, and Putin in particular, use history as their 
justification for governing a certain way. Putin wants democracy to work for Russia, and both 
he and his spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, have stated publically that they fear the population has 
not yet matured enough. Hence, a patriotic person is a responsible one and, therefore, will vote 
                                                          
476 My Good Hans tells the story of Russians and Germans cooperating during the Second World War, with the 
main hero, Hans, later returning to Russia as an invader. He eventually remembers that he was once in Russia 
before as a friend. Like Matilda, the film was not banned but it still attracted a lot of criticism and controversy in 
certain circles, and needed certain approvals from the War Historical Society; Alexander Mindadze (Dir.), My 
Good Hans, (Russia: Passenger Film Studio, 2015).  
477 ‘Terror snimayut s arkhivogo ucheta’, Kommersant, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3652040 accessed 
08/06/2017. 
478 A Levada poll (‘nostal’gia po SSSR’) in December 2017 revealed 58% of Russians still regret the collapse of 
the USSR and that nostalgia among all age groups remains high. The poll is available at 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/12/25/nostalgiya-po-sssr/  accessed 29/12/2017  
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‘correctly’. In other words, history shows that democracy cannot work in Russia with the wrong 
leaders. It is also important to stress that modernisation does not require democracy, and this 
period has two examples from which to draw from as ‘proof’ of this. Additionally, Russian 
history has several examples of when democracy has proven regressive, disruptive and chaotic. 
As mentioned, however, the shelf life of the current government’s stance is currently unknown 
and the upcoming generation will test this. Signs of change are apparent, too. At the time of 
writing, six of Russia’s eighty-five governors were under forty, as was a key economic 
minister.479 Their worldviews and experience of Russia’s past will shape it over the next few 
generations.   
Although anniversaries and memorabilia are the ultimate reinforcement and symbol of the 
narrative and designed for everyone, these usually represent the state or something about its 
legacy. Taking into consideration monuments and exhibitions to the Stalinist terror, there are 
few dedicated to the actual population. The ‘House on the Embankment’ and ‘Wall of Sorrows’ 
in Moscow both attest to the role of the NKVD, an organ of state power. What is more, both of 
these are in the city centre. By contrast, plaques with the names of its victims sit on Moscow’s 
outskirts. The Civil War monument is in a small town (Novocherkassk) that is relatively 
unknown and was not an obvious choice. By contrast the most recent monument to a Russian 
leader from the period under focus (Aleksandr III) was unveiled in Crimea. Although heroes of 
the Great Patriotic War are given their dues, many have been critical of how the state uses them. 
At the Victory Day parade on Red Square 2012, an elderly female veteran dressed as a general 
had previously been spotted wearing another uniform with a different rank and medals.480 The 
director of the state archives, Sergei Mironenko, also warned that while falsifications are 
inevitable, historical events should not be confused with ‘political considerations’.481 Recently, 
the ‘immortal regiment’ has become a widely popular and participated in event where Russians 
march through the main streets of their local towns carrying portraits of their relatives who 
fought in the war. The leadership, including Putin, also take part. A political consideration, this 
also adds to the sacralisation of those who fought for the motherland, yet equally highlights how 
over relied on the Great Patriotic War is as a unifier.  
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While this thesis has concentrated on history in Russia, the cross-disciplinary approach has shed 
light on other problems in the country as a whole. Russia’s place in the world has not been fully 
decided, and the nineteenth century traditions of querying this have returned. The geopolitical 
situation will determine much of how the historical narrative continues to develop and morph 
to the state’s immediate interests. Yet, this adds to the quasi-messainic mission of Russia, which 
has existed throughout the centuries. Russians are increasingly seeing themselves as separate 
from other civilisations, and are emphasising their ‘otherness’ as a viable alternative.482 
Secondly, this thesis has given some exposure to the socio-economic position of Russian 
citizens and how a patriotic past is used to soften their woes. This study suggests that these 
cannot be explained away by any past because this vast society is so diverse and split. Also, the 
past indicates that the state building process is not wholly complete, since while it is the new 
unifying force, it is all too often the replacement for the taboo. The construction and 
maintenance of democratic institutions must continue and should receive support from the 
international community. Although Russia has a democratic framework in place, it is quite 
dysfunctional and history plays a key role in explaining the reasons why. However, this is a 
double-edged sword. If Russia does not transition from ‘explaining’ its current situation to 
viable and popular solutions, democratisation and modernisation will not be realised. Likewise, 
the West must also have patience regarding this process and not keep rushing to criticise any 
setbacks as this often alienates Russians. The image of the West in Russia today is often as 
aggressive, hypocritical, triumphalist and condescending.483 Such an image plays into the hands 
of those who are inward looking and desire a socially and politically convenient history.  
Notwithstanding its limitations, this study does imply that the vulnerability of the state is not 
unfounded. As long as teachers are teaching to an exam specification, this has the ability to 
overshadow the patriotic message. If for no other reason, this is because students will be focused 
on passing YeGE with the right score and not taking much else into consideration. Another 
contributing factor is not including more teachers and professional historians in updating the 
school materials. Feeling left out of the modernsiation process could alienate a key demographic 
who are expected to ‘vote properly’ and transmit the message. The polarisation of society 
combined with the fragility of institutions also means that the situation is not as stable as the 
                                                          
482 Edwin Bacon, Inside Russian Politics, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2017), p.39  
483 Michael Kimmage, ‘How Russian Society Created Putin, Foreign Affairs, available at 
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state would like. A message that does not champion unity far enough or is polarising could 
expose this fragility and inflict self-harm further down the line. In addition, while criticisms of 
domestic policy from the international community are largely shrugged off, these are perceived 
as unhelpful and sometimes threatening.  
This thesis has several openings for further research, with three especially worth highlighting. 
As this study focused on a particular period, it was naturally unable to determine how much 
other periods impact the Russian identity and Putin Agenda. Other case studies to consider 
would be the Khrushchev Thaw and Brezhnev era. Two reasons in particular make this an 
interesting point of study. Firstly, both Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s leadership saw dramatic 
transformations in how the past is constructed. Stalin’s legacy had to be completely re-evaluated 
both times and the Great Patriotic War became increasingly used as the grounds for supporting 
much needed myths. The presence of both in the modern day and ways of approaching them 
began in the post-Stalin period and deserve greater study. Secondly, the period has been 
consistently ranked as an era of positive development by the majority of Russians under Putin.484 
This is likely down to economic support system and nostalgia for the quality of life, also 
supported in recent polls.485 This may be useful in deciphering what Russians expect from a 
future state and certain chapters of this thesis allude as to why. For instance, if wages remain 
low, the economy stays fixated around oil and gas, property prices continue to rise, the 
healthcare system deteriorate and less funding is provided for development in the regions it 
could lead to social unrest amongst a mobile population. There is less of an economic safety net 
in place, and should another economic catastrophe occur or the standard of living drop 
significantly, the fear of chaos could become a reality. These were not of concern for citizens in 
the 1960s and 70s, and Putin’s most recent presidential campaign focused on some of these 
issues, including increasing the minimum wage.486 Perhaps Putin is mindful of the upcoming 
generation whose experience mean it may demand more from their elected officials. As 
Perestroika shows, the message cannot be disjointed from reality and so a patriotic past is not 
an impenetrable mask for a lack of change.   
                                                          
484 ‘The Role of Personality in Russian History’, Levada, 26/01/2015 https://www.levada.ru/en/2015/01/26/the-
role-of-personality-in-russia-s-history/ accessed 31/12/2017  
485 54% responded to the question ‘what do you regret most about the collapse of the USSR?’ the destruction of 
the united economic system, ‘Nostal’gia po SSSR’, Levada, 25/12/2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/12/25/nostalgia-for-the-ussr/  accessed 27/12/2017  
486 ‘Everything you need to know about the monthly minimum wage in Russia’, TASS, 
http://tass.com/economy/983714  accessed 02/01/2017  
181 
 
Although this thesis assessed the homework tasks of schoolchildren, it is worth exploring what 
is absorbed in the classroom and actually gained in the learning process. The primary focus was 
on the projection of the message from above and how the narrative compliments the state’s 
agenda. The apparent lack of interest in taking history at school is worth further investigation 
and may provide additional indications as to whether the narrative is succeeding in convincing 
the population. One method worth considering is conducting diary studies of schoolchildren 
taking Russian history in the ninth and tenth classes. This is when they must decide whether to 
continue their history education and when the twentieth century enters the curriculum. Such a 
study would not only chart their progress, but also provide a more thorough understanding of 
how history lessons are conducted and what is actually learned. Limitations of such a study are 
the control factor, as it rests entirely on the participants’ shoulders. In this case, they would be 
schoolchildren, which in itself has limitations due to their age. Most importantly though, a diary 
study is just one person’s perspective, meaning the scale and recruitment of participants would 
require careful consideration.  
Russian history in former Soviet space has become prominent topic in recent years, particularly 
following the Colour Revolutions and events of Maidan 2013-2014. Most of the attention is 
centered on the Baltic States, Georgia and Ukraine, since their new national histories are based 
around casting Russia in a negative way. To increase Russia’s attractiveness in the former Soviet 
space, memory is heavily relied on, in particular the Great Patriotic War and Soviet economic 
support system. Russia is not the only former republic with bitter memories of aftermath of the 
Soviet collapse. Millions of people across the former Soviet space have left over nostalgia for 
the USSR because it provided them with more economic stability. Much of Central Asia now 
relies on wages earned in Russia by their citizens, whereas many Ukrainians and Moldovans 
also send money home from Europe and Russia alike. In addition, these countries were too once 
a part of a nuclear superpower, and are now considered second or third world countries. 
Maintaining attraction in the former Soviet space requires the continued importance of the 
Russian language, meaning it cannot lose its influence in the region. Ukraine recently passed a 
law requiring all school lessons be conducted in Ukrainian, despite three sizeable minority 
populations who operate numerous schools in their native language, including 621 in Russian.487 
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This is another area where history can be a negotiating space in geopolitics, and to Russia’s 
benefit via the promotion of a ‘shared history’. Then again, the Ukrainian government would 
argue this is precisely the reason to prohibit Russian language schools to avoid ‘indoctrination’ 
and attempting to disassociate children with the Ukrainian state. While Russia has been accused 
of attempting this with ‘compatriots’, there is also an underlying fear from the state that the 
West is attempting to do the same to its citizens.  
Many motors are driving the use of history in Russia today and it has not gone unnoticed. This 
has become an important component of Putin’s presidency for affirming the state and social 
order. The past is therefore a state policy aimed at establishing a national identity. For this 
reason, many areas have to be examined in order to grasp the scale of its importance and how it 
is often misrepresented. Continuity means not only the life of the state and its power, but also 
Russian culture, traditions and their attractiveness. Above all, what this thesis has demonstrated 
is that Russia has still not come to terms with this period. The available polling on the 1917 
revolutions and Stalin era supports this. Whether it is the lack of commemoration for the 
revolution’s centenary, the film Matilda or Stalin’s legacy, all suggest that the scars have not 
completely healed, and there is a great risk of reopening the wounds and causing great frictions 
among society. Most of the past’s reinterpretation is done at the state’s initiative and there is 
little outcry from civil society for investigations into crimes committed by the Soviet regime or 
to even restore the monarchy. This provides it with some breathing space and more flexibility 
in pushing the narrative it prefers. The period under focus and the last one hundred years of 
Russian history also compliment the Putin narrative. After a century which saw the fall of the 
monarchy, revolution, Stalin’s terror, the fall of the USSR, democracy’s disappointment, 
economic crises and almost total corruption, Putin was able to usher in a period of stability and 
use the glories of Russia’s past to weather any bad storms, as he did in the early 2000s and 
aftermath of Crimea. These references were also aided by the strengthening of the economy and 
restoration of order in the early to mid-2000s. As Andrei Kolesnikov wrote, the period Russians 
value the most is the present.488 Putin and his ‘new’ state after the disintegration of the 1990s 
have become the inheritors of all that is best about Russian history.   
                                                          
488 Andrei Kolesnikov, A Past That Divides Us, Carnegie Centre Moscow, available at 
www.carnegie.ru/2017/10/05/past-that-divides-russia-s-new-official-pub-73304  accessed 09/07/2018.  
183 
 
The Russian filmmaker, Andron Konchalovsky, perhaps put it best when he said that politics 
alone cannot change a mentality, citing the example of Stalin. Konchalovsky believes that Stalin 
ultimately failed to ‘modernise’ Russia (make it catch up with the West in ten years) because he 
believed that politics could change a mentality.489 At least, politics cannot immediately achieve 
this, and is arguably the best description of contemporary Russia. History in Russia today is the 
best indication of where Russia is as a nation; it continues to define itself by the past. However, 
this raises two important questions that are appropriate to end on. Can a country modernise 
successfully if it is solely defined and bound by a rigid interpretation of its history? Secondly, 
is the end goal merely morphing into an updated version of itself? Modernisation and 
reconciliation does not simply mean moving on without a discussion, nor is this possible. This 
period will not be forgotten or lost in the pages of history, and neither should it. As with many 
things in Russian life, the past is adapted to, which auspiciously sums up the answer to this 
thesis. History is used in Putin’s Russia for adapting to modernity.  
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Appendix A 
Letters from the Ministry of Education asking for an additional thirty days to respond to the 
author’s request for interview and to send in the interview questions.  
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
Mozhem Povtorit’ (We can repeat). 
 
This vulgar meme appeared on social media following the Annexation of Crimea. Many 
Russians even bought it in the form of car stickers, see at <http://xn--2-8sbpmeecfp.xn--
p1ai/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BC-
%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-
%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F-2.html> 
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Appendix C 
A sample YeGE paper in a self study book, this question asks students to name which of the 
monuments were built during the reign of the same leader. This is followed by part two, where 
students must read a historical extract and then complete short answer questions.  
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Appendix D 
  
 
 
Krym v istorii Rossii (Crimea in the History of Russia) 
 
A textbook on the history of Crimea published following the annexation. The textbook itself is 
actually very slim.  
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Front cover of Dannilov’s ninth class textbook 
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Appendix G 
 
 
 
  
 
O.V. Volubuev’s tenth class textbook.  
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Appendix G 
 
  
 
 
 
The front page of a tenth class student’s written essay from NOU Vladimir Orthodox 
Gynasium. The theme is on Nicholas II and was awarded a ‘5’ by the teacher.  
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Appendix H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the exhibition ‘Constructivism For Children’. Here are two of the flyers and a book (title 
unknown) on how to cross a busy street.  
 
 
 
213 
 
Appendix I  
                               
 
Moya Istoriya at VDNKh. In the window of the entrance (left) is a billboard with Aleskandr 
III and his famous quote ‘Russia has only two allies: the army and navy’. At the end of the 
exhibition is one of President Putin (right). The quote reads: ‘too often in our national history, 
instead of opposing power, we are confronted by opposition to Russia itself. And we know 
how it ended: the demolition of the state as we knew it’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
